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     “Is it not for us to confess that in our civilized attitude towards death we are 
once more living psychologically beyond our means, and must reform and 
give truth its due? Would it not be better to give death the place in actuality 
and in our thoughts which properly belongs to it, and to yield a little more 
prominence to that unconscious attitude towards death which we have 
hitherto so carefully suppressed? This hardly seems indeed a greater 
achievement, but rather a backward step…but it has the merit of taking 
somewhat more into account the true state of affairs.” 
 
-Freud, 1915   
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Portfolio abstract 
 
There is a high prevalence of distress amongst cancer patients, with up to 40% 
reporting clinically-significant levels of distress, such as depression, anxiety, 
and death anxiety. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has a growing 
evidence base in health populations, such as in diabetes and chronic pain, 
counteracting the avoidant behaviours which are negatively implicated in 
outcomes. ACT claims that experiential acceptance is key to shifting the 
avoidant responses people exhibit towards their inner experiences and 
psychological pain. Thus far, there is limited research exploring ACT processes 
within a cancer population. Traditional existentially-informed theory has claimed 
that accepting death anxiety would be psychologically paralysing and that 
mortality must be defended against, yet evidence for acceptance suggests the 
opposite. This study therefore aimed to explore the relationship between 
acceptance and outcomes of quality of life and distress in a cancer population, 
in order to explore the implications for an accepting response style, and also 
whether avoidant or approach response styles were implicated in better or 
worse psychological outcomes.   
 
Using a longitudinal design, six standardised questionnaires, well-utilised in 
cancer populations, were issued to 72 adults with experience of cancer, 
measuring clinical variables, cancer appraisals, response styles, and both 
quality of life and distress outcomes. The addition of a follow-up questionnaire, 
completed by 31 participants after three months, allowed for predictive and 
cross-lag analyses to be carried out. Results showed acceptance to be an 
independent explanatory and predictive response style variable for both quality 
of life and distress outcomes, in the direction of psychological health. ‘Avoidant’ 
response styles were negatively implicated in outcomes, and many ‘approach’ 
response styles other than acceptance did not reach correlational significance 
with outcome variables. Acceptance and avoidant response styles remained 
stable over time, whilst outcomes continued to change, and acceptance was 
thought to be driving future outcomes in a one-way direction. 
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The findings support the notion that experiential acceptance is implicated in 
beneficial psychological outcomes for cancer populations, rather than being 
detrimental to functioning, as suggested by existential theorists. Acceptance 
demonstrated significantly more influence over outcomes than either disease 
characteristics or threatening illness appraisals, and may influence future 
functioning. Furthermore, avoidant responses to cancer-related experiences 
were negatively implicated in psychological distress and also quality of life, 
which continued to deteriorate over time despite avoidant response styles 
remaining stable. Acceptance may be a helpful and influential response style, 
given that it predicts and potentially influences future functioning, and may 
provide a reasonable treatment target for psychological intervention with cancer 
patients, over and above the direct targeting of cancer appraisals.   
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Abstract 
 
 
Objective. 40% of cancer patients may experience clinically-significant levels of 
distress, yet evidence for appropriate psycho-oncological interventions remains lacking. 
This study aimed to explore acceptance, as defined by acceptance and commitment 
therapy (ACT), in cancer patients. Primary aims investigated whether acceptance was 
related to and predictive of better quality of life and distress outcomes, and whether 
acceptance interacted with cancer appraisals to influence outcomes.  
Design. Longitudinal, quantitative design with a follow-up after three months. 
Participants completed a battery of questionnaires at times one and two.  
Measures. 72 participants completed standardised questionnaire batteries comprising: 
Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire; Brief COPE; Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire II; Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Functional Assessment of 
Cancer Therapy – General (FACT-G); and Death Anxiety Scale (DAS). 31 participants 
repeated the battery after three months. 
Results. Acceptance was an independent explanatory and predictive variable for quality 
of life and distress scores, in the direction of psychological health, and predicted 
functioning over time. Acceptance had greater explanatory power for outcomes than 
either cancer appraisals or avoidant response styles, including denial and self-
distraction. Avoidant response styles showed significant associations with outcomes, 
but in the directions of greater distress and poorer quality of life.  
Conclusions. The findings support the role of an accepting response style in improved 
psychological outcomes. Avoidant responses were consistently related to poorer 
outcomes in a population with distress and death anxiety. Acceptance predicts 
functioning, and is supported as a helpful response style for cancer patients.  
 
 
Key words: ACT, Acceptance, Death, Cancer, Quality of Life, Distress 
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Introduction 
 
Cancer and experiential distress  
In the UK, an estimated fifty percent of people born post-1960 will experience cancer in 
their lifetimes (Cancer Research UK, 2014). During the phases of diagnosis, treatment, 
and remission, as many as 75% of cancer patients experience psychological distress 
(Cardy et al., 2006), reduced quality of life (QoL) (Ciarrochi, Fisher, & Lane, 2011), 
and heightened levels of anxiety, grief, pain, fatigue, death anxiety, and depression 
(Barraclough, 1999).
 
Such difficulties are thought to become clinically significant in 
30%-40% of patients (Cardy et al., 2006; Ciarrochi et al, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2011), 
yet there remains a wide gap between recommended levels of psycho-oncological care, 
and the 10% of patients who actually receive it (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence, 2004; Ramachandra, Booth, Pieters, Vrotsou, & Huppert, 2009). Distress in 
cancer patients may be a response to real or threatened loss across many domains, such 
as physical wellbeing, body image, self-esteem, independence, work, role, relationships, 
sexual function, and life expectancy.   
 
Although survival rates are continually improving, cancer remains a very real threat to 
life, killing 162,000 people in the UK annually (Cancer Research UK, 2014). Many 
cancer patients consequently report intrusive thoughts and worry in relation to their 
survival, and preoccupation with existential thoughts and death anxiety (Adelbratt & 
Strang, 2000). Patients may also experience trauma and grief reactions when confronted 
with their existential vulnerability, with those who try to avoid cancer-related cognitions 
and behaviours at greater risk of distress (Angiola & Bowen, 2013). Death anxiety is 
described as “an emotional reaction involving subjective feelings of unpleasantness and 
concern”, evoked by “the anticipation of a state in which the self does not exist” 
(Hoelter, 1979; Tomer & Eliason, 1996), and correlates with general anxiety, 
depression, and perceived shortened life expectancy
1
. Death anxiety may also occur 
alongside sadness, hope, and despair (Ciarrochi et al., 2011).  
 
Although distress occurs across the disease trajectory, advanced cancer patients may 
experience different appraisal and response styles (Rinaldis, Pakenham, Lynch, & 
Aitken, 2009), higher rates of distress (Vodermaier, Linden, MacKenzie, Greig, & 
Marshall, 2011), and high death anxiety (Adelbratt & Strang, 2000; Neel, Lo, Rydall, 
Hales, & Rodin, 2015). Patients with aggressive or late-stage pancreatic, lung, and 
prostate cancers report greater levels of distress and suicidal risk (Bill-Axelson et al., 
2010; Zabora, BrintzenhofeSzoc, Curbow, Hooker, & Piantadosi, 2001), as the 
subjective and objective threat to life increases. It is logical to suggest that levels of 
distress and anxiety may therefore augment in line with worsening prognosis and 
perceived severity of the disease (Gao, Bennett, Stark, Murray, & Higginson, 2010; 
Rinaldis et al., 2009), and that increasingly-proximal threats to life may affect appraisal, 
response styles, and distress. It is also clear that not everyone with cancer experiences 
acute emotional suffering, even at the end of life, and that there are probable 
mechanisms, beyond objective disease status, which influence acute distress and 
warrant further investigation.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of distress measurement in cancer populations, see Extended Paper (EP) 1.1 – 
1.1.2 
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Terror Management Theory, ACT, and response styles in cancer 
Some research has suggested that death anxiety results from unresolved psychological 
distress and maladjustment, rather than from simply having cancer (Gonen et al., 2012). 
Conversely, Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 
1986) suggests that death anxiety is innate and universal, with the degree of death 
awareness varying between individuals; potentially being higher in those whose lives 
are more threatened by disease
2
. TMT suggests we must stave off the ‘terror of death’ 
through the defensive mechanisms of thought suppression, cultural belonging, and self-
esteem (Greenberg et al., 1986); the latter providing significance, meaning, and a sense 
of permanence (Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2007). The idea of meaning-making is also 
incorporated within models of grief (Hall, 2011; Jim & Andersen, 2007; Tolstikova, 
Fleming, & Chartier, 2005); implying that a breakdown in the defensive strategies of 
meaning-making and self-esteem bring the terror of death into awareness. TMT 
suggests that defences must therefore be strengthened, to alleviate this distress, and to 
facilitate psychological survival and functioning (Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2007), yet 
the negative effects of such avoidant response styles upon psychological outcomes may 
be severe.  
 
Defence mechanisms are akin to avoidant response styles
3
, used in the attempt to ward 
off the internal experiences associated with cancer. According to TMT this avoidance is 
key to psychological survival, but emerging evidence for the role of acceptance in 
physical health populations supports an alternative model of psychological functioning 
and intervention. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (pronounced “ACT”) (Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011) suggests that avoidance of inner experiences, such as death 
anxiety, comes at a high cost to the individual, and does not provide a successful or 
protective long-term solution. Attempts to suppress thoughts have been shown to 
heighten their frequency and emotional salience (Hayes et al., 2011), and as a corollary, 
problematic avoidance behaviours increase (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 
2015), through attempts to escape an increasing number of anxiety-eliciting related 
stimuli
4
.  
 
Accordingly, avoidant responses, including denial, disengagement, self-blame, and 
emotion-focused control, are associated with anxiety, depression, lower treatment 
compliance, and poorer quality of life in cancer patients (Carver et al., 1993; Hulbert‐
Williams, Storey, & Wilson, 2015; Nipp et al., 2016; Šoštarič & Šprah, 2004; Stanton, 
Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-Burg, 2000). Approach-oriented responses, which facilitate 
the expression of affect, are instead linked to better adjustment and quality of life in 
cancer (Stanton et al., 2000). Furthermore, research has implicated the role of illness 
appraisals in determining distress, yet attempts to directly modify these appraisals, as 
might be applied in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, encounter the same limitations as 
thought-suppression (Vilardaga, Hayes, Atkins, Bresee, & Kambiz, 2013). Attempting 
to modify appraisals may also be inappropriate, for example, when thoughts about the 
end of life may be accurate, rather than dysfunctional. This scenario warrants an 
alternative route for intervention, providing scope to investigate whether cancer- and 
death-related thoughts and feelings can be safely accepted and experienced, rather than 
avoided.  
                                                 
2
 For death anxiety, ACT and TMT, see EP 1.2 – 1.2.2 
3
 For coping and response styles, see EP 1.3 – 1.3.4 
4
 For an overview of the role of verbal language in experiential avoidance, see EP 1.4 
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Accepting distress in cancer 
ACT
5
 belongs to the ‘third-wave’ family of cognitive and behavioural psychotherapies, 
and seeks to change relationships to psychological events, rather than to directly lessen, 
control, or substitute the events themselves
6
 (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 
2006; Hayes et al., 2011). In contrast to TMT, ACT would therefore suggest that 
attempts to avoid and control painful cancer-related inner experiences inadvertently 
create a state of suffering and unhelpful ‘experiential avoidance’. Thus, we cannot and 
should not attempt to avoid psychological pain, which is a normal and ubiquitous part 
of life, as the ensuing struggle with avoidance narrows our engagement with valued 
behaviours and creates suffering (Hayes & Smith, 2005).  
 
One of the six, interconnected core processes
7
 in the ACT model of psychological 
flexibility is acceptance
8
.  In ACT, acceptance is not a state of tolerance or resignation, 
but a willingness to allow all thoughts and feelings to occur without judgement or 
avoidance; an attitude and process detrimental to taking healthy, valued action. 
Acceptance is therefore the opposite to the experiential avoidance thought to underpin 
poor psychological health, anxiety, and depression
9
 (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010), and 
also diametrically opposed to the response styles advocated by TMT. Through 
acceptance and mindfulness processes, people become free to engage in more valued 
activities (Ciarrochi et al., 2011), and experience lower levels of depression, increased 
coping, and reduced pain behaviour (Jacob, Kerns, Rosenberg, & Haythornthwaite, 
1993). Understanding acceptance may be particularly relevant to health populations, 
where an unwillingness to experience painful thoughts and feelings has been shown to 
predict psychological distress, depression, disability, and persistent pain (McCracken, 
1998).  
 
This research explores whether acceptance may be an alternative and beneficial 
approach to the avoidance of death and cancer-related experiences. High levels of death 
anxiety in cancer patients suggest that any ‘defences’ have become ineffective, and may 
serve the function of experiential avoidance. When death-related thoughts and feelings 
augment in response to the threat of cancer, defences and experiential avoidance may 
escalate, proliferating suffering (Hayes et al., 2011). Thus, suffering is the result of an 
avoidant response to internal experiences, rather than a direct corollary of those internal 
experiences themselves. Furthermore, TMT suggests that valued behaviours should be 
increased as a defensive strategy against death-related feelings, though this may only 
serve to increase experiential avoidance (Ciarrochi et al., 2011). How then, to enable 
valued living, as both ACT and TMT suggest, if this only serves to increase avoidance 
and the salience of distressing internal experiences? Acceptance is one potential 
solution, and when adopted, means that engaging in activities no longer functions as an 
avoidance strategy. Instead, valued activities are undertaken alongside the psychological 
pain that is evoked by cancer’s threat to life expectancy and the experience of personal 
loss. Given the deleterious impact of experiential avoidance, the acceptance of death 
anxiety and cancer-related inner experiences may relate positively to psychological 
                                                 
5For an overview of ACT’s background, see EP 1.5  
6
 For an overview of ACT’s epistemological position, see EP 4.1 – 4.2.1 
7
 For five of the core processes of ACT, see EP 1.6 – 1.6.5 
8
 For acceptance, see EP 1.7 – 1.7.3 
9
 For an ACT conceptualisation of psychopathology and wellbeing, see EP 1.8 
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flexibility, distress, and quality of life. Furthermore, as death anxiety is not acute in all 
cancer patients, this may indicate that certain response styles are implicated in better or 
worse psychological outcomes.  
 
Present study 
In physical health populations, ACT is effective for chronic pain, addictions, psychosis, 
diabetes, HIV, and epilepsy (e.g. Davis, Morina, Powers, Smits, & Emmelkamp, 2014); 
reducing distress and improving quality of life. Although studies into ACT and cancer 
remain few, initial research is promising and nascent (Hulbert‐Williams et al., 2015; 
Low et al., 2016), with evidence for mindfulness interventions in cancer slightly better 
established (Piet, Würtzen, & Zachariae, 2012). Existing ACT studies have often 
recruited for specific types or stages of cancer, with female breast cancer patients being 
over-represented, and those with advanced cancer or in remission being under-
represented (Rand et al., 2012; Stanton, 2012). Studies are frequently of cross-sectional 
design, potentially limiting the generalisability of results and opportunities to consider 
changes in response processes over time. A need for longitudinal and processual studies 
on ACT in cancer has been identified (Dunne et al., 2016; Rand et al., 2012), with this 
paper marking only the fourth non-interventional study of ACT in cancer, in order to 
better understand the processes underpinning ACT interventions in this population. 
There have also been calls for research into appropriate psychotherapeutic approaches 
in palliative populations (Zimmermann, 2012); a sample included within this study
10
.  
 
As ACT is effective for treating problems relevant to cancer patients, such as anxiety 
and depression, it seems plausible to investigate ACT processes within this population, 
particularly given the death-avoidant strategies recommended by TMT. Acceptance-
based interventions may provide a plausible alternative to these avoidant response styles 
in cancer patients (Hulbert-Williams et al., 2015), and this study aimed to investigate 
this premise by examining the relationships between acceptance, distress, and quality of 
life in a broad sample of cancer patients.   
Methods 
 
Aims and design 
The primary aims of this study were 1) to discover whether acceptance was related to 
quality of life and distress outcomes in cancer patients, and 2) whether acceptance 
moderated any relationship between cancer appraisal, and quality of life, and distress 
outcomes (Figure 1). Secondary aims were to examine 3) whether sample 
characteristics and alternative response styles were also related to quality of life and 
distress outcomes, and 4) any temporal relationships between acceptance and outcomes, 
across time points one and two.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 For a review of the evidence for psycho-oncological interventions, see EP 1.9 -1.9.1 
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 Figure 1: A priori conceptual model of the variables examined in the study 
 
The study used a longitudinal, quantitative design. Participants completed several 
demographic and clinical questions, and a battery of six standardised questionnaires
11
, 
which measured cancer appraisal, response styles, and both psychological distress and 
quality of life. The study was granted ethical approval by the University of Lincoln and 
an NHS Ethics Committee
12
, with R&D approved locally by four participating NHS 
trusts.   
 
Participants and procedure 
A priori power calculations estimated that at least 32 participants were needed to detect 
an acceptance-quality of life correlation with a medium effect size (based on a 
correlation derived from previous research (Hulbert-Williams et al., 2015). The 
calculation was based on an alpha of 0.05 (p<0.05), a power of 0.80, and was also of 
sufficient power to detect medium effect sizes or larger with the inclusion of 16 
potential predictor variables in the regression analyses ( = .05,  = .80). Over-
recruiting was deemed desirable, to allow for attrition and to power any later 
multivariate analyses (which were contingent on the correlational outcomes). 74 
participants were recruited at time one, but two data sets were excluded due to having 
missing data on over 20% of the questionnaire; a threshold utilised elsewhere in 
research (e.g. Gillanders, Sinclair, MacLean, & Jardine, 2015). Pairwise deletion was 
used appropriately for the remaining items with missing data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007), as the relatively few missing data (7.4%) was shown to be concentrated across a 
few variables and missing completely at random (MCAR), as established by Little’s test 
(x
2
 =321.54, df=283, p=.057).   
 
Participants with current or historic cancer were invited to the study via one of two 
recruitment streams. They were either identified and approached by NHS clinical 
gatekeepers, or self-selected via advertisements placed online. Clinical gatekeepers 
were recruited from hospitals, hospices, and community services in Nottinghamshire, 
from where they identified potential participants and distributed questionnaire packs. 
Packs contained participant information sheets, consent forms, questionnaire batteries, 
and return envelopes. Online participants were targeted through adverts placed on social 
media platforms and cancer support websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Cancer 
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ESTABLISHED 
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Cancer appraisal & 
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OUTCOME 
MEASURES: 
Psychological 
distress & QoL 
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Chat. Online participants were provided with the same information as paper 
participants, which they accessed via a link to an online survey programme. Consenting 
participants were eligible if they were over 18 years old, had experience of cancer, and 
lived in the UK. All participants were invited to take part in a follow-up questionnaire, 
which took place three months after initial participation. The overall sample size was n= 
72 for time one, and n= 31 for the follow-up. The online and paper samples were 
similarly sized: 48% of total participants completed paper questionnaires, and 52% 
completed online questionnaires. Whilst the online sample contained significantly more 
younger, female participants than the paper sample, there were no significant 
differences between samples in terms of cancer stage or number of previous cancers.  
 
Measures 
A questionnaire battery was administered to measure three domains: predictor variables 
(demographics, cancer characteristics, and appraisals); response style variables 
(responses to appraisals); and outcome variables (quality of life and distress) (see Table 
1). 
  
 1 2 3 
Theoretical 
category 
Established predictor 
variables 
Response style 
variables 
Outcome variables 
 
 
Conceptual 
targets 
Appraisal-focused 
measures; 
The experience of 
having cancer  
 
 
Response-focused 
measures;  
Response styles to 
cancer-related 
appraisals  
Psychological 
outcome measures 
Measurement 
targets 
Demographic and 
clinical variables; 
cancer characteristics 
& beliefs 
 
Acceptance and 
alternative response 
styles 
 
Quality of life and 
distress 
 
Measures used Brief IPQ 
Age 
Education 
Religion/spirituality 
Psychological support 
Bereavement 
Cancer site 
Cancer stage 
No.  previous cancers 
 
AAQ II 
 
Brief COPE 
FACT-G  
 
HADS 
 
DAS 
 
 
Table 1: Theoretically-informed measurement framework and the measures used in 
each category.  
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The following standardised measures of appraisal, response styles, and outcomes were 
issued
13
:  
 
Appraisal measure: Brief Illness Perception Questionnaire (Brief IPQ) 
 
The Brief IPQ (Broadbent, Petrie, Main, & Weinman, 2006) is a nine-item 
questionnaire assessing the cognitive and emotional representations of illness. It is 
quick to administer and therefore suitable for populations who may feel unwell (Ng, 
2012), and has good test-retest and discriminant reliability, and predictive and 
discriminant validity (Van Oort, Schröder, & French, 2011). Cronbach’s alpha was low 
(α=.38), but the scale was adapted to the population as recommended (Broadbent et al., 
2015), and remains common in studies of health populations. 
 
Scale items were made specific to a cancer population, e.g. by substituting the wording 
of ‘illness’ for ‘cancer,’ and to improve the comprehensibility of items 3, 7, 8, and 9 as 
recommended (Broadbent et al., 2015). The anchoring system was also adapted to that 
of the IPQ-Revised, as research had previously identified that the existing 0-11 ratings 
scale was unsuitable for those with short-term prognoses when answering the timeline 
item (Price et al., 2012). The five-item Likert scale from the IPQ-Revised was therefore 
adopted, with response anchors of ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree.’ The IPQ-
Revised also has good psychometric properties for the cancer population (Ashley et al., 
2013). Higher Brief IPQ scores reflect a more threatening view of the illness.  
 
Response style measures: 
 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire II (AAQ II) 
 
The AAQ II (Bond et al., 2011) is a seven-item measure of psychological flexibility and 
acceptance, and in this study was scored in the direction of higher scores indicating 
greater experiential acceptance (rather than experiential avoidance). Use of the AAQ II 
is well-established in the ACT literature, and has been deemed to be of satisfactory 
reliability and validity in general research and with cancer populations (Bond et al., 
2011; Feros, Lane, Ciarrochi, & Blackledge, 2013). Cronbach’s α was established at 
.85.  
 
Brief COPE 
 
The Brief COPE (Carver, 1997) measures coping (response) styles across 28 items on a 
Likert scale. Although the author does not specify aggregates for the fourteen response 
styles assessed, later research has suggested problem-focused coping, and active 
emotion/avoidant emotion coping (Gillanders et al., 2015). The Brief COPE has been 
used in cancer populations of varying cancer sites and stages, and has adequate validity 
and reliability for cancer populations (Yusoff, Low, & Yip, 2010), with Cronbach’s α 
reaching .82 in this study. Higher scores reflect greater use of particular response styles. 
 
Outcome measures: 
 
Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy - General (Fact-G) 
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The FACT-G (Cella et al., 1993) is a widely-used measure of cancer-related quality of 
life (Ciarrochi et al., 2011) across four domains on a Likert scale: emotional, functional, 
physical, and social. It has total score reliability within the range of .80-.96, and good 
validity; established across cancer subtypes (Webster, Cella, & Yost, 2003), and 
through correlations with other health-related quality of life measures, mood, and 
anxiety (Luckett et al., 2011). Cronbach’s α ranged between .77 and .86 for each 
subscale. Higher scores suggest better cancer-related quality of life. 
 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) 
 
The HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) is a 14-item measure of anxiety and depression, 
widely used and validated in a range of patient populations, including different cancer 
subtypes, and palliative and non-palliative populations (Mitchell, Meader, & Symonds, 
2010; Vodermaier, Linden, & Siu, 2009). The HADS has high validity and reliability 
for cancer populations (Mitchell et al., 2010), and is an effective screening tool for 
anxiety and depression (Mitchell et al., 2010). Higher scores represent increased levels 
of anxiety and depression, with subscale scores above 11 indicating clinical 
significance. Cronbach’s α = .76.  
 
Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) 
 
The DAS (Templer, 1970) uses a fixed choice, true/false format to assess attitudes 
towards death on 15 items. The DAS is a brief measure, which has internal validity, 
test-retest reliability (Templer, 1970), and remains the most widely-used measure of 
death anxiety. Cronbach’s α was .77. The DAS has been used in both palliative and 
non-palliative cancer populations (e.g. Gonen et al., 2012; Royal & Elahi, 2011), and 
has also been validated internationally in non-health populations (Nia et al., 2014). 
Higher scores indicate increased death anxiety, with a cut-off score of 7.  
 
Data analyses 
Time One: Preliminary analyses allowed for exploration and assumption checks
14
 to be 
carried out on the data, using IBM SPSS Statistics (version 22.0). Correlation analyses 
using Pearson’s r were carried out to examine any relations between demographic and 
outcome variables, and between established predictor, response style, and outcome 
variables. Research aims 1 and 3 were met through the use of hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses, with aim 2 addressed through the use of moderation modelling, 
using PROCESS for SPSS (Hayes, 2013; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Statistical tests 
were two-tailed with alpha set at .05. Variables which did not significantly correlate 
with at least one response style and one outcome variable were suppressed, i.e. 
excluded, from regression analyses, as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). This 
condition and exclusion reduced the number of predictors in analyses and preserved 
statistical power
15
.  
 
Time Two: Preliminary paired samples t-tests were carried out to establish whether any 
significant changes in scores had occurred between time points one and two. Aim 4 was 
met through the use of partial correlations, hierarchical multiple regression analyses, 
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and moderation modelling between time points one and two, with time one outcomes 
controlled for in each time two analysis. Cross-lag panel correlations of acceptance and 
outcome variable scores were carried out, to examine whether temporal and causal 
inferences could be drawn from the paths between data sets at two points in time.   
Results
16 
 
Participant characteristics  
At time one, 72 participants completed a battery of questionnaires, generating an 
attrition rate of 2.7%. The sample comprised 41 females, and 31 males (see Table 2). 
58% of participants were over 50 years old, with a modal age range of 65-74 years. 
There was a wide range of cancer sites reported, the most common of which were: 
breast (28%), prostate (26%), bowel (13%), lung (10%) and ‘other’ (23%); the latter 
including blood, ovarian, neck, and pancreatic cancers. 75% of participants knew the 
stage of their cancer, and of these, 33.3% reported stage I or II cancers, and 41.6% 
reported stage III or IV. Stage I cancers are relatively small, and contained within the 
organ of origin, whereas stage II cancers are also contained, but are larger tumours. 
Contrastingly, stage III cancers are larger again, and may have started to spread to 
surrounding tissues. Stage IV cancers - ‘metastases’ – are defined as having spread to 
other organs in the body. 25% of participants reported having secondary cancers (stages 
3 or 4), and 24% of participants had had cancer at least once before. 11 participants had 
previously taken part in other research, some of which investigated the psychological 
impact of survivorship. The most common attributions participants cited for having 
cancer were lifestyle factors, such as being overweight, having a poor diet, not 
exercising, and being stressed.  At time two, a follow-up rate of 53% (n= 31) was 
obtained and calculated based on participants who had consented to the follow-up and 
went on to complete it. Three participants died between times one and two. Similar to 
the make-up of the time one sample, the most common cancers reported were breast 
(26%), prostate (16%), and blood (10%), with 23% of participants reporting secondary 
cancers, and 13% having experienced more than one episode of cancer. There were no 
significant differences between the demographic or clinical variables between time one 
and time two samples.  
 
60% of the sample reported clinically significant levels of distress, as measured by 
HADS scores reaching 8 or above (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), and 44% experienced 
high death anxiety, as measured on the Death Anxiety Scale, equalling or exceeding a 
cut-off score of 7. A further 31% of participants obtained scores of experiential 
avoidance in a range commensurate with clinically-relevant psychological distress, i.e. 
scores which exceed 24, when the AAQ II is scored in the direction of experiential 
avoidance (Bond et al., 2011).  
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Sample demographics Sample (N=72) Percentage % 
 
Gender 
  Male 
  Female 
 
31 
41 
 
43.1 
56.9 
Age range 
  18-24 
  25-34 
  35-44 
  45-54 
  55-64 
  65-74 
  75+ 
 
 0 
 7 
 6 
17 
12 
19 
11 
 
- 
9.7 
8.3 
23.6 
16.7 
26.4 
15.3 
Cancer site 
  Unknown 
  Breast  
  Prostate 
  Other 
  Bowel 
  Lung 
  Blood 
  Secondaries 
 
3 
19 
18 
12 
 9 
 7 
 4 
17 
 
4.2 
26.4 
42.9 
16.7 
12.5 
9.7 
5.6 
23.6 
Cancer stage 
  I 
  II 
  III 
  IV 
  Unknown 
 
3 
21 
16 
14 
18 
 
4.2 
29.1 
22.2 
19.4 
25.0 
Highest level of education 
Missing 
None 
Level 1 or below 
GCSE 
A-Level 
Higher Education or above 
 
2 
12 
2 
17 
4 
35 
 
 
2.80 
16.7 
2.80 
24.0 
5.6 
48.6 
Religion/spirituality 
Yes 
No 
 
25 
47 
 
34.7 
65.2 
Number of previous cancers 
 0 
 1 
 2 + 
 
55 
16 
1 
 
76.4 
22.0 
1.40 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the overall sample at time one 
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Time one: Correlational analyses 
There were few significant correlations between variables used to capture the 
experience of having cancer (clinical and demographic factors), and response style or 
outcome variables (see Table 3). However, cancer appraisal scores, measured on the 
Brief IPQ, yielded seven significant positive correlations with avoidant response styles 
and outcome variables, e.g. disengagement, depression, and death anxiety (rs=.35-.54, 
ps<.001). Cancer appraisal was also negatively related to acceptance and emotional 
quality of life, and positively correlated with stage of cancer (rs =-.28-.28, ps=.002-
.037). Earlier stage of cancer was associated with worse physical and functional quality 
of life (rs =-.27 - -.37, ps=.005-.048), but as cancer stage had no significant associations 
with response style variables, it was excluded from further analyses. Cancer appraisal 
was consequently retained as the measure of illness experience, due to being both an a 
priori variable of interest, and being significantly correlated with seven other variables. 
Cancer appraisal was therefore entered as the appraisal-focused predictor variable in 
subsequent regression analyses.  
 
Five of the fourteen Brief COPE response styles measured were significantly associated 
with numerous outcomes and were subsequently entered as response style variables into 
regression analyses. The five retained response styles were self-distraction, denial, 
behavioural disengagement, venting, and self-blame, and can be broadly classified as 
‘avoidant’ response styles. Each response style demonstrated significant correlations 
with lower acceptance, and greater anxiety, depression, death anxiety, and poorer 
quality of life (rs=-.06-.69, ps=.042-<.001). Overall, there were significant associations 
between higher rates of acceptance and more desirable outcomes across each outcome 
measure. Acceptance, as measured by the AAQ II, was positively and significantly 
associated with quality of life, and negatively associated with anxiety, death anxiety, 
and depression (rs=.26 - -.799, ps=.031-<.001).  
24 
 
 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table 3: Time one bivariate correlation matrix between established predictor, response style, and outcome variables, which met the conditions for 
further analyses (with the exception of stage of cancer, displayed here for theoretical interest) 
 
Note 1: Rows 1-2 = established predictor variables, 3-8 = response style variables, and 9-15 = outcome variables 
 
Note 2: Variables with fewer than two significant correlations (one with a response and one with an outcome) were suppressed
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1=Stage  .283* .007 -.039 -.134 .148 .226 .051 .254 -.061 .072 -.141 -.268* -.372** -.013 
2=Brief IPQ   -.361** .537** .293* .191 .208 .221 .503** .437** .204 -.257* -.161 -.165 .353** 
3=AAQ II    -.523** -.400** -.691** -.279* -.436** -.601** -.799** .298* .729** .496** .256* -.571** 
4=Disengagement     .524** .326** .373** .184 .531** .567** -.154 -.554** -.435** -.319** .284* 
5=Venting      .309* .106 .364** .254* .358** -.177 -.286* -.174 -.056 .242 
6=Self-Blame       .439** .415** .418** .619** -.210 -.552** -.394** -.216 .503** 
7=Denial        .007 .273* .340* -.096 -.377** -.428** -.243* .275* 
8=Self-distract         .247* .486** -.058 -.320** -.115 .056 .313* 
9=HADS Dep.          .501** -.334** -.573** -.669** -.589** .325** 
10=HADS Anx.           -.108 -.678** -.394** -.120 .662** 
11=FACT-G Soc.            .326** .456** .292* .000 
12=FACT-G Emo.             .621** .327** -.461** 
13=FACT-G Func.              .695** -.225 
14=FACT-G Phys.               -.003 
15=DAS                
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Time one: Regression analyses 
Seven, two-block hierarchical multiple regressions were run to determine whether 
cancer appraisal, acceptance, and avoidant response variables were significant 
explanatory variables of quality of life and psychological distress, in line with the 
primary research aim. Regression models were run in parallel, with each distress and 
quality of life outcome forming a dependent variable. Established predictor and 
response style variables were entered into the model in two blocks: block one without 
the AAQ II, and block two with the AAQ II. This allowed R
2
 change scores to be 
calculated for the inclusion of the AAQ II into each model. The five avoidant response 
styles entered as predictors in the models were: self-distraction, denial, behavioural 
disengagement, venting, and self-blame. The response styles were entered if they had 
correlated with each outcome, though Brief IPQ and AAQ II scores were entered into 
all regressions as a priori variables of interest.  
 
The results for each block of hierarchical regressions are displayed in Table 4. The 
addition of acceptance to block two models led to statistically significant increases in R
2
 
and F values for all models, except for physical and functional quality of life; though 
the addition of acceptance to these models did not cause significant reductions in R
2 
(p>.05) or model significance. Conversely, the social quality of life model only reached 
significance following the addition of acceptance (increase in R
2
 =.10, F(1,68)=7.80, 
p=.007). Acceptance was the single most significant contributor to outcome in five 
models (out of seven) at time one, and explained between 3.1% and 10.8% of unique 
model variance, indicated by R
2
. In these models, acceptance had a significant 
relationship in a positive direction with emotional, and social quality of life, and 
significant relationship in a negative direction with depression, anxiety, and death 
anxiety. Cancer appraisals did not achieve significant explanatory power for any 
outcome.  
 
Acceptance lacked significant explanatory power in two models, functional and 
physical quality of life, both of which were significantly explained by denial 
(sstandardised=-.26 - -.32, ps=.014–.034). The direction of these beta values suggest that 
denial had a significant negative relationship with functional and physical quality of life 
outcomes. Only two further avoidant response styles were also significant contributors 
in two regression models: Behavioural disengagement was a significant contributor to 
depression, and self-distraction was a significant contributor to anxiety 
(sstandardised=.19-.43, ps=.020-<.001). However, acceptance also remained a significant 
explanatory variable in these models, and explained a larger proportion of variance for 
both depression and anxiety outcomes than either behavioural disengagement or self-
distraction (standardised =-.50 - -.53, ps<.001).   
 
Time one: Moderation analyses
17
 
Using PROCESS (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) in SPSS, acceptance was examined as a 
moderator of the relationship between IPQ and each outcome variable, in parallel 
moderation models. There were no significant interaction effects of cancer appraisal and 
acceptance on any of the outcome variables (p>.05), suggesting that the effect of cancer 
appraisal on each outcome was not conditional on the level of acceptance. All main 
effects of acceptance on outcomes established in the multiple regressions remained, 
with many cancer appraisal effects reaching significance. However, no moderation 
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effects reached significance (p>.05), meaning the relationship between cancer appraisal, 
and quality of life and distress was not dependent on, or altered in strength or direction 
by, levels of acceptance.  
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Outcome variable and 
(n) 
Block Predictors 
entered 
St.  t p R2 df F p 
HADS Depression 
(n=59) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
.147 
.134 
.543 
.032 
.148 
-.103 
1.273 
1.178 
4.011 
.307 
1.236 
-.897 
.209 
.244 
.000** 
.760 
.222 
.374 
- 6,52 10.615 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
-.528 
.117 
.114 
.429 
-.061 
-.120 
-.134 
4.025 
1.144 
1.135 
3.507 
-.647 
-.962 
-1.317 
.000** 
.258 
.262 
.001** 
.521 
.341 
.194 
.108** 1,51 14.073 .000** 
HADS Anxiety  
(n=61) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
.089 
.150 
.290 
.272 
.394 
-.053 
.917 
1.527 
2.553 
3.020 
3.848 
-.540 
.363 
.133 
.014* 
.004* 
.000** 
.591 
- 6,54 17.135 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
-.495 
.073 
.130 
.170 
.190 
.141 
-.074 
4.547 
.878 
1.542 
1.684 
2.390 
1.359 
-.869 
.000** 
 384 
.129 
.098 
.020 
.180 
.389 
.097** 1,53 22.993 .000** 
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Outcome variable and 
(n) 
Block Predictors 
entered 
St.  t p R2 df F p 
FACT-G Social  
(n=71) 
1 IPQ .003 .025 .980 - 1,69 .001 .980 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
.344 
.127 
-2.793 
1.033 
.007** 
.305 
.103* 1,68 3.900 .025* 
FACT-G Emotional 
(n=61) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
-.152 
-.151 
-.291 
-.121 
-.392 
.111 
-1.376 
-1.351 
-2.250 
-1.176 
-3.355 
.989 
.175 
.182 
.029* 
.245 
.001** 
.327 
- 6,54 11.096 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
Venting 
.473 
-.137 
-.132 
-.176 
-.042 
-.150 
.131 
-3.612 
-1.367 
-1.302 
-1.454 
-.438 
-1.198 
1.281 
.001** 
.177 
.199 
.152 
.663 
.236 
.206 
.088** 1,53 13.495 .000** 
FACT-G Functional 
(n=65) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Self-blame 
-.101 
-.272 
-.242 
-.169 
-.803 
-2.227 
-1.830 
-1.433 
.425 
.030* 
.072 
.157 
- 4,60 7.856 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Self-blame 
.269 
-.089 
-.261 
-.163 
-.017 
-1.699 
-.724 
-2.165 
-1.176 
-.114 
.095 
.472 
.034* 
.245 
.909 
.031 1,59 7.059 .000** 
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Outcome variable and 
(n) 
Block Predictors 
entered 
St.  t p R2 df F p 
FACT-G Physical  
(n=65) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
-.222 
-.312 
-.126 
-1.690 
-2.598 
-.927 
.096 
.012* 
.357 
 
- 
3,61 7.376 0.00** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
.024 
-.223 
-.318 
-.136 
.178 
-1.168 
-2.537 
-.922 
.859 
.097 
.014* 
.360 
.000 1,60 5.452 .001** 
DAS  
(n=63) 
1 IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
.037 
.214 
.064 
.141 
.349 
.287 
1.682 
.471 
1.150 
2.586 
.775 
.098 
.639 
.255 
.012* 
- 5,57 6.153 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Denial 
Disengage 
Distract 
Self-blame 
-.410 
.031 
.185 
-.054 
.065 
.151 
2.531 
.250 
.250 
1.517 
-.394 
.537 
.014* 
.803 
.803 
.135 
.695 
.594 
.067* 1,56 6.681 .000** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
Table 4: Two- block hierarchical multiple regression results for time one variables  
 
Note: Only response style variables which significantly correlated with each outcome were entered in the models. Brief IPQ and 
AAQ II were entered into all models. 
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Time two analyses 
t-tests between times one and two outcome variables (Table 5) were carried out as a 
preliminary check of whether variables had changed over time. t-tests revealed that 
outcome scores significantly changed over time on measures of anxiety, and on all four 
quality of life subdomains: emotional, social, physical, and functional. The direction of 
change showed that anxiety, emotional, and physical quality of life scores had 
significantly increased over time, whereas social and functional quality of life had 
decreased. Death anxiety and depression scores had also reduced between the two time 
points, but this finding did not reach significance. Scores were stable over time for 
illness appraisals and all response style variables (p>.05). No shifts in participants’ 
demographic or clinical details were identified between times one and two, with the 
exception of three participants reporting a reduction in cancer stage, and two 
participants reporting an increase.  
 
 
Outcome Variable Time One Time Two t-test 
 Mean SD Mean SD p 
HADS Depression 3.77 3.45 3.50 2.24 .643 
HADS Anxiety 6.94 3.84 8.55 4.29 .034* 
FACT-G Social 16.73 5.91 10.17 7.61 .000** 
FACT-G Emotional 16.32 4.71 19.30 2.81 .001** 
FACT-G Functional 16.12 6.20 10.68 8.65 .004** 
FACT-G Physical 21.30 4.92 26.43 1.92 .000** 
DAS 6.47 3.21 5.80 2.93 .235 
 
Table 5: t-test means and standard deviations for time one and two outcome variables 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01  
 
Time two: Partial correlations and regression analyses 
Partial correlations were carried out between the time one response styles that had 
previously emerged as significant (self-distraction, denial, behavioural disengagement, 
venting, and self-blame), and time two outcomes (Table 6). Two-block hierarchical 
regression analyses were then constructed in parallel models, regressing the significant 
time one response styles, identified in partial correlations, onto each time two outcome, 
whilst controlling for time one outcomes (Table 7). Time one Brief IPQ and AAQ II 
were entered into each model, as stated a priori. Time one predictors were entered in 
without the AAQ II in block one, and with the AAQ II in block two, again allowing for 
R
2
 change scores to be calculated.  
 
Time one acceptance was a significant explanatory predictor of future functioning, 
measured on two domains at time two: Anxiety and functional quality of life 
(sstandardised=-.57-.49, ps=.006-.012). The direction of these beta values was in line with 
time one regressions, with acceptance predictive of lower future anxiety, and higher 
future quality of life. Cancer appraisal was also a significant explanatory predictor of 
functional quality of life (standardised=-.44., p=.020), though acceptance made a greater 
contribution to the unique variance of this model than cancer appraisal, by a margin of 
12% (difference in R
2 =
.12). Self-distract, behavioural disengagement, and self-blame 
had been entered into regression models for anxiety, depression, and social quality of 
 31 
life, and self-distract emerged as a significant explanatory predictor of future depression 
in a positive direction (standardised=41., p=.018), even when controlling for current levels 
of depression.   
 
Time two: Moderation analyses 
Moderation models were constructed for each of the seven outcome variables in 
parallel, i.e. anxiety, depression, death anxiety, and social, emotional, physical, and 
functional quality of life. Acceptance at time one was not a significant moderator in the 
interaction between illness perceptions and outcome at time two, for any of the quality 
of life or distress outcome variables.  
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*p<0.05, **p<0.01. T2 = time two. 
 
Table 6: Time two partial correlation matrix (controlling for time one outcome variables) 
 
Note: Only response style variables which significantly correlated outcomes at time one were entered into the 
partial correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Established predictor & response style variables: Time One 
Outcomes:  
Time Two 
Distract Denial DisengageDis Disengage Venting Self- 
blame 
AAQ II IPQ 
HADS Depression T2 .528** -.039 .195 .386 .208 -.340 -.232 
HADS Anxiety T2 -.050 -.238 .396* .235 -.413* -.384 .083 
DAS T2 .281 .289 .579** .344 -.215 -.188 .521** 
FAGT-G Physical T2 .023 -.065 .140 .224 .149 .051 -.125 
FACT-G Social T2 -.419* -.093 -.319 -.005 .016 .398 .006 
FACT-G Emotional T2 .014 -.268 -.145 .039 .318 -.060 -.310 
FACT-G Functional T2 -.363 .028 -.353 -.210 -.085 .469* .265 
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Outcome variables:  
Time Two  
and n 
Block Predictors 
entered:  
Time One 
St.  t p R2 df F p 
HADS Depression 2 
(n=29) 
1 IPQ 
Distract 
  
-.329 
.405 
-1.939 
2.525 
.064 
.018* 
- 2,25 6.236 .003** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Distract 
-.191 
-.316 
.343 
.925 
-1.853 
1.968 
.364 
.076 
.061 
.020 1,24 4.864 .005** 
HADS Anxiety 2 
(n=28) 
1 IPQ 
Disengage 
Self-blame  
 
-.100 
.364 
-.174 
-.512 
1.602 
-.880 
.614 
.123 
.388 
- 3,23 4.587 .007** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Disengage 
Self-blame 
-.567 
-.093 
.344 
-.287 
2.738 
-.539 
1.715 
-1.602 
.012* 
595 
.100 
.124 
.141* 1,22 6.205 .001** 
FACT-G Social 2 
(n=28) 
1 IPQ 
Distract 
 
.089 
-.097 
.511 
-.555 
.614 
.584 
- 2,24 4.245 .015* 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Distract 
.347 
.152 
.019 
-1.646 
.876 
.103 
.113 
.390 
.919 
.069 1,23 4.088 .012* 
FACT-G Emotional 2 
(n=30) 
1 IPQ 
 
-.331 -1.863 .073 - 1,27 5.063 .014* 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
.151 
-.332 
-.737 
-1.852 
.467 
.075 
.015 1,26 3.500 .030* 
FACT-G Functional 2 
(n=30) 
1 IPQ .354 1.796 .084 - 1,27 2.003 .154 
 2 AAQ II .484 -2.96 .006** .220* 1,26 4.646 .010** 
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IPQ .437 2.483 .020* 
FACT-G Physical 2 
(n=29) 
1 IPQ 
 
-.134 -.658 .516 - 1,26 1.390 .267 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
.114 
-.108 
-.589 
-.511 
.561 
.614 
.012 1,25 1.019 .401 
DAS 2 
(n=28) 
1 IPQ 
Disengage 
 
.251 
.322 
1.496 
1.900 
.148 
.070 
- 2,24 9.609 .000** 
 2 AAQ II 
IPQ 
Disengage 
.014 
.253 
.325 
-.087 
1.466 
1.842 
.932 
.156 
.078 
.000 1,23 6.911 .001** 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01 
 
Table 7: Two block hierarchical regression results for time two significant and outcome variables (controlling for time 
one outcome variables) 
 
Note: Only response style variables which significantly correlated with each outcome were entered in the models. 
Brief IPQ and AAQ II were entered into all models. 
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Cross-lag analyses 
Cross-lag panel correlations (Figures 2 & 3), a method of examining the direction and 
relationship of change in longitudinal data (Selig & Little, 2012), revealed that 
acceptance at time one predicted both anxiety (r=.60, p=<.001) and functional quality of 
life (r=-.42, p=.024) at time two. Furthermore, these were one-way predictive 
relationships, shown by one-way significant paths, as neither anxiety nor functional 
quality of life at time one significantly predicted acceptance at time two (p>.05). Cross-
lag correlations with the five remaining outcomes yielded no significant findings, in 
either direction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01. ns = not significant  
 
Figure 2: Path diagram for a two-variable panel model of acceptance and anxiety, 
at times one and two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01. ns = not significant 
Figure 3: Path diagram for a two-variable panel model of acceptance and 
functioning (FACT-G functional), at times one and two 
 
Time Two 
Acceptance  
Time One  
Acceptance  r4 = .60** 
Time One 
Anxiety  
Time Two 
Anxiety r3 = .56** 
r1 =.54** 
r2 = .09 (ns) 
r1 =.54** 
Time Two 
Acceptance  
Time One  
Acceptance  
Time Two 
Functioning 
Time One 
Functioning 
r4 = -.42* 
r2 = .05 (ns) 
r3 = .16 (ns) 
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Discussion 
 
This longitudinal quantitative study aimed to explore whether acceptance was related to 
quality of life and distress in cancer patients, alongside other response styles. It also 
aimed to explore whether acceptance functioned as a moderator variable and an 
approach response style over time. Avoidant response styles -such as denial, 
behavioural disengagement, and self-distraction - showed a pattern of moderate to 
strong negative correlations with quality of life, and significant positive correlations 
with distress outcomes in the cancer population
18
. Cancer appraisals lacked overall 
explanatory power, but did achieve a greater number of significant correlations with 
response styles and outcomes than measures of physical disease characteristics. In line 
with previous research, this supports the role of more threatening cognitive appraisals in 
poorer outcomes; relationships that were not demonstrated by disease characteristics 
alone. Contrastingly, acceptance was an independent explanatory variable of quality of 
life and distress outcomes, in directions consistent with psychological health. 
Acceptance also demonstrated predictive power for these outcomes over time, over and 
above the influence of cancer appraisals.  
  
Theoretical implications
19
 
In contrast to the ‘protective’ and defensive role of denial posited by TMT, denial was 
significantly associated with lower quality of life, and higher distress; including on the 
measure of death anxiety. TMT suggests that denial should be utilised to avoid the 
terror of mortality and its associated emotions, yet here the findings that denial was 
significantly associated with distress and poorer quality of life suggest the opposite.    
 
Quality of life declined over time on social and functional domains, the latter of which 
was initially significantly explained by denial. Avoidant responses were therefore 
implicated in poorer functional quality of life, over and above the appraisal of cancer, 
which initially correlated with stage of cancer and may in part reflect some objective 
disease severity. Functional and social quality of life both declined over time, despite 
physical quality of life improving, lending support to the ACT notion that experiential 
avoidance at the cost of engagement in valued action may be detrimental to maintaining 
distress, irrespective of physical disease status.   
 
The results provide preliminary support for the trial of acceptance-based interventions 
in a cancer population, having shown that acceptance was significantly more implicated 
in optimal quality of life and distress outcomes than other response styles. This included 
those that might be targeted in conventional therapies, such as CBT, which is currently 
the most empirically-supported psychological intervention for cancer patients.  
Moreover, some non-accepting, avoidant response styles –those which have been 
hypothesised by TMT theorists to be protective when faced with a proximal threat such 
as cancer – were found to be inversely related to quality of life, and positively 
associated with distress in this population. Denial, a traditional death-avoidance 
strategy, was uniquely implicated in explaining more outcomes than any other avoidant 
response style measured, even when included alongside acceptance; which had 
absorbed the explanatory variance of other responses in some models. The direction of 
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 For results in the context of theory, see EP 4.2 – 4.2.4 
19
 For implications for clinical knowledge and practice, see EP 4.3 
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these explanatory relationships was positively related to distress, and negatively related 
to quality of life.   
 
ACT’s principle that experientially avoiding and struggling against inner experiences 
maintains distress is supported, given that avoidant responses were consistently 
associated with poorer outcomes. Acceptance was a unique predictor of outcomes in the 
opposite direction, suggesting that acceptance may be a viable, alternative response 
strategy for influencing quality of life and distress. However, given that many response 
styles did not retain significant explanatory power following the addition of the 
acceptance measure, it is also likely that avoidant responses and experiential avoidance 
(as measured by low AAQ II scores) share some common variance, and that this 
prevented avoidant response styles from achieving significance. Experiential avoidance 
may therefore be a generalised avoidance phenomenon, rather than a unique concept, 
given its medium to large correlations with other measures of avoidant responding 
(Chawla & Ostafin, 2007). Acceptance, however, as measured by the AAQ II, made a 
unique and statistically independent contribution as an explanatory variable: accounting 
for an additional 3-10% of model variance, over and above cancer appraisals or 
avoidant response styles.    
 
Clinical implications 
Of particular clinical relevance is the long-term, deleterious effect of avoidance on 
outcomes over time, which continues even when avoidant responses themselves remain 
stable. Furthermore, levels of acceptance are predictive of future functioning and 
anxiety in a uni-directional relationship, which tentatively suggests that an accepting 
response style may drive outcomes, in a one-way relationship. An implication of this for 
future research and practice is that acceptance predicts and potentially influences future 
functioning, such that it may form a useful target for intervention. However, it must be 
noted that the relationships in this study were calculated using aggregate scores, and 
that within the sample there may be considerable individual differences. It cannot be 
stated that acceptance and avoidance are entirely helpful or unhelpful for all 
participants, as participants were not individually categorised based on their response 
styles and corresponding outcomes scores. A further caveat for intervention, which may 
facilitate the need for preliminary trials, is that acceptance was not manipulated in this 
study. Thus, although acceptance is strongly implicated in improved outcomes, even 
over time, it remains to be seen whether changing acceptance will lead to changes in 
outcomes, particularly given the potentially moderating effects of pre-existing response 
styles on outcomes.   
 
Strengths & Limitations
20
 
This study used a broad sample of cancer patients, and was conducted over two points 
in time. Although there is not yet a vast body of literature focusing on ACT processes in 
cancer patients, those that do exist have often used narrow cancer sub-groups and cross-
sectional designs. Whilst this study acknowledged that different cancer groups may 
have differing needs and levels of distress, and that this often guides study design by 
way of improving generalisability to unique sub-populations, this study deliberately 
targeted a large sample. ACT models of psychological health and psychopathology, and 
the purported advantage of acceptance, are generalisable and universal, rather than 
theorised to be unique to specific individuals or types of cancer. The broad sample in 
                                                 
20
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this study represented groups of cancer patients as a whole, in line with an underlying 
theory of acceptance and widespread experiential avoidance, which Hayes et al. (2011) 
attribute to a category as broad as human nature. Furthermore, distress and threatening 
cancer appraisals occurred across all sub-sections of this sample, suggesting that these 
factors may have a generalised effect, which is perhaps unsurprising given that cancer 
appraisals are not uniquely related to objective disease status, and also given the 
complex and wide-reaching effects cancer can have on people’s lives.   
 
Limitations of this study include the observational research design, and the cross-
sectional nature of the data collected at time-one, which was consequently subject to the 
limitations of correlational, multivariate data analyses and the non-causal conclusions 
that can be drawn from them. Multiple regression models are not capable of establishing 
causal inferences or temporality between data at a single point in time, yet despite this 
some researchers use multiple regressions to make predictions about future 
performance, which is not a valid conclusion when carried out within a cross-sectional 
research design. The inclusion of data at a second time point went some way to 
addressing these limitations however, as multiple regressions, moderation, and cross-lag 
models were carried out on data taken from two points in time, thus increasing their 
predictive validity, and effectively demonstrating one-directional predictive 
relationships. A further limitation of this study was that questionnaires are inherently 
reliant upon self-report, which can introduce subjective and social desirability biases, 
and produce common method variance in the data; though again the latter was 
addressed through the inclusion of a follow-up point. Although the response rate 
achieved for the follow-up was over half, at 53%, this sample had opted-in and were 
therefore somewhat self-selecting, which introduced a further risk of bias in terms of the 
characteristics and response styles of the follow-up group. 
Time since diagnosis was not accurately captured, as it has been elsewhere in cancer 
literature (e.g. Hulbert-Williams et al., 2015). Furthermore, the Brief IPQ achieved a 
very low score for internal reliability (α=.38), yet has achieved much higher levels in 
cancer research elsewhere (e.g. Ashley et al., 2013). This alpha level may have been 
decreased by the adaptation of the items to suit the population, as recommended by the 
authors to increase the scale’s face and content validity for different illness populations 
(Broadbent et al., 2015). However, authors have cautioned against the use of 
Cronbach’s alpha as a standalone measure of internal reliability, at the expense of study 
context (Sijtsma, 2009; Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991). It is possible that the low alpha 
for Brief IPQ was both affected by re-wording of certain questions to make them 
cancer-specific, and also that it reflects the complex nature of illness appraisal. A 
further measurement limitation may be posed by the use of the AAQ II, as some 
researchers have questioned whether its items are conflated with distress outcomes 
(Wolgast, 2014). Although the AAQ II was used as a process measure indicative of 
acceptance, with implications for targeted assessment and intervention in this process, 
the observed relationships with outcomes may be artificially inflated by overlapping 
content and weak discriminant construct validity. However, use of the AAQ II is well-
established in the ACT literature, and it has been deemed to be of satisfactory reliability 
and validity in research with cancer populations (Feros, Lane, Ciarrochi, & Blackledge, 
2013). At the time of this study, no superior psychometric measure of acceptance was 
available.  
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Finally, moderation analyses were carried out using only acceptance as a proposed 
moderator. This was because acceptance was the primary variable of interest in this 
study, but also in part to prevent the increased risk of finding chance effects. Although 
data was captured at two points in time, this was without any psychological intervention 
having taken place in the interim period. Future research
21
 could show whether an ACT 
intervention might result in a change to the stability of acceptance that had been 
demonstrated in this study over three months in time. Intervention across multiple time 
points would also justify the use of mediational analyses, to see whether acceptance or 
other response styles explained any relationship between cancer appraisals and 
psychological outcomes.  
 
Conclusions
22
 
 
Acceptance is supported as a helpful response style, and a potential target for 
intervention in psychological work with cancer patients. This is over and above the 
targeting of cancer appraisals, which had less predictive and explanatory power, though 
remained correlated with distress outcomes. Furthermore, results also show that many 
response styles that might be incorporated into more traditional CBT or expressive 
therapies are not associated with positive outcomes in cancer patients. Such strategies, 
as measured by the Brief COPE, include active coping, emotional support, planning, 
positive reframing, and venting. Finally, as experiential avoidance and avoidant 
response styles had greater predictive power than cancer appraisal, increasing 
acceptance and shifting relationships to distressing cognitions, rather than their content, 
is indicated as a direction for possible intervention studies with this population.   
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1. Extended background 
1.1. Measuring Distress and Quality of Life in Cancer 
 
 1.1.1. Operationalising Distress  
In order to attempt effective measurement of distress and quality of life in a 
cancer population, it is first important to discuss the meaning of these terms. 
Distress is a broad construct that is often poorly-defined (Ridner, 2004), and is 
therefore open to subjective interpretation, potentially meaning different things 
to different people, and adversely affecting the reliability of outcomes. Within the 
context of this research, distress is taken to mean adverse emotional and 
psychological “functioning in the face of stressful life events” (Abeloff, Armitage, 
Lichter, & Niederhuber, 2000, p.556). Distress was consequently measured by 
rating scales for anxiety, depression, and death anxiety, which were framed 
within an illness context through prefacing in the questionnaire, and also in the 
participant information sheet. Distress is therefore used only as an overarching 
term, to refer to these individual outcome measures as an aggregated category 
of outcome measures.   
 
Quality of life has been defined as ‘a complete state of physical, mental, and 
social well-being, not merely the absence of disease’ (World Health 
Organization, 1997). Measuring and improving quality of life, rather than 
focusing solely on distress and how to reduce it, is therefore congruent with 
both ACT philosophy, and also the recognised need from within the oncology 
community to promote wellbeing, rather than just to reduce symptoms of 
distress (Jacobsen & Jim, 2008). In this study, quality of life was studied in 
relation to cancer, as measured by the FACT-G (Cella et al., 1993).  
 
 1.1.2. Methodological Challenges of Measuring Distress 
Operationalising psychological distress for the purposes of measurement in 
research studies has in many cases relied on psychiatric diagnoses from the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (5th ed.; DSM-V; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), or International Classification of Diseases (10th ed.; ICD-10; 
World Health Organisation, 1992), rather than on self-reported measurement 
(e.g. Bukberg, Penman & Holland, 1984). This method risks excluding patients’ 
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distress where it is not severe enough to meet diagnostic thresholds, and also 
relies upon the methodological robustness of diagnostic classification systems. 
The validity, reliability, and even utility of such systems have been refuted by 
numerous researchers (e.g. Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & Bentall, 2013; 
Pickersgill, 2013). Diagnoses were not required in this study design, in part 
because of the observational nature of the study and the lack of need to 
randomise participants to different conditions, or select suitable participants for 
a certain intervention; occasions when diagnoses have some practical utility. In 
this study, all outcome measures used were self-report questionnaires of 
psychological distress and cancer-related quality of life, which were non-
diagnostic and of greater relevance to the cancer context and psychological, 
rather than psychiatric, models of behaviour and functioning (Herschbach et al., 
2004). Furthermore, ACT researchers have been openly critical of psychiatric 
diagnoses and classification systems, stating that symptoms and signs can 
emerge through experiential avoidance rather than biological causation (Hayes 
et al., 2013), and also implying that research should focus on functional 
analyses and underlying psychological processes, rather than merely labelling 
behaviours as the result of disease.   
 
Although the prevalence of emotional distress within cancer populations is 
thought to be as high as 75% (Macmillan, 2015), measuring this accurately and 
effectively poses some methodological challenges, which could limit the validity 
and generalisability of such prevalence estimates. For example, cancer affects 
a very broad number of areas in people’s lives, such as physical health 
symptoms, treatment side-effects, financial worries, concerns about leaving 
work, and diminishing social engagement. The variability in these factors 
between individuals adds to the challenge of measuring distress prevalence, as 
cancer-related distress could therefore be influenced by, and interpreted to 
mean, a vast range of factors which vary between individuals. Multi-dimensional 
measures of quality of life have attempted to reflect this challenge by including 
subscales for different areas of life, for example the FACT-G measure (Cella et 
al., 1993), which has scales on physical, functional, social, and emotional 
domains. Recently, the Distress Thermometer (National Comprehensive Cancer 
Network, 2007) was introduced as a rapid distress-screening tool for cancer 
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patients. Whilst clinician awareness and screening of distress in cancer patients 
is to be commended, the simplicity of the rating scale measure may fail to 
accurately measure or capture the complexity of the factors affecting the 
population, as outlined previously. The Distress Thermometer has consequently 
been criticised for lacking validity (Stewart-Knight, Parry, Abey, & Seymour, 
2012), and is perhaps not specific enough in terms of defining what ‘distress’ 
means. Relying on one single item measure such as the Distress Thermometer, 
to accurately depict distress and quality of life in this population is therefore 
unlikely to reflect the diverse and broad experiences of cancer patients when 
used as a standalone measure in research studies. However, the distress 
thermometer may have some utility as a tool for beginning conversations about 
subjective emotional distress in clinical settings –conversations that may 
otherwise not occur– and should be used as part of a more extensive 
psychological assessment as necessary (Gessler et al., 2008; Hegel et al., 
2008).  
 
Beyond having to administer a broad range of measures in an attempt to 
capture the complex and multiple factors which can influence distress in cancer 
patients, other challenges to measuring distress include the heterogeneity of the 
population, due to the variance in disease factors such as cancer stages and 
sites. There are also broad methodological differences between existing 
research studies carried out, and the settings in which research projects are 
conducted (Massie, 2004). Furthermore, distress is not a stable factor and is 
likely to fluctuate across time, with the illness trajectory, levels of pain, treatment 
side-effects, or cancer re-occurrence (Massie 2004; Stanton, Leucken, 
MacKinnon, & Thompson, 2012); as well as distress potentially being influenced 
by problems which pre-dated the disease. This latter possibility is hard to 
exclude, and presents the potential for confounding variables, which may also 
influence outcomes. Distress can also continue into remission, and may be 
linked to threats of re-occurrence and shortened life-expectancy (Deimling, 
Bowman, Sterns, Wagner, & Kahana, 2006), yet along with palliative patients, 
these two cancer sub-groups are not well-researched (Payne, 1992). This 
affects the overall generalisability of findings to both past and terminal cancer 
patients, given that these sub-populations may have unique concerns related to 
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survivorship, or higher levels of distress related to the imminent end of life 
(Adelbratt & Strang, 2000). This study attempted to address some of the 
concerns about specific cancer populations by recruiting from a broad section of 
the cancer population, and also included a follow-up in order to capture data at 
more than one point in time, or in a person’s disease trajectory. For further 
details about methodological decisions and rationale, see extended paper 2.2 – 
2.3. 
1.2. Death Anxiety, ACT, and TMT 
 
1.2.1. Death Anxiety in Avoidant Society 
 Given that all humans know rationally they will one day die, fear about death 
may be present in the general population (Yalom, 2008), but is reportedly 
higher amongst people with chronic diseases (Strömberg & Jaarsma, 2008). 
Even though increasing numbers of cancer patients are surviving (Cancer 
Research UK, 2014), cancer still poses a very real threat to life, and it makes 
intuitive sense that cancer is therefore associated with death and dying. This 
association is perhaps enhanced by the amount of coverage cancer is afforded 
in Western society, via charity advertisements, or through the media reporting 
breakthroughs in medical treatments for cancer, sending a hopeful message 
that we can postpone death.  
 
Given that for many, cancer is becoming more akin to a chronic disease as 
treatments and prognoses continually improve (Rand et al., 2012), this raises 
questions about the impact of lengthier diseases upon psychological factors, 
such as general anxiety and death anxiety. In theoretical terms, the proximal 
threat, or life event, of cancer represents a change in context, whereby habitual 
ways of responding may no longer be helpful nor effective at minimising anxiety. 
Anxiety in cancer patients is well-reported and frequently measured as a key 
factor in distress. However, intrusive and unpleasant thoughts may often involve 
disease, death, or disability (Stark & House, 2000), yet specific death anxiety is 
far rarer in the literature on distress in this population (Gonen et al., 2012). 
Kübler-Ross (1969) stated that the drive to avoid death prevents an open 
dialogue in society and in healthcare. Given that society, and even clinicians, 
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may be anxious about talking about dying (Peters et al., 2013), it may be that 
patients are not asked about their experiences on this domain, or are asked 
instead about other anxiety-eliciting factors; thereby talking about anxiety, but 
not in relation to death. Death anxiety is demonstrated and potentially reinforced 
in many ways throughout Western society, and is notably lower in Eastern 
countries (Urien & Occidentale, 2004), where religions such as Hinduism view 
death as the first element in life, and believe in life after death. Such views can 
prevent death from being seen as a frightening entity, and in turn affect how 
cultures behave around the dying; suggesting that reappraisal or acceptance of 
death may reduce anxiety. It is interesting to reflect on whether European 
countries, where there is a trend towards atheism (Eurobarometer, 2005), are 
more avoidant towards death as a result of not utilising religion as a potential 
defence mechanism to prevent experiencing death anxiety.  
 
1.2.2. Death Anxiety: Theoretical Underpinnings 
One reason we may fear death is because it is associated with painful 
emotions, such as grief and sadness; emotions reported whether we are 
grieving for ourselves, prior to dying, or for others (Hoëlter, 1979; Kübler-Ross, 
1969). According to ACT, attempting to avoid these inner feelings will only serve 
to increase their salience, and thereby feelings in relation to death remain 
strong. Furthermore, thoughts, feelings, and inner experiences which are 
struggled against are increasingly elicited by an augmenting number of death- 
related and emotion-eliciting stimuli.  
 
Theoretically, ACT and TMT differ in their understandings of how this 
relationship between cancer and anxiety might have come to pass. TMT posits 
that death anxiety is an evolutionary trait universal to humanity, whereby we are 
driven to stay alive and would be psychologically paralysed by conscious death 
awareness (Iverach, Menzies, & Menzies, 2014). Within this model, behaviours, 
either at a societal level, such as social engagement, or at an intrapsychic level, 
such as denial and thought-suppression, are interpreted as being motivated by 
the underlying fear of death. Many experimental studies have shown the results 
of death-reminding primers upon subsequent behaviours, such as with people 
who had been reminded of mortality then demonstrating increased defensive 
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and avoidant behaviours, both intrapsychically and towards others (e.g. 
Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2015). However, it could also be 
interpreted that these studies have shown a link between the priming of anxiety, 
and ensuing avoidance; which may indeed be a helpful and adaptive response 
style in the short-term (Suls & Fletcher, 1985), as most people are not overly 
reminded of death on a frequent basis. However, in the life-threatening context 
of receiving a diagnosis of cancer, such avoidance may cease to be adaptive or 
successful. This is because of the potential for death and illness reminders to 
increase exponentially, for example on visits to hospital, when receiving 
treatment, and when experiencing physical symptoms or side-effects. The long-
term effects of avoidant response styles upon distress and quality of life are 
detrimental to cancer patients (Stanton, 2012; Gillanders et al., 2015; 
Zimmermann & Rodin, 2004), perhaps given the potential for avoidance of 
illness-related stimuli to augment exponentially, thereby inducing a state of 
suffering through experiential avoidance. 
 
Aside from theoretical differences between TMT and ACT as to its aetiology, 
death anxiety remains prevalent amongst cancer patients, and so it is perhaps 
more clinically relevant to explore ways to alleviate the distress with which it is 
associated. Gonen et al. (2012) concluded that death anxiety was most closely 
related to anxiety and depression, and occurred more frequently in cancer 
patients with co-morbid mental health problems than those without. One 
interpretation of this finding is that attempts to minimise or avoid different 
emotional experiences have failed in their entirety, resulting in the presentation 
of distress across a number of different presenting problems. Although TMT 
would suggest this requires an increase in avoidant defences, if anxiety and 
distress are in full awareness, then these defences have failed to work thus far, 
and are proving maladaptive in the context of disease (Kastenbaum, 2000). 
TMT’s claims that bolstering defences leads to functioning with minimal anxiety 
in response to threats (Greenberg et al., 1992) is therefore not supported or 
justified for this population, given that cancer patients experience high death 
anxiety, alongside the use of avoidant response styles.  
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Although the prospect of mortality is likely to evoke emotions, from an ACT 
perspective the resulting death anxiety would not be due to an underlying innate 
construct, as suggested by Becker (1973). It would be the result of cancer 
becoming related to death and to fear through an individual’s relational learning 
history, perhaps influenced by Western culture (Charmaz, 1980). A further point 
of difference is whether or not death anxiety augments due to failing defences 
against an underlying and intolerable construct, or because of the increasing 
and problematic attempts to avoid these internal experiences. Within an ACT 
model, the inner experiences themselves are therefore painful, but not 
pathological. ACT would consequently encourage a stance of acceptance and 
the use of approach, rather than avoidant, response styles, to change the way 
cancer patients relate to their death-related inner experiences. This premise 
consequently presents a rationale for researching whether acceptance is 
predictive of better outcomes in a death-anxious cancer population, or whether 
acceptance is likely to be harmful, perhaps because death anxiety truly is an 
unbearable and problematic emotion in itself.  
1.3. Response Styles and Coping 
 
 1.3.1. Definition and Measurement of Coping 
Coping is an effortful, adaptive, behavioural or cognitive attempt to manage 
stressful demands (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), where stress is seen to emerge 
from the appraisal of a situation as exceeding resources, or threatening 
wellbeing. Whether or not coping is helpful or successful may depend on its 
function, and thus coping needs to be understood from a functional 
contextualist perspective (Hulbert-Williams, Storey & Wilson, 2015). This notion 
is reflected in the author’s reluctance to state definitive, aggregate scales for 
coping items, or to specify which styles are adaptive or maladaptive, for scores 
on the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997). 
 
Coping styles are an established predictor of distress and quality of life (Carver 
et al., 1993; Stanton et al., 2000), and, as a family of behaviours coping styles 
have been grouped and clustered in myriad ways over preceding decades, 
including problem-focused and emotion-focused coping (Folkman & Lazarus, 
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1985); passive and active coping; and avoidance-oriented and approach-
oriented coping (e.g. Roth & Cohen, 1986). Optimism and pessimism are also 
related to faring better and worse in terms of distress, though the mechanism by 
which this occurs appears to be the mediational effect of approach and avoidant 
coping, respectively (Carver et al., 1993). Given the lack of consensus across 
the expansive coping literature, empirical and conceptual problems with 
defining coping have been identified (McCracken & Eccleston, 2003), potentially 
impacting on the reliability of individual and sub-grouped coping styles within 
different studies. For example, it has been found that both problem- and 
emotion-focused coping styles may be subsumed into, and co-occur within, the 
broader categories of avoidance and approach-oriented coping. As such, the 
problem- or emotion-focused categories initially proposed by Folkman and 
Lazarus (1985) may have been too dichotomous, lacking in both ecological and 
construct validity, and also low in reliability, as defining factors within these 
categories has been unstable and largely inconclusive over time (Litman, 2006).  
 
1.3.2. Terminology in the Present Study 
The journal article that this extended paper expands upon used the term 
response styles, rather than coping styles throughout. This was an attempt to 
distinguish acceptance in an ACT context from the version of acceptance 
commonly measured in coping styles literature, by the COPE and Brief COPE 
measures (Carver, 1989; Carver, 1997). In reality the terms ‘coping styles’ and 
‘response styles’ are interchangeable, both referring to responses to contextual 
demands, stressors, or cues, but only one term was used in the journal article, 
in order to ensure clarity and consistency. However, the literature on coping and 
the Brief COPE measure remains relevant to this research, and was drawn 
upon in the conception of the study. 
 
For the purposes of this research, coping is taken to mean voluntary responses, 
rather that those which are involuntary and automatic. Voluntary responses 
pertain to cognitive or behavioural reactions which occur as a result of what 
Lazarus (1966) termed secondary appraisal, i.e. making the choice of how to 
respond, following the appraisal of a stressor. Furthermore, as similarly stated 
by Carver and Connor-Smith (2010), responses in the context of this research 
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are processes consciously accessible, rather than the unconscious drives 
commonly alluded to in psychodynamic theories of behaviour.  
 
1.3.3. Approach and Avoidant Coping 
Approach coping is aimed at tackling perceived threats and the associated 
emotions which follow them, whereas avoidance coping is aimed at escaping 
these factors (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Different avoidant 
coping styles, for example denial, behavioural disengagement, or distraction, 
may therefore be cognitive and behavioural forms of experiential avoidance, 
which is the opposite process to acceptance. This comparison has been 
supported by factor analyses showing experiential avoidance and avoidant 
coping styles to load on the same factor (Karekla & Panayiotou, 2011). This 
study adopted the broader terms of approach and avoidance coping as a 
framework for considering acceptance and the Brief COPE styles included in 
the final analyses, as this distinction is thought to be of the ‘greatest importance’ 
in influencing psychological outcomes over time (Carver & Connor-Smith, 
2010). It also helps to structure the research question of whether acceptance is 
a more beneficial, ‘approach’ response style than other ‘avoidant’ forms of 
coping, for a cancer population, and has been used elsewhere in psycho-
oncology literature as a high-order categorisation of coping styles (e.g. Stanton, 
Dannoff-burg, & Huggins, 2002). Within the dimension of avoidant coping, two 
further sub-categories of active and avoidant emotional coping have been 
adopted by some researchers (Gillanders, Sinclair, MacLean, & Jardine, 2015; 
Schnider, Elhai, & Gray, 2007).  
 
Although it is likely that individuals use more than one style of coping when they 
are stressed (Tennen, Affleck, & Armeli, 2000), individuals’ choices of coping 
styles are thought to be relatively persistent over time (Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989), characterising their interactions with the environment (Moos 
& Holahan, 2003). Furthermore, the use of particular coping styles, such as 
denial, may increase when a situation is perceived to be uncontrollable, and 
when it matters more to individuals (Carver et al., 1989), so we might 
reasonably expect a person who habitually avoids to become more avoidant 
when faced with a threatening situation, such as cancer. Coping styles are 
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thought to determine the impact of adverse events on emotional functioning, in 
both the short and long term (Skinner et al., 2003), with approach-oriented 
coping styles linked to better distress and quality of life outcomes than avoidant 
coping styles (Gillanders et al., 2015). In the short-term, avoidant coping 
strategies, e.g. distraction, might be helpful in reducing anxieties, and thereby 
become negatively reinforced. However, evidence suggests that over longer 
periods of time, such avoidance can have a detrimental impact on engagement 
in valued activities and psychological wellbeing (Hayes & Pankey, 2003). 
Accordingly, avoiding cancer-related cognitions increases the risk of 
psychological distress in cancer patients (Costanzo, Lutgendorf, Bradley, Rose, 
& Anderson, 2005). Furthermore, avoidance in an illness context can prevent 
engagement with behaviours as important as treatment compliance, or seeking 
medical assistance (Šoštarič & Šprah, 2004).  
 
Although overall there has been little conceptual consistency regarding 
individual coping styles in the literature, with definitions varying between 
authors, denial is broadly taken to mean a “disavowal of reality,” (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984, p. 136), which is utilised in an attempt to mitigate or avoid 
internal responses. In this study, denial pertains to the form of denial as 
measured by the Brief COPE (Carver, 1997); namely, a refusal to acknowledge 
a stressful situation. Perhaps more importantly, despite the variations in 
terminology, there is a consensus in the literature that denial is an avoidant 
strategy, whether applied consciously or unconsciously. In the context of this 
research, denial is a conscious construct, rather than the unconscious form of 
denial traditionally alluded to in psychoanalytic literature.  
 
There is some theoretical disagreement surrounding whether avoidant 
strategies such as denial are helpful, and to an extent this is dependent on the 
theoretical approach taken. In the context of cancer, Terror Management 
theorists might advocate the use of increased denial and other avoidance 
strategies, to guard against the risk of becoming overwhelmed by death-related 
anxiety. Theoretically, this may be more aligned to unconscious denial, but it 
could also be argued that for many cancer patients, anxieties about their illness 
are very much in conscious awareness. Death anxiety becoming conscious may 
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be as a result of previous, routine avoidance strategies no longer functioning 
effectively, in the face of changing health status, the illness context, and the 
proximal threat of disease. Continued reliance on denial in this case would 
serve the function of avoidance, possibly perpetuating and even increasing the 
feared, aversive experience of cancer-related anxieties. Although no singular 
coping style is entirely good or bad in itself (Carver, 1989), an ACT model of 
psychopathology would suggest that coping styles become unhelpful when they 
are avoidant and excessively relied upon, such that preoccupation with 
avoidance comes to restrict valued behaviour, and prohibit adaptation to 
changing environments. Furthermore, a considerable amount of literature 
supports the notion that thought suppression, as might occur in the denial of 
illness or of death-related thoughts (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 
1986), is an ineffective strategy which can inadvertently result in thoughts 
returning more frequently, and with increased emotional salience; thereby 
perpetuating distress (Masedo & Esteve, 2007; Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 
2001).   
1.3.4. The Role of Appraisals in Responses 
 Much of the existing coping literature emerged from theories of stress, due to 
the common role of appraisal implicated in both emotional responses and 
response styles. In health populations, a causal relationship has been 
postulated between illness representations (appraisals) and the selected 
response style(s) which are then employed (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980). 
These illness appraisals may be influenced by perceived symptoms, causes, 
consequences, control, and duration (Broadbent et al., 2015; Meyer, Leventhal 
& Gutmann, 1985).  Research has also shown that the stronger the perceived 
illness threat, the worse functioning, distress, quality of life, and the more 
avoidant the response styles that are utilised (Hagger & Orbell, 2010). Although 
illness appraisals may be central in eliciting emotional and cognitive reactions, 
even more so than objective disease characteristics (Rand et al., 2012), the 
psychological and disease outcomes associated with these appraisals may 
occur as a result of response styles, or what Lazarus (1966) termed secondary 
appraisals. Therefore, initial unpleasant thoughts and feelings elicited by illness 
appraisals may be compounded by a range of avoidant responses, adversely 
affecting psychological outcomes. Furthermore, ACT researchers would 
 61 
suggest that avoidant response styles may be used as an attempt to 
experientially avoid difficult internal thoughts and feelings brought about by the 
threatening illness appraisals (Harris, 2006). Problematic relationships to our 
inner experiences may therefore influence the response styles we choose, as 
we attempt to manage our internal responses to perceived threats, such as 
illness. ACT proposes acceptance of these inner experiences as the counter to 
experientially avoidant response styles, which have negative consequences for 
many healthcare populations, such as chronic pain (McCracken, 1998) and 
end-of-life cancer (Nipp et al., 2016).   
 
The proposed ACT mechanism by which clinical suffering occurs, i.e. through 
experiential avoidance, could help to explain many of the significant 
correlational findings that have been reported between threatening illness 
appraisals and poor outcomes (e.g. Galli et al., 2010), whereby response styles 
mediate the relationship between appraisal and outcome. Of note, a more 
accepting response style may in time also affect primary appraisal and the 
physiological response to stressors (Hoffman, Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 
2009), or perhaps the reporting of how threatening an illness is perceived to be 
(Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). This is not however the focus of 
this research nor of ACT interventions, which construe acceptance as a 
response-focused, rather than antecedent-focused strategy (Wolgast, Lundh, & 
Viborg, 2008). Whether or not initial appraisals are changed, outcomes can still 
be affected by shifting relationships to the inner experiences evoked by these 
appraisals, and by changing the problematic and avoidant attempts at 
emotional monitoring and control that can determine psychological outcomes 
and wellbeing (Kulpa, Ziętalewicz, Kosowicz, Stypuła-Ciuba, & Ziółkowska, 
2016).  
1.4. The Role of Verbal Language in Experiential Avoidance 
Verbal language enables us to relate stimuli to each other arbitrarily and in 
different ways. This can result in stimuli functions changing, so that they acquire 
new properties, even without direct experience. These properties, transferred to 
new stimuli through relational learning, can then elicit responses, and the way in 
which we then respond to stimuli changes accordingly (Blackledge, 2007; 
 62 
Hayes et al., 2011). Verbal language can therefore become increasingly 
problematic, as the networks of relations between verbal events and their 
transferred properties expand exponentially. We can consequently experience 
emotional responses, even in the absence of overt environmental cues, just 
through verbally recalling events. If we then attempt to avoid these painful 
experiences, greater numbers of symbolic representations may become related 
to them, and thus avoidance has to augment in order to try to avoid a growing 
number of pain-eliciting stimuli. In attempting to avoid pain, we therefore 
inadvertently limit our valued and meaningful action, and it is this avoidance 
which is key to ACT’s models of psychopathology and intervention (see 
extended paper 1.8).  
1.5. Background to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)  
An overview of ACT will provide some background to the focal aspect of this 
research: acceptance. This clarity is particularly important given that the word 
‘acceptance’ can mean a range of things depending on context, and is 
frequently used in social parlance to allude to a state of passiveness, 
resignation, or ‘giving up’ (see extended paper 1.7.1). Here, acceptance 
pertains to the opposite of this withdrawal or avoidance, and is a response to 
internal experiences which involves relinquishing unhelpful attempts to change 
or evaluate them.   
 
In ACT, the phrase ‘psychological pain’ is used to describe the everyday 
psychological distress that we as humans encounter throughout life. ACT 
makes a distinction between psychological pain, and suffering; the latter being 
an experience which occurs due to our very attempts to avoid and control 
psychological pain and its emotional consequences. According to Hayes and 
Smith (2005), suffering is the result of “a rigged game,” by which the authors 
imply that our efforts to save ourselves from pain are actually self-defeating, 
due to the role of language in our mental and emotional lives (see extended 
paper 1.4). ACT states that human language has given us the ability to predict 
and solve problems, which is extremely advantageous in the outside world, but 
can lead to suffering when these problem-solving abilities are then applied to 
our innermost thoughts, feelings, memories, and sensations. Attempts to ignore 
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or rid ourselves of these emotional experiences, or ‘problems,’ can become so 
restrictive that we are prevented from acting in line with our values. 
Furthermore, as any situation can become related to the pain we are attempting 
to avoid through relational framing, this pain is inadvertently evoked in more and 
more situations. Cognitive avoidance techniques thus take up time and energy 
which could otherwise be spent on positive and effective action. It is therefore 
not the experiences themselves which become the problem, but our increasing 
attempts to avoid and control them. Accordingly, symptom reduction is not the 
primary target of ACT, as people are encouraged to accept, rather than resist, 
psychological pain; though it may be a secondary by-product of changing how 
we respond to our inner experiences. 
 
ACT consequently seeks to reduce the impact of emotional experiences, rather 
than to reduce the experiences themselves, by shifting our relationship to the 
perceived problems. This shift is achieved through developing acceptance: the 
direct opposite of emotional control (see extended paper 1.7 – 1.73). Through 
encouraging the acceptance of difficult internal experiences, ACT renounces 
the assumption of healthy normality, i.e. the suggestion that psychological 
health equates to an absence of psychological pain (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 
2011). Furthermore, ACT suggests that the pervasiveness of the belief that 
psychological pain is an abnormal symptom enhances people’s strivings to 
avoid pain symptoms, and through this avoidance they paradoxically harm 
themselves in the process. It is therefore the cognitive, problem-solving 
processes which make us human that are also the mechanisms by which we 
suffer, as a result of our attempts to problem-solve our way out of psychological 
and emotional pain.  
 
Rather than assuming a healthy mind is pain-free, and that pain emerges due to 
faulty intrapsychic processes, ACT instead places great emphasis on 
understanding the function of internal behaviours in a given context, and how 
they are related to problematic actions, rather than trying to modify internal 
experiences directly. ACT does not attempt to alter cognitions on several 
counts: first, associative learning has already taken place, and cannot be un-
learned; secondly, in challenging the thoughts they can become more salient; 
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and finally, experiential avoidance may continue unless the context is changed 
(Hayes, Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013). ACT and other so-
called ‘third wave’ contextual behavioural therapies, such as Dialectical 
Behavior Therapy (Linehan, 1993), and Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy 
(Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), therefore represent  a departure away 
from the underlying tenets of the cognitive aspect of cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT), through their focus on the roles of acceptance, mindfulness, 
attention, and the importance of the function (rather than content) of cognitions 
(Hayes, 2004). As ACT does not target symptomology directly, viewing the 
struggle as the problem rather than the ‘symptoms’ themselves, it focuses 
instead on enriching and expanding a person’s life around their perceived 
problems. ACT can consequently be considered a model of wellbeing and 
health promotion, rather than of psychopathology.  
1.6 ACT Core Processes 
Whereas psychological flexibility is considered to be fundamental to 
psychological health (beyond the absence of psychological symptoms or 
‘disorder’), its opposite, psychological inflexibility, occurs when behavioural 
repertoires become rigid and insensitive to context, limiting personal and social 
functioning. ACT therefore aims to increase psychological flexibility, through the 
six, interconnected core processes demonstrated in the hexaflex below (Figure 
4). Here, both the presence and absence of psychological skills are shown, with 
the model demonstrating both psychological wellbeing and psychopathology. 
The six-process model informs ACT interventions, with the goal of creating a 
rich and meaningful life through present-moment contact and valued action; 
whilst being aware and accepting of painful experiences (Harris, 2006; Hayes et 
al., 2006). Five ACT process will be outlined briefly, but as acceptance is most 
relevant to this research, and also underpins many other ACT processes, it will 
be explored separately in section 1.7. 
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Figure 4: The ACT hexaflex of psychological wellbeing and psychopathology 
(adapted from Hayes et al., 2006).  
 
1.6.1 Contact with the Present Moment 
Each of the ACT core processes is linked to the present-moment, without 
awareness of which clients would not benefit from ACT interventions (Hayes, 
Strosahl, & Wilson, 2011). Contact with the present moment is bringing 
awareness to what is being experienced in the here-and-now, as it shifts and 
occurs, i.e. developing an observing self. Through this increased access to 
direct experience, activities can be focused on and fully engaged with. Such 
contact has previously been lost, due to preoccupation with avoidance 
strategies. Language is used to describe and label events as they occur 
moment-to-moment, noticing them in the present rather than considering the 
past or future with judgement and prediction. This process enhances our ability 
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Contact with the present moment / 
Dominance of conceptualised events 
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to be flexible in our interactions with the environment, where they were 
previously limited by rigid attentional control.  
 
Present moment awareness also requires an accepting stance, in order that 
there is a receptiveness to focus on and engage with whatever experiences are 
occurring. Furthermore, present moment awareness, acceptance, and defusion 
are all processes used in and enhanced by mindfulness: an awareness 
developed through “paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and 
nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (Kabat 
Zinn, 2003; see extended paper 1.6.2). With the acceptance of aversive internal 
experiences, these attentional processes allow a person to pursue valued 
activities, rather than continuing to engage in problematic avoidance 
behaviours.   
 
1.6.2 Self-As-Context 
 Self-as-context, or the ‘observing self,’ is the ability to adopt a perspective-
taking position, and so to separate experiences from a sense of self. There is a 
distinction between a) thoughts and feelings that arise in any given context, and 
b) the person observing those thoughts and feelings. Thus, a person does not 
need to be threatened or defined by the content of thoughts and feelings when 
they occur. ACT uses metaphors, mindfulness, and experiential exercises to 
develop ‘self-as-context’, thus undermining ‘self-as-content,’ and enhancing 
psychological flexibility.  
 
1.6.3 Defusion 
Cognitive defusion is the process by which the undesirable function of thoughts 
and private events is altered, shifting a person’s relationship to those 
experiences, rather than attempting to alter the form or content of the events 
themselves. This is achieved by creating contexts within which the unpleasant 
functions become lessened, and the dominance of relational frames over 
behaviour become weakened. Cognitive fusion is the state where people take 
their thoughts literally, leading their behaviour to become excessively ‘rule 
governed.’  
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In defusion, thoughts, memories, and images are mindfully observed and 
perceived as those very occurrences, rather than as truths or rules to be 
obeyed. An example of this might be learning to separate the thought “I am a 
bad person and do not deserve to be happy” from noticing “I am having the 
thought that I am a bad person who does not deserve to be happy.” Techniques 
which encourage defusion include repeating words until they become only 
sounds, thanking the mind for a thought, and acting in a way that contradicts the 
thought. By reducing the literal attributes of thoughts, people become able to 
respond to what the thought or image represents (some words strung together 
in a sentence; a picture in the mind), rather than to the content as bona fide 
truth. Word repetition has been shown to decrease the believability of self-
attacking thoughts, as well as the distress they once evoked (Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett, & Twohig, 2004).   
 
1.6.4 Values 
 Goals in ACT are informed by values, i.e. what truly matters to a person in 
terms of their life and what is meaningful to them. Values are seen as chosen 
life directions, described by Hayes and Smith (2005) as being qualities joining a 
string of unfolding actions together into a meaningful path. Values can never be 
entities that are owned or achieved, but rather guide actions and are something 
that is worked towards in an ongoing manner. Values are therefore overarching 
directions, whereas goals are temporary, concrete, measurable entities which 
act as milestones and can be used to monitor progress in living a valued life. 
ACT interventions are evaluated by the extent to which a person is reaching 
goals and acting in line with their chosen values, and whether they are 
successfully changing their behaviour in order to do so.  
 
Although they have benefits in themselves, mindfulness and acceptance 
processes in ACT are not standalone exercises. They are employed with the 
aim of helping a person to live a values-consistent life. ACT places great 
emphasis on striving towards values (which are often defined on domains such 
as relationship; career; friendship; leisure; health), which practitioners can use 
in motivating people to experience the pain and aversive experiences they have 
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previously attempted to avoid, in the service of working towards a more 
meaningful life.   
 
1.6.5 Committed Action 
Committed action is behaviour undertaken to achieve goals and work towards 
verbally-stated personal values, i.e. the translation of values into behaviours. 
Behaviour change in ACT is subject to many traditional behavioural techniques 
which increase or decrease the frequency of certain behaviours, such as 
positive reinforcement and exposure (Hayes et al., 2006). However, ACT 
processes of acceptance and awareness can add an advantage in addressing 
potential barriers to change, for example when values-consistent behaviour will 
involve making contact with feared experiences, or when previous attempts to 
do so have been unsuccessful. Furthermore, as each of the ACT processes are 
interdependent, it is unlikely that valued, committed action would be taken 
successfully until a person gains the psychological flexibility required to become 
more sensitive to reinforcement contingencies, as this ability is compromised 
when under rigid, rule-governed control (Hayes et al., 2011). The successful 
enactment of, and choosing of, values is therefore contingent on each of the 
other ACT processes, which in turn are best understood and undertaken in the 
context and service of valued action (as represented by Figure 4).   
1.7 Acceptance  
 
1.7.1 Acceptance in Different Forms 
Acceptance has been described as ‘making room’ for the unpleasant feelings, 
thoughts, and urges we experience, allowing them to occur without judging 
them, avoiding them, or being overly concerned by them (Harris, 2006). 
Acceptance in ACT is therefore not resignation or self-defeat, but an active, 
“vital embrace of the moment” (Hayes, 2005, p.7), akin to an attitude of 
willingness. It involves a non-judgmental stance towards feelings, thoughts, and 
the self, so that these experiences can be fully embraced, freeing us from 
struggle and instead allowing us to engage in activities of valued and 
meaningful living. The opposite of acceptance is experiential avoidance, which 
is any attempt to control, avoid, or directly alter the inner experiences of 
thoughts, feelings, memories, or physical sensations, and when relied upon, is 
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implicated in the ACT model of psychopathology (Hayes et al., 2011). Even 
though acceptance of inner experiences may fluctuate over time (Flaxman, 
Blackledge, & Bond, 2010), which is understandable given the long history of 
dominant cognitive fusion processes, any overall reduction in experiential 
avoidance and more engagement with valued activities still represents positive 
change. Furthermore, there may be times when to experientially avoid is 
functional, but as with any avoidant response, long-term and indiscriminate 
reliance on avoidance has been associated with many adverse outcomes, 
including anxiety and chronic pain (Kashdan, Barrios, Forsyth, & Steger, 2006; 
Ruiz-Parraga & Lopes-Martinez, 2015).   
 
From within an ACT framework, acceptance therefore has a very specific 
definition, which may differ greatly to its use in common parlance, or in other 
theoretical contexts. In common usage within an illness context, acceptance 
may be talked about in terms of someone coming to terms with a terminal 
prognosis, and is positioned as the opposite to a state of denial (Hulbert-
Williams, Storey, & Wilson, 2015). For example, in well-known models of grief, 
such as the grief cycle by Kübler-Ross (1969), acceptance is the final stage in a 
theoretical grieving process entered by those who are dying themselves, or who 
have been bereaved; though the processes by which one moves through 
different stages are not clearly delineated in the literature. Although the stages 
have been somewhat decontextualized in modern applications of the model, 
and were never intended to be interpreted as occurring in a fixed order, 
acceptance in the original context of the model does still refer to a state where a 
person no longer experiences difficult emotions, such as anger (Guex, 1994). 
This idea is theoretically inconsistent with the view of Hayes (1994), who posits 
that the occurrence of emotional experiences is beyond our control, and key to 
being human. The notion that the ideal state of acceptance is reached when we 
no longer experience difficult emotions also implies that the emotions 
themselves, rather than experiential avoidance, are problematic, and somehow 
obstruct people from reaching an ‘ideal’ state of emotional stability. It has been 
noted, however, that higher levels of acceptance (as intended in the ACT 
context) may over time lead to fewer ‘negative’ emotions (Rothbaum, 1982), 
suggesting a pattern of circularity, whereby acceptance may come over time to 
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affect appraisals of distress, as well as being a response applied following initial 
appraisal.  
 
By the logic of the grief cycle, acceptance is considered an outcome and an end 
stage in itself, which occurs once the emotional stages preceding it, e.g. anger 
and depression, have been passed through. It is therefore implied that 
acceptance is a desirable and final destination, rather than an ongoing, active 
embrace of emotions and inner experiences. Contrastingly, ACT suggests that 
acceptance itself is a tool for living alongside these feelings, which could be 
actively employed at any stage in the cycle of grief, rather than only occurring 
as an end stage or outcome following the feelings somehow being resolved. 
Thus, acceptance in an ACT sense is both a tool for achieving change, but also 
acts as a mechanism of change in itself (Hayes & Pankey, 2003). Acceptance, 
when conceptualised as an end stage where emotions are escaped, as in the 
grief cycle, may therefore be more akin to a state of passive resignation or 
disengagement than an active embrace of emotion, and is thus unlikely to 
facilitate valued living due to the impact of experiential avoidance upon 
psychological inflexibility. Although ACT would commend relinquishing a fight 
against inner experiences, this is through conscious choice and is distinct from 
a state of resignation (Hayes & Smith, 2005), in that it still requires and 
encourages active engagement with inner experiences. Thus, ‘giving up’ or 
relinquishing a fight in ACT is separate and distinct from helplessness or 
resigning oneself to emotional distress, with a key difference between the two 
types of acceptance determined by whether or not it allows a person to continue 
engaging in valued behaviours, thus maintaining or improving quality of life.  
 
A further facet of the acceptance stage in Kübler-Ross’ (1969) work is of a 
coming to terms with reality, notably accepting the fact that ourselves, or those 
who have died, are not returning. Acceptance here seems to refer to accepting 
a cognitive reality, rather than accepting inner experiences. Whether or not 
these two realities (the reality of a situation and the reality of present moment 
emotions) are separable is a point of contention, as paying moment-to-moment 
attention to our inner lives is arguably our reality at that given time. 
Experiencing loss is undoubtedly very painful, but in suggesting we can only 
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cope with reality when we have reached a state of acceptance, acceptance is 
again positioned as an end state, devoid of emotions or emotionally-evocative 
thoughts. Conversely, within ACT, acceptance is a chosen embrace of these 
inner experiences, which may or may not continue to occur, but which will not 
obstruct continued valued action and engagement unless met with experiential 
avoidance.   
 
1.7.2. Acceptance and Mindfulness 
Acceptance is cultivated and practiced through mindfulness, which brings 
moment-to-moment experiences into attention, combining the two ACT 
processes of acceptance and present-moment awareness. Acceptance is also 
required in the other ACT processes of defusion, contact with the present 
moment, and self-as-context (Hayes et al., 2006). Values and committed action 
may be the behavioural components of ACT, but such actions take place whilst 
experiencing internal events, and there must therefore be an awareness and 
willingness to allow these to occur. Mindfulness is therefore a strategy by which 
acceptance and awareness are practiced, in order to engage with one’s valued 
behaviours. In this sense acceptance helps to facilitate values-based action, 
through a willingness to experience increased contact with the external world 
(Hayes et al., 2006). Furthermore, cultivating present-moment awareness and 
attention without a willing acceptance of inner experiences may serve to 
increase experiential avoidance, and therefore acceptance is key to these 
activities. Some emerging evidence suggests that mindful awareness or 
increased insight without acceptance, combined with the presence of negative 
illness beliefs, may increase depression, suicidality, or demoralisation in clinical-
level mental health problems (e.g. Osatuke et al., 2008).  
 
Almost mirroring ACT’s commitment to a contextual approach, Kabat-Zinn 
(2003) cautions against the temptation to manualise and apply mindfulness to 
clinical problems, without understanding the context in which it belongs. For 
example, in its increasingly popular presence in society, decontextualised 
mindfulness may become touted a curative intervention or relaxation strategy, 
with the advertised purpose of addressing, or even fixing, ‘abnormal’ distress. 
Hayes et al., (1994) refer to this resistance and renouncing of distress as the 
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assumption of healthy normality. However, a true mindful approach would 
require a complete departure from the medicalised, curative perspective so 
pervasive in modern society, and instead invoking a willing openness to accept 
both good and bad experiences, rather than trying to forcibly eliminate 
unpleasant ones, or search out a ‘cure’ for normal, human psychological pain.   
 
1.7.3. Acceptance vs. Reappraisal 
A distinction has been made between the roles of antecedent-focused and 
response-focused emotional regulation strategies and interventions (Wolgast, 
Lundh, & Viborg, 2008). Within this overarching model of emotion generation 
(Gross, 1998), emotions (which have both cognitive and physiological 
components) can be regulated at either the level of initial appraisal, prior to the 
emotion fully occurring, or during the response, after the appraisal and emotion 
has occurred. Common psychological interventions using antecedent-focused 
techniques include cognitive therapy (e.g. Beck, 1979), which attempts to shift 
appraisals in order to alter the feelings and behaviours which they elicit. A 
critique of this approach from proponents of an acceptance approach would be 
that cognitive interventions uphold the notion of asserting control over 
cognitions, by replacing them with more accurate or balanced appraisals as a 
mechanism of change. Attempts to assert control over inner experience are a 
purported mechanism of psychopathology, whereby such attempts are in effect 
avoidance, and more problematic than the experiences themselves (Hayes, 
2004). In order to alter their form, ‘maladaptive’ cognitions must first be 
suppressed, which only increases their frequency and salience (Hayes, 2004).   
 
However, it could also be argued that acceptance is in itself a form of 
reappraisal, as accepted inner experiences may then be re-evaluated and 
reappraised as less intolerable in the future. Altering cognitions in this way is 
not the direct focus of ACT interventions, which instead aim for the opposite: to 
foster acceptance without controlling or suppressing any internal experiences 
(Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008), thereby changing the context, and not the 
content of internal events. Nevertheless, although much of the ACT literature 
dismisses reappraisal interventions for being experientially avoidant, there is 
some evidence to support reappraisals as equally, or in some cases more, 
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effective at diminishing distress as acceptance-based interventions (Hoffman, 
Heering, Sawyer, & Asnaani, 2008; Arch et al., 2012); though randomly 
assigning participants to experimental response style conditions may not 
account for the time it takes to develop acceptance skills.   
 
A point of convergence is that both ACT and cognitive reappraisal interventions 
are more effective for psychological outcomes than emotional suppression 
techniques. This may cast some doubt on ACT’s claim that reappraisal is likely 
to have the same negative effect as thought suppression, i.e. an increase in 
unwanted thoughts; though there is some debate as to whether the 
mechanisms of reappraisal are clearly understood (Herbert & Forman, 2013). 
Regardless of whether secondary reappraisal plays some role in ACT 
interventions, there is evidence to support both forms of intervention in reducing 
distress (Wolgast et al., 2011). Substantial evidence for the superiority of one 
approach over the other has yet to be demonstrated, nor is it perhaps strictly 
necessary if both are effective and have clinical utility (Helbig-Lang, Rusch, 
Rief, & Lincoln, 2015). Although they differ in philosophy and proposed 
mechanisms of change, given that both interventions acknowledge the harmful 
role of avoidance in the formation and maintenance of psychological distress, 
there is support for the idea that ACT and cognitive approaches could therefore 
be used in conjunction with one another (Ciarrochi & Bailey, 2008; Gillanders, 
Ferreira, Bose, & Esrich, 2013), as has been successful in mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (Kuyken et al., 2010).    
1.8 ACT Models of Psychopathology and Intervention 
When attempts to avoid aversive internal events dominate, our ability to 
respond flexibly to the demands of changing contexts is compromised (Törneke, 
Luciano, & Valdivia Salas, 2008), so that we do not engage in behaviour that 
contradicts the verbalised view of ourselves. We can inadvertently live more in 
our verbally-remembered past and verbally-imagined future than we do in the 
present, thereby becoming controlled by our internal dialogues (Ciarrochi, 
Bilich, & Godsell, 2010). These dialogues are automatically reinforced, e.g. 
when we believe we have solved a problem, and as a result we continue to 
behave in ways that are in line with our verbal theories. The dominance of these 
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verbal behaviours, coupled with a lack of awareness of this process, is said to 
represent a state of cognitive fusion, in which a person responds to their 
thoughts as though they represent reality: often with painful consequences.  
 
When cognitive fusion occurs, a person can no longer act in line with their 
personal values, which would provide the benefit of being rewarding and 
positively reinforcing. Instead, actions become regulated by unhelpful, 
interrelated contexts, such as literality (whereby thoughts are taken as truth), 
reason-giving (whereby causes for their behaviour are constructed), or 
experiential control (attempts to manipulate and avoid aversive internal events) 
(Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). The verbal contexts of cognitive 
fusion produce attempts to alter the form, frequency, or sensitivity of internal 
events, thus the focus on the rules of the inner world increases, which sees 
valued actions becoming fewer. Such inner attempts to control and avoid 
‘negative’ experiences, through strategies such as thought suppression, 
inevitably fail; instead augmenting their frequency and strengthening the 
number of stimuli in the relational network. Thought suppression is ineffective 
due to the monitoring process that is employed to see whether the thought has 
re-occurred, paradoxically bringing the thought back into mind (Wegner, 1989). 
Furthermore, avoidance of internal events enhances their emotional salience, 
thereby necessitating increasingly restrictive behaviours to avoid an increasing 
number of stimuli in the relational network that can evoke the feared 
experience.  
 
In order to undermine this fusion and promote wellbeing, ACT aims to enhance 
psychological flexibility, and create cognitive defusion. An alternative context is 
constructed whereby thoughts are seen as verbal events rather than literal 
‘truths’. As language itself creates problematic rule-governed rigidity, ACT 
employs ‘non-linear language’ in its interventions, through the use of 
metaphors, stories, exercises, and experiential tasks (Hayes, 2004).   
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1.9. Evidence for Psychological Interventions in Cancer 
Cancer is still a relatively new area in the field of psychological intervention, with 
psychological input having increased over the last 15 to 20 years. Psychological 
needs were brought into sharper focus by the burgeoning hospice movement 
which began in the late 1960s, and promoted a holistic treatment approach for 
patients with terminal cancer. The recent application of psychology to a cancer 
population may be reflected in the psycho-oncology evidence base, which 
remains limited when compared to other populations in physical and mental 
health.   
 
Psychologists working in cancer care apply a wide range of psychological 
interventions (Grant & Kalus, 2010), which have broadly demonstrated 
effectiveness in reducing distress, and specifically anxiety (Andrykowski & 
Manne, 2006), though conclusive evidence for the most effective approach 
remains lacking and inconclusive (Galway et al., 2012). Such a lack of 
psychological treatment superiority is not unique to a cancer population, 
however, and also prevails in the literature on general adult and child 
populations. Death is a prospect often considered by, and relevant to, cancer 
patients and their distress (Gonen et al., 2012), yet many traditional models of 
dying are phase models rather than clear treatment protocols, such as the 
Kübler-Ross model of grief (see extended paper 1.7.1). The need for further 
research into psycho-oncological interventions has therefore been highlighted 
(Newell, Sanson-Fisher, & Savolainen, 2002). Furthermore, despite various 
psychological therapies reportedly reducing distress, and improving quality of 
life, emotional adjustment, and even cancer prognosis (Newell et al., 2002), 
many such effectiveness studies have been hindered in part by methodological 
limitations, such as common method variance, or researcher bias (Baliousis, 
Rennoldson, & Snowden, 2015).  
 
Dependent on the need of the patient and the target for treatment, e.g. needle 
phobia, conditioned nausea, or psychological distress, common existing 
interventions in psycho-oncology include CBT, behavioural activation, 
relaxation, family systemic therapy, counselling (Macmillan, 2015), and more 
traditionally, psychodynamic psychotherapy. There is a lack of methodological 
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rigour in terms of how these are defined or implemented, adding to the lack of 
recommendations available in the evidence base or even NICE guidelines for 
psychological intervention (NICE, 2004). Interventions may be coping- or skills-
related, and delivered by healthcare workers such as nurses, or more formal 
psychological therapies, delivered by trained therapists and psychologists for 
those with clinically-significant distress. There is some evidence for the 
effectiveness of ACT in cancer populations (e.g. Feros, Lane, Ciarrochi, & 
Blackledge, 2013), though much research into this population remains 
observational, i.e. studying the population in terms of ACT processes and 
psychological outcomes. These studies are revealing more about how ACT 
processes function in this population, and whether increasing them is likely to 
help cancer patients and their psychological distress (Low et al., 2012). Given 
the ethical concerns surrounding research with cancer patients (Reid, 2009), 
having a clear rationale and direction for intervention, ACT or otherwise, is likely 
to be important and can be supported by evidence gathered by these 
observational research designs.  
 
 1.9.1. Implications for Psychological Research in Cancer 
Given the breadth of the cancer population as a whole, and their differing 
contexts, interventions need to be realistic in terms of goals, measures, and the 
aims of treatment; factors which may also have influenced the non-significant 
findings in effectiveness studies reported in several systematic literature 
reviews (e.g. Lepore & Coyne, 2015; Newell et al., 2002). For example, it would 
not be realistic or appropriate to apply cognitive reappraisal techniques if a 
person’s thoughts about dying are realistic representations of their situation. 
Here, an acceptance approach might be more appropriate, given that ACT is 
implicated for situations with no obvious solution. Furthermore, clinical change 
needs to be constructed and evaluated in a way that is context-specific; 
reductions in measures of distress may be small but meaningful for a person at 
the end of life, when eliminating negative emotionality would be an 
inappropriate aim for intervention (Golijani-Moghaddam, 2014). These factors 
may help to explain why there is not a more conclusive evidence base for a 
cancer population, as controlled trials and other outcome studies require a 
scheduled number of interventions (which may not be needed nor possible in 
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this population), as well as a treatment protocol, specified psychiatric diagnosis, 
and a specific set of outcome measures; standardised variables which may not 
necessarily suit the settings or the psychological needs of cancer patients. 
Given the patient-reported need for, and positive response to, psycho-
oncological intervention (Golijani-Moghaddam, 2014), it is important for any 
intervention to consider and meet these contextual demands. ACT, though not 
experimentally supported in more than ten cancer intervention studies, has 
been suggested as a suitably flexible intervention, and therefore represents an 
area of research which warrants further investigation for cancer patients 
(Hulbert-Williams et al., 2015).    
 
.  
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2. Extended methods 
2.1 Study Methods 
 
2.1.1. Inclusion Criteria 
 This study recruited a wide range of cancer patients in different settings and at 
different stages of illness. Furthermore, participants with all types and sites of 
cancer were eligible for inclusion, in a deliberate contrast to much cancer 
research, which focuses on specific populations when measuring factors which 
affect quality of life and distress. Varied stages and sites of cancer helped to 
expand upon whether the utility of response styles varied with illness context, 
such as whether life was in imminent danger, or whether responses had an 
overall impact on the wider cancer population. As death anxiety theory implies 
that threats to life may increase anxiety and avoidant responses, the inclusion 
of a range of cancer stages and also a palliative sub-group allowed us to see 
whether results would vary by the stage of cancer; although it was also noted 
that the severity of illness perceptions would not necessarily be reflective of 
objective threat to life.  
 
2.1.2. Recruitment Procedures 
Participants were recruited from Nottingham City Hospital, Kingsmill Hospital, 
John Eastwood Hospice, and from Nottinghamshire county, via the Macmillan 
community support service team. Participants were approached by clinical 
gatekeepers, who were doctors and nurses within the cancer services. 
Gatekeepers were initially approached by email, and were met with several 
times to discuss the study, before agreeing to take part by approaching 
potential participants and handing out questionnaire packs. Clinical gatekeepers 
also helped to shape the demographic and clinical questions asked on the 
questionnaires, and also to delineate the processes involved with participants 
completing and sending back questionnaires. A prompt sheet was designed in 
consultation with the gatekeepers (Appendix A), so that they could each provide 
participants with consistent information about the study, before asking them to 
read the participant information sheets (Appendix B) and to fill out the consent 
forms and questionnaires if they wished to take part (Appendices C & D). It was 
decided that providing participants with stamped, addressed envelopes would 
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both preserve the confidentiality of responses in clinical settings, and potentially 
reduce any impact that the risk of clinicians seeing completed questionnaires 
might have on participants’ responses. Providing envelopes also eased the 
burden on clinicians’ workloads, as they were not involved with collecting 
questionnaires in or handing them back to the researcher; time-consuming 
activities which could have impacted upon their clinical duties and was therefore 
not optimal for patient care. Recruitment of participants took place between 
September 2015 and February 2016.  
 
2.1.3. Online and Paper Participation 
The recruitment strategy of using both paper and online versions of the 
questionnaire was designed to target maximum numbers of participants, in as 
broad a number of contexts as possible. The online questionnaire allowed 
recruitment to be extended beyond hospital settings, thereby targeting 
participants who no longer had cancer, and whose experiences may therefore 
have been different.  
 
Participants were able to participate in the study online, and were targeted via 
advertisements placed on social media platforms (Facebook and Twitter), and 
online cancer fora, such as Cancer Chat. Permissions were sought from 
website administrators via email before advertisements were placed on these 
fora. Online participants were asked to create a pseudonym, by combining the 
month of their birth with the first three letters of their mother’s maiden name, for 
example ‘03FOR’. These pseudonyms were then used to record and track 
participants’ data, so that their responses could be matched up if they 
participated in a follow-up questionnaire three months later.  
 
Paper questionnaires were each issued with an assigned code, pertaining to 
the hospital or hospice where they were given out, e.g. ‘NC31’ = Nottingham 
City Hospital, participant number 31. This identifier allowed the researcher to 
track which gatekeepers were issuing questionnaires, and to liaise with any who 
were not, to see whether they were experiencing issues. The unique identifiers 
also allowed for questionnaire responses to be stored separately from consent 
forms displaying participant names and contact details, in line with data 
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protection procedures. However, as both paper questionnaires and consent 
forms were labelled with corresponding codes, this allowed a participant’s data 
to be withdrawn if requested, by matching up their code with their named 
consent form. This was a precautionary process but was not required, as no 
participants requested the withdrawal of their data from the study.  
 
2.1.4. Data Storage and Coding 
Data were stored on an encrypted data stick, upon which was a password-
protected spreadsheet. Data on the spreadsheet were identifiable only by 
participant codes, with the corresponding consent forms -listing names and 
contact details - stored in a locked filing cabinet at the University of Lincoln. The 
participant codes allowed for data tracking, in order to monitor when participants 
had first completed the battery of questionnaires, and when they should be 
issued with a follow-up three months later, provided they had consented to this. 
Follow-up participant information sheets, consent forms, and questionnaires 
(see Appendices E & F) were mostly issued online, via a link sent to participants 
in an email; with the exception of three participants who had opted to be sent a 
paper questionnaire by post. 
 
Upon receipt of completed questionnaires and consent forms, the data were 
stored securely in a locked filing cabinet in the University of Lincoln, only 
accessible to the departmental administrators and research team. The data will 
be stored securely for five years before being destroyed, in line with the Data 
Protection Act (1998) and the British Psychological Society Code of Ethics and 
Conduct (2009). Online data was stored securely using an online survey tool 
called Qualtrics, where it was password-protected and inaccessible to any 
external party. Participant names were not required for the online arm of the 
study, as participants created and were tracked by their unique pseudonyms.   
 
2.1.5. Ethics 
The study was granted ethical approval by the University of Lincoln Ethics 
Committee, and the East Midlands Research Ethics Committee (REC reference 
14/EM/1224), in January 2015 (Appendix G). Further amendments made to the 
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processes of recruitment and data collection received ethical approval in May 
2015 (Appendix H).   
 
Ethical considerations in this study were informed by feedback from the NHS 
ethics committee, meetings with clinical gatekeepers and research supervisors, 
and common practices in the literature. Research has suggested that cancer 
patients find participating in research to be beneficial, as they are able to share 
their experiences and contribute to future practice (Pessin et al., 2008). 
Evidence for this interest was shown by the 45 participants who opted to be 
notified of the study results once they had been analysed. However, the primary 
concern voiced by the NHS ethics committee was whether issuing participants 
with cancer-related questionnaires was likely to induce distress. Although the 
questionnaire battery comprised standardised measures which have been 
issued to cancer participants in previous research, the ethics committee’s 
concern required the inclusion of several statements throughout the 
questionnaire to preface the nature of the questions, and to emphasise that 
participants had the right to either leave out questions, or to withdraw from the 
study at any time. Furthermore, contact details for the research team were 
given in participant information sheets, alongside sources of support 
participants could consult if they felt distressed after completing the measures. 
Participants were asked to read information sheets about the study prior to 
signing consent forms, and filling out any questionnaires. The questionnaire 
was long enough to measure a range of processes and outcomes, but due 
consideration was given to its length, as participants may not have been feeling 
well. Short-form versions of two subscales were included in order to ensure 
participants were not over-burdened by a lengthy and very time-consuming 
questionnaire battery. 
 
Clinical gatekeepers were appointed in order to mitigate the chances of 
vulnerable participants being approached and asked to participate in the study. 
It had also been agreed that participants’ consultants or lead professionals 
would be made aware that they were taking part, but as the gatekeepers held 
those roles, a separate process for this notification was not necessary. A further 
ethical process decided upon was that prior to follow-up, the names of 
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consenting participants would be checked with gatekeepers. This was to check 
whether it was still appropriate to contact that person, given that the nature of 
disease means their condition may have deteriorated. In three cases, 
participants had died between initial participation and follow-up, and this 
safeguard therefore prevented any inappropriate contact being made, e.g. 
sending out a follow-up questionnaire, if the participants had chosen to be 
contacted by post.   
 
2.2. Choice of Theoretical Categories 
A thorough search of the literature was conducted via electronic databases and 
hand-searching reference lists, in order to choose the most appropriate 
measures for use in this study. Measures were chosen on three domains: 
cancer characteristics and appraisals (measured by clinical questions and Brief 
IPQ); response styles (measured by AAQ II and Brief COPE); and both distress 
and quality of life outcomes (measured by HADS, FACT-G, and DAS). 
However, in using three theoretical categories of variables, the study did not 
seek to establish temporality, as it was acknowledged that illness perceptions 
and responses can not only contribute to psychological outcomes, but may also 
influence each other. For example, an accepting stance towards emotions may 
over time lead to cognitive defusion, i.e. separation from thoughts about illness, 
which are then retrospectively reported as being less severe.  
 
Hayes et al. (2006) have called for more ‘micro studies’, of key processes, to 
see whether they work in a theoretically-coherent way, and acceptance was the 
a priori response style of interest in this study. Acceptance may also account for 
a greater proportion of outcome than other ACT processes (Hulbert-Williams et 
al., 2015). Measures of alternative response styles were included alongside 
acceptance, as theoretically-related variables, and because the inclusion of 
additional behavioural measures has been called for, when studying how ACT 
processes relate to outcomes (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Specifically, 
response styles were considered in terms of being approach or avoidant 
responses, in line with the overarching theory of ACT’s model of acceptance 
and avoidance as underlying mechanisms of health and psychopathology, 
respectively. Grouping Brief COPE styles together may also improve the 
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measure’s scale reliability, given the high rate of interdependence between 
some of its items (Hankins, Foster, Hulbert-Williams, & Breckons, 2013). Brief 
COPE items were not defined in terms of groups however until after 
correlational analyses, which were carried out to see which items were 
correlated with outcomes. Final items grouped as ‘avoidant’ comprised self-
distract, denial, behavioural disengagement, venting, and self-blame. Self-
blame is thought to serve an avoidant function similar to inhibition or withdrawal, 
whilst venting constitutes the avoidance of moment-to-moment tolerance of 
emotions and active coping efforts (Carver, 1982). The decision to measure 
response styles was also drawn from the extensive literature base on the 
relationships between coping and outcomes in cancer patients (e.g. Carver et 
al., 1993; Stanton et al., 2000) (see extended paper 1.3).  
 
Lazarus (1996) suggested the importance of knowing what is of particular and 
imminent concern to patients in order to study their response styles. 
Furthermore, illness appraisals have been strongly implicated in how people 
respond to cancer and other diseases (e.g. Rand et al., 2012), and may interact 
with response styles in determining outcomes (Carver et al., 1993). An illness 
appraisal measure provided a way to capture subjective initial illness status and 
meaning, and a cancer-related context for the questionnaire battery. It also 
allowed for the assessment of whether cancer was impacting upon patients, as 
if not the population would not necessarily have differed from any other. There 
are subjective processes involved with illness appraisal, and for this reason 
more objective measures of illness status were also included (such as cancer 
stage); though these were not clinically checked with patient records, and were 
therefore not immune to subjective processes. Further background variables 
which have been linked to responses and outcomes in cancer, such as age, 
and number of previous cancers, were also measured and included. 
 
The selected outcomes were for measures of anxiety, distress, death anxiety, 
and cancer-related quality of life. These outcomes are common in cancer-
related research and would thus allow for comparisons to be drawn between 
research and theoretical findings. Quality of life has been described as a “critical 
endpoint” in health-related research (Smith, Avis, & Assman, 1999, p. 447), and 
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is also affected by emotional outcomes, such as anxiety and depression. 
Anxiety and depression contribute to an overall picture of psychological 
distress, but may also affect worse physical outcomes (Gillanders et al., 2015). 
Death anxiety was measured as a theoretically-relevant concept, which is 
known to occur amongst cancer patients. Furthermore, TMT would suggest that 
death anxiety should only increase in the presence of an accepting response 
style; offering a theoretical counter to an ACT model of psychological health and 
emotional acceptance.  
 
2.3. Measures 
Permissions for the use of subscales were granted by the questionnaire 
authors, where required, and were purchased for the HADS. 
 
 2.3.1. Adaptation of Measures 
 The wording in-between the subscales in the questionnaire battery was partly 
instated as a result of the requirements of the NHS ethics committee (see 
extended paper 2.1.5), and partly served as a primer and contextual cue for the 
more general measures included on the questionnaire. For example, text 
inserted prior to the first item of the Brief COPE items asked participants to 
consider the items in relation to their cancer.   
 
Some items on the Brief IPQ (item numbers 2,3,7,8) were altered, in line with 
recommendations from the author (Broadbent et al., 2015) and researchers 
investigating the validity of the Brief IPQ for cancer populations (Price et al., 
2012; van Oort, Schröder, & French, 2011). Alterations to the wording of items 
made them first person, cancer-specific, and in some cases improved their 
clarity (van Oort et al., 2011). For example, an item which asked about 
perceived control over cancer, was replaced by perceived influence over 
cancer, with the authors’ rationale for this change being that control was 
abstract and not necessarily internally-attributed. One original timeline question, 
which had poor psychometric properties for participants with short prognoses 
(Price et al., 2012), was replaced by an original item from the IPQ-Revised, 
from which the Brief IPQ was derived and which has well-established validity in 
cancer populations (Ashley et al., 2013). The replaced item still targeted 
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perceived life expectancy: ‘How long do you think your illness will continue?’ 
was therefore substituted for ‘I expect to have this cancer for the rest of my life’.  
 
2.3.2. Justification of Measures 
Two questionnaires were included in their brief forms, to prevent over-burdening 
participants with cancer, and to prevent high rates of study attrition. The six 
standardised questionnaires chosen to make up the questionnaire battery are 
frequently used in research on distress and quality of life in health populations, 
and are therefore easily related to other findings. The exception to this is the 
DAS, as death anxiety is not routinely measured. However, the DAS has been 
used in cancer research, but far less frequently than measures of general 
anxiety, such as the HADS. The DAS remains the most widespread measure of 
death anxiety (Neimeyer, Moser, & Wittkowski, 2003), and was less lengthy to 
complete than other death anxiety measures available; a factor which was key 
given the likely physical health limitations of some participants. The Brief IPQ 
has good psychometric properties (Broadbent et al., 2015), in terms of its 
sensitivity to change and validity, and has been used in both long and short 
form in cancer populations. However, the internal reliability as measured using 
Cronbach’s alpha (α=.38) was lower for this study than in research elsewhere 
with cancer patients, possibly due to the changes made to scale items to 
improve their readability and validity for the population. As the scale attempts to 
assess “both emotional and cognitive representations of illness” (Broadbent et 
al., 2015, p.631), it was used here as a broader measure of the experience of 
cancer, in recognition of the complex and multi-factorial nature of illness.  
 
Although there has been some concern as to whether the AAQ II has poor 
validity in measuring several ACT processes, which may conflate with distress 
outcomes (Wolgast, 2014), the AAQ II may be most reflective of experiential 
acceptance over any other ACT process and therefore has utility within this 
study, as well as ubiquity in its use elsewhere in the literature (Francis, Dawson, 
& Golijani-Moghaddam, in press). Furthermore, at the time of beginning this 
study, the AAQ II was the only validated measure of experiential acceptance, 
though a later further measure of acceptance has since been developed 
(Francis et al., in press).      
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There is a wealth of literature that studies response styles, as measured by the 
Brief COPE, and outcomes of quality of life and distress. However, little 
research has used the AAQ II alongside the Brief COPE, despite experiential 
avoidance potentially mediating the effects of coping styles upon distress 
outcomes (Fledderus, Bohlmeijer, & Pieterse, 2010). One potential reason for 
the lack of inclusion of the AAQ II in cancer research is that acceptance is an 
item listed on the Brief COPE, though as explained below there are theoretical 
contrasts between the two types of avoidance. This study included both the 
Brief COPE and AAQ II measures, in order to assess the contribution of 
acceptance to the outcomes well-known to be influenced by different Brief 
COPE styles in cancer patients. 
 
Acceptance as measured by the Brief COPE alludes to ‘accepting the fact that 
the stressful event has occurred and is real’, i.e. a form of cognitive awareness 
of a situation rather than of one’s innermost states. Carver (1982) stated that 
this accepting coping strategy allows people to actively engage with situations, 
and whilst acceptance on the Brief COPE differs in its definition from 
acceptance in ACT, both may facilitate approach rather than avoidant 
responses. The two items were included in bivariate correlations to see whether 
they were associated with each other, and related to outcomes in the same 
direction.  
 
The FACT-G is cancer-specific, and therefore targets aspects of quality of life 
known to be affected by cancer, through items which ask about side effects of 
treatment, pain, and concerns about dying, for example. Although alternative 
measures of quality of life are frequently used with cancer patients, such as the 
SF-6D or EQ5D, these measures are expensive to use and are also not 
disease-specific. Thus, the FACT-G was considered a less global, and more 
specific option to capture cancer-related quality of health domains for this 
population; although the scores from the FACT-G can be mapped on to those of 
the EQ5D and the SF-6D to improve generalisability across research projects, 
as required (Teckle et al., 2013). Although not initially designed for patients in 
remission, the FACT-G is still useful and valid for historical cancer patients, 
 87 
despite the fact some items such as ‘I have nausea’ may no longer be relevant 
(Yost et al., 2013).  
2.4. Details of Additional Analyses  
 
2.4.1. Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping is a technique which estimates the sampling distribution of a 
statistic by repeatedly taking samples from a data set, and is defined here due 
to its use in PROCESS; the statistical package used to run moderation analyses 
on the data set. Bootstrapping estimates these samples when samples are not 
large, or data is not normally distributed. The process works by calculating the 
parameters of each smaller sample borrowed from the overall data set, up to 
2000 times. This creates parameter estimates, from which confidence intervals 
can be drawn (Field, 2013).  
 
2.4.2. Chi-Squared Secondary Analyses 
 Chi-squared tests of association were carried out on the demographic details 
between paper and online participant groups, to see whether the groups 
differed significantly in their participant make up, on measures of cancer stage, 
age, and gender. These tests were conducted as secondary analyses (see 
extended paper 3.3.3 for the results). The chi-squared used Fisher’s exact test 
to calculate the exact probability of the Chi-Squared statistic, which is implicated 
when groups are small, or of uneven sizes (Field, 2013). Chi-squared tests are 
used to assess whether there is a significant relationship between two 
categorical variables (online and paper questionnaires) from a single population 
(participants in the study).   
 
2.4.3. Comparing Means in Secondary Analyses 
 One-way ANOVAs were carried out to explore whether there were significant 
differences in levels of acceptance between stages of cancer. Additional 
independent samples t-tests were also carried out to determine whether 
participant response styles and outcomes were significantly different between 
those who had only had cancer once (i.e. at the time of participation), and those 
with experience of multiple cancers. The rationale for these further demographic 
tests was that cancer stage and acceptance were significantly correlated in 
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preliminary bivariate correlations, and ANOVAs would reveal whether certain 
stages of cancer had significantly higher or lower levels of acceptance. The 
theoretical rationale for testing was that TMT (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & 
Solomon, 1986) would predict avoidance (the unipolar construct to acceptance 
on the AAQ II) to be higher in late stage cancers, as a result of more proximal 
threat to life. Having previous experience of cancer may also have increased 
the awareness of death, which according to TMT would –and should - lead to 
more avoidant responses, and hypothesised improved outcomes.  
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3. Extended Results 
 
3.1. Assumption Checking and Outliers 
Suitability for multivariate analyses at both times one and two was established 
using an extensive range of assumption tests, which revealed no violations of 
assumptions. All data were checked for normality, linearity, and converted to z-
scores, i.e. studentised residuals, in order to check for outliers and large 
residuals. A range of +/-3 was adopted when assessing z-scores, as commonly 
recommended (e.g. Field, 2013), and a limit of 5% of cases with scores over 2 
was set. 15 scores in total initially fell outside this range, and were converted 
using a winzorising technique, whereby they were changed to the next highest 
score within the normal distribution. Z-scores were then checked again, to 
ensure this technique had been successful.  
 
Tests following initial regressions checked for linearity, independent errors, 
homoscedasticity, multicollinearity, multivariate outliers, and influential cases. 
These tests included scatter plots, and plots of standardised residuals against 
standardised predicted values (zpred vs. zresid), to check for outliers, linearity, 
and homoscedasticity (see Figure 4 below for an example). Durbin-Watson 
tests revealed a lack of autocorrelation in the data, as all scores ranged 
between 1.48 and 2.07 (i.e. between 1 and 3).  For each regression model, the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was calculated to be <10, with tolerance 
statistics >2; results therefore fell within recommended range (Menard, 1995; 
Myers, 1990) and suggested a lack of collinearity in the data, i.e. the predictors 
in the model did not have a strong linear relationship. Although scatter plots for 
dependent variables showed approximately 16 points which seemed to differ 
from the main trend, potentially influential cases were assessed by calculating 
leverage values, Cook’s, and Mahalanobis distances. 
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Figure 4: Regression plot of standardized residual vales against predicted 
residual values, with HADS anxiety as an outcome variable  
 
Leverage values calculated in SPSS were assessed using a cut-off score 
calculated by the formula (k + 1)/n, where k was the number of predictors in the 
model (14), plus one (14+1=15), divided by the number of participants (n=72). 
The total (.22) was multiplied by three, as recommended by Stevens (2002), to 
give a cut-off score of .66. All leverage values were less than .66, suggesting 
cases did not have large influence. Similarly, all Cook’s distances fell under the 
recommended level of 1 (Cook & Weisberg, 1982), and Mahalanobis distances 
fell beneath the cut-off point of 36.12. The Mahalanobis cut-off was determined 
by the critical value of chi-square for an alpha level of .001, with 14 degrees of 
freedom, as there were 14 variables entered into regression analyses in total. 
These tests revealed all data to be within acceptable parameters, such that no 
outliers were unduly influencing the models.   
 
3.2. Power Calculations 
The two power calculations were carried out using G*Power, to determine the 
number of participants needed to achieve a sufficient level of power (.8), on 
both correlational analyses and multiple regression analyses. The required 
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sample size would detect an R2 increase on multiple regressions at an alpha 
level of .05. As the power calculation for regression was conducted a priori, all 
14 Brief COPE variables were counted as predictors in the calculation, as it was 
not yet known which ones (if any) would be suppressed.  
 
The power analyses were based on a large effect size, taken from an existing 
quality of life – psychological flexibility correlation coefficient (r=.472), reported 
in previous research (Hulbert-Williams et al., 2015). When converted, this 
correlation coefficient approached a large effect size (f2=.29), based on cut-offs 
of .15 for a medium effect size, and .35 for a large effect size (Cohen, 1988). 
The total sample size required was n=32, for both correlations and multiple 
regression.   
3.3 Secondary Analyses 
 
3.3.1. Participation Statistics 
Analyses of all responses revealed similar numbers of participants had taken 
part in paper questionnaires and online questionnaires: 52% of participants 
were recruited online, and 48% were recruited face-to-face, via clinical 
gatekeepers. 
 
Missing values analyses revealed that the questionnaire with the most missing 
responses was the Brief COPE, with an average of 10 missing responses per 
subscale. The Brief COPE was the penultimate measure in the questionnaire 
battery, but the DAS followed the Brief COPE, and had fewer missing 
responses (5), and a larger number of completed scores. Although some 
participants missing out data on the Brief COPE may also have missed out the 
DAS, the pattern of missing values peaked at the Brief COPE and then 
declined. This suggests that missing out measures was not always due to 
attrition part-way through participation, and did not always preclude participants 
from completing the questionnaire to the end.   
 
 3.3.2. Prevalence of Distress in the Sample 
60% of the sample reported clinically significant levels of distress, as measured 
by HADS scores reaching 8 or above (Zigmond et al., 1983), and 44% 
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experienced high death anxiety, as measured on the Death Anxiety Scale, 
equalling or exceeding a cut-off score of 7. A further 31% of participants 
obtained AAQ II scores within a range commensurate with clinically-relevant 
psychological distress, i.e. below 25, when the AAQ II is scored in the direction 
of experiential acceptance (Bond et al., 2011).  
 
3.3.3. Further Descriptive and Clinical Characteristics 
Many demographic details cited in psycho-oncology literature, e.g. religiosity 
and gender, were not significantly related to any demographic, response style, 
or outcome variables in this study. In addition to the analyses in the journal 
paper, some further testing was carried out to see whether outcomes varied by 
clinical characteristics, such as cancer stage and number of previous cancers. 
These tests were carried out to compare the demographics of the sample to 
existing research, and also to highlight potential moderating factors in 
psychological outcomes that could be explored further in future research.   
 
Chi-squared tests were conducted on categorical data between the online and 
paper samples, to compare whether there were significant demographic details 
between the two groups. Fisher’s exact test was used to determine significance, 
as some categories, e.g. age group 25-34 years, had fewer than 10 
participants. The tests revealed that there were no significant differences 
between the online and paper populations on the domains of stage of cancer or 
number of cancers, but there were significant differences in gender and age, 
with the online sample having significantly more, and significantly younger, 
women than the paper sample (p<.001, Fisher’s exact test).   
 
Exploratory correlations with demographic and clinical details showed that age 
was the factor with the highest number of significant correlations. Age was 
significantly related to stage of cancer (r=.34, p=.012), but not to the number of 
cancers participants had experienced; although the average age of participants 
who had experienced cancer more than once was 57 years old. Levels of 
acceptance also correlated with age (r=-.30, p=.010), but not with number of 
previous cancers, or stage of cancer. Older participants reported later stage 
cancers, but less threatening cancer appraisals, whereas younger participants 
 93 
reported more threatening cancer appraisals, higher emotional and instrumental 
support, and venting and planning response styles.  
 
One-way ANOVAs revealed there were no significant differences between 
acceptance levels at each stage of cancer (p>.05), at either time one or two. 
Furthermore, independent samples t-tests revealed that there were no 
significant differences between response styles or outcomes for participants 
who had previous experience of cancer, and those participants who had not 
had cancer before (p>.05).  The exception to this was on scores for the self-
distract response style, where participants who had previously had cancer used 
less self-distraction (M = 1.79, SE = 0.42) than those experiencing cancer for 
the first time (M = 3.13, SE = 0.27). This difference, 1.35, BCa 95% CI [0.221, 
2.471] was significant t(65) = 2.39, p = .020. 
 
 3.3.4. Brief COPE Response Styles and Outcomes 
Acceptance as measured by the Brief COPE correlated with acceptance as 
measured by the AAQ II (r=.26, p=.035). This association moved towards being 
of medium strength, according to Cohen’s (1988) convention of .3 for a 
moderate effect size. However, acceptance on the Brief COPE did not 
demonstrate any significant correlations with outcomes, and was therefore not 
entered into regression analyses.23 
 
Only avoidant Brief COPE response styles had sufficient numbers of significant 
associations to be retained for regression analyses, with only three brief COPE 
styles emerging as significant contributors to outcomes: denial and 
disengagement at time one, and self-distract at time two. Brief COPE styles 
were therefore not overwhelmingly predictive of either high or low psychological 
outcomes, at times one or two.  
 
Carver (1997) warns against calculating summative or aggregate scores across 
the sub-scales of the Brief COPE, but states that the scale is suitable for 
assessing the most dominant coping styles. Therefore, of the five avoidant 
                                                 
23 As previously stated, variables which did not significantly correlate with at least one 
response style and one outcome variable were suppressed in regression analyses. 
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response styles retained in the analyses, self-distraction and venting had the 
highest average scores across the sample, and behavioural disengagement 
had the lowest. Overall, avoidant coping correlated with high levels of distress in 
the sample, as measured by scores on HADS depression and anxiety 
measures.   
3.4. Alternative Analyses 
An alternative method of analysis which would have addressed the aims of this 
study would have been to use mediational, as opposed to moderation, 
modelling. A mediating variable explains the association between two other 
variables, whereas a moderator variable affects that relationship, in size or 
directionality. Mediation might have shown that the relationship between cancer 
appraisals and outcomes was contingent on acceptance, for example, perhaps 
implying that targeting a mediating variable, e.g. acceptance, could theoretically 
change a distress outcome, e.g. anxiety (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). 
However, moderation is less dependent on establishing a linear sequence 
between variables in time, as moderators can both pre-exist or co-occur with 
other variables, and thus do not depend on establishing temporality between 
variables. In this study, cancer appraisal was used as an initial measure 
alongside other commonly-understood variables that might have influenced 
outcomes. However, despite the widespread use of mediation in psychological 
literature, and its appeal in explaining relationships between variables, the 
advantage of using moderation was that it did not rest on the assumption that 
the variables measured were causal, or occurred in time-ordered sequence; 
these are two assumptions of mediation (Gunzler, Chen, Wu, & Zhang, 2013). 
Such discrete categories or sequencing between variables could not be inferred 
in this methodology, due to questionnaires capturing variables which are 
measured at one moment, and the absence of an intervention to begin to 
separate out the order in which measured events may occur.  
 
In order for mediation to have been an appropriate method of analysis 
therefore, the study design would have had to follow participants over time in 
order to establish whether response styles, such as acceptance, affect 
psychological outcomes. Tracking participants prospectively would allow for 
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initial baseline response styles to be measured, and then re-measured in 
participants within the sample who go on to be screened for, or diagnosed with 
cancer. The hypothesised impact of response styles upon outcomes (e.g. of 
distress and quality of life) could then be measured through significant changes 
in response styles preceding change in outcome. A clearer picture of whether 
response styles shift in type or frequency in response to the diagnosis of cancer 
could be measured, by comparing response styles at baseline, to those post-
diagnoses. Furthermore, participants with cancer could also be compared to 
those who had not developed cancer, on the domains of response styles and 
outcomes. Prospective longitudinal study designs are extremely expensive and 
therefore relatively few in number; a brief search of the literature revealed only 
two that have studied distress in adults with cancer in the last decade, but such 
a design would allow for a more temporal chain of events to be established 
between the factors of initial cancer diagnosis and appraisal, response styles, 
and psychological outcomes.  
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4. Extended discussion and Critical Reflections 
 
4.1. ACT’s Philosophies of Science and of Truth 
  
4.1.1. Functional Contextualism and Pragmatic Truth 
ACT is considered to be a contextual behavioural science, and advocates for 
the functional analysis of behaviours in terms of their environmental context, in 
order to predict and influence behaviour with precision, scope, and depth 
(Hayes, 1993). The functions of behaviours are derived from previous contexts 
and learning histories, and present behaviours are seen as ‘ongoing acts in 
context,’ i.e. the past and future of an act, which also exist in the present. ACT 
aims to predict and influence behaviour in the service of “successful working 
towards one’s [practical] analytic goals” (Hayes, 1993, p. 182), which must be 
specific and verbally stated a-priori. Functional contextualism is thereby 
underpinned by a pragmatic truth criterion, whereby analyses are only taken to 
be ‘true’ in terms of whether or not they lead to successful goals, i.e. the truth is 
what works. In this sense, there is no attempt being made to uncover the truth, 
in an objective, context-free, and generalisable sense. In fact, contextualism 
suggests that there can be no objective truth or reality separable from our 
interactions in and with the world, which are historically and contextually bound 
(Hayes, 2004). Actions can consequently only be understood relative to the 
context in which they occur, and whether they are useful, rather than ‘true’. 
Applied to response styles, believing thoughts to be true can lead to excessively 
rule-governed behaviour and experiential avoidance, rather than questioning a) 
whether or not the thoughts have to be responded to, and b) whether or not 
these responses are helpful. Functional contextualism lends itself to 
correlational analyses, as discovering that one event is correlated with another 
implies that the contextual variables affecting the first event might also affect the 
second (Biglan & Hayes, 1996).  
 
4.1.2. Underlying theories of measurement 
 There are also philosophical underpinnings to the psychometric standards of 
reliability and validity, to which we often hold measures and critique them in 
terms of scientific rigour. The notions of psychometric validity - how well a 
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measure assesses what it claims to - and reliability -the degree of consistency 
the measure allows - form part of an elemental realist epistemology (Ciarrochi 
et al., 2016). However, ACT is underpinned by the assumptions of 
contextualism, whereby a measure’s context and usefulness are more important 
than whether or not it is reflecting a supposed objective truth about the world 
and a person’s state of mind. Therefore, response styles must be considered in 
terms of whether they are useful, not just in the short-term avoidance of anxiety 
for example, but in terms of whether they help a person to lived a valued life 
that is consistent with their values and goals.   
4.2. Results in the Context of Theory 
 
4.2.1. Approach Response Styles 
No approach styles measured on the Brief COPE demonstrated significant 
associations with acceptance or outcomes. This could be explained by ACT’s 
understanding of experiential avoidance, which suggests that avoidance 
augments over time and prevents engagement with valued activities, as well as 
the ability to assess and change unhelpful responses. For example, 
engagement with approach-focused response styles, e.g. problem-solving or 
obtaining social support, may be obstructed by rigid and restrictive attempts to 
avoid inner experiences, which consequently obstruct adaptation to changing 
contexts (Hayes et al., 2011). Thus, it becomes difficult to utilise diametrically 
opposed approach and response styles simultaneously, which may also explain 
why acceptance and denial did not significantly contribute to any regression 
model simultaneously, and only did so independently of one another.  
 
4.2.2. Acceptance as a Construct 
The results indicated that acceptance was a unique explanatory and predictor 
variable for a range of outcomes. t-test results supported the notion that a 
person’s use of coping style is relatively stable over time (Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989), which warrants consideration of whether acceptance is a 
state or trait type response style. The latter would imply that an accepting 
response style is an underlying and somewhat permanent individual 
characteristic. However, it may be more congruent with a functional 
contextualist position to consider the opposite, that response styles are likely to 
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be used and even augment in response to an internal or external environmental 
stimulus. In this case, acceptance may seem more akin to a ‘state’, or 
behaviour which is shaped and changed by context and environmental 
contingencies. Furthermore, according to functional contextualism, the AAQ II 
scores elicited in attempt to measure acceptance are also reflective of 
behaviour-in-context, and not of an objective underlying truth, as psychometric 
theory might imply.  
 
Although the results of this study showed acceptance to be a stable construct in 
those participants who took part in the follow-up, it is important to note that this 
was not an intervention study, and no attempts to impact upon levels of 
acceptance were made. Although the demographic measures were not 
designed to capture all events that might have affected participants and their 
response styles between times one and two, the variables that were 
administered showed few shifts had occurred on individuals’ demographic or 
clinical scores. Given that their broad experiences of illness were relatively 
stable therefore, with the exception of five participants whose cancer stage had 
changed, it is reasonable to assume that this explained why their levels of 
response styles also remained stable. The repetition of demographic and 
clinical details questions was designed to broadly capture any major shifts that 
might have otherwise provided some background to changed levels of 
responses or outcomes.  
 
Although acceptance did not therefore shift significantly between time points 
one and two in this study, this could be due to a) the length of time being 
relatively short (three months), b) there had been no changes in the cancer-
related items asked of participants, and therefore no escalation, de-escalation, 
or change in response styles (assuming that cancer appraisals are antecedents 
to responses), and c) the lack of acceptance-based intervention. The AAQ II is 
sensitive to change over time (Bond et al., 2011), and would be an appropriate 
measure to capture any shifts following any future acceptance-based 
interventions. The ability of acceptance levels to shift with intervention has been 
demonstrated elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Lillis, Hayes, Bunting, & Masuda, 
2009), and given that the prevalence of experiential avoidance has been touted 
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as a universal problem, it seems reasonable to assume that acceptance is not a 
default position, but a skill that takes time and practice to master. Therefore, 
acceptance may act less like a trait, given that it is sensitive to change over 
time, when measured by the AAQ II.  
 
4.2.3. Acceptance and the AAQ II 
All of the results obtained through measurement in this study are only as valid 
and reliable as the psychometrics used to obtain them. Furthermore, all 
psychometrics measured intrapsychic rather than observed constructs, which 
cannot be directly measured without interpretation first taking place, inevitably 
influencing results to some degree.  
 
The AAQ II has been criticised for having poor discriminant validity, and 
conflating distress items with process items. Therefore, results of this study and 
of the existing literature need to be interpreted in the knowledge that any 
observed relationships may be artificially inflated due to week discriminant 
construct validity. The AAQ II has also been criticised for measuring both 
process and outcome (Chawla & Ostafin, 2007), but in this study was used as a 
measure of the former. Given the AAQ II’s significant correlations with 
measures of avoidant responses on the Brief COPE, it is also reasonable to 
suggest that there was shared variance between measures of generalised and 
experiential avoidance (the unipolar opposite of experiential acceptance on the 
AAQ II measure) (Karekea & Panayiotou, 2011).  Although the AAQ II measure 
has some psychometric weaknesses, it remains the most widely-used measure 
of experiential acceptance. Furthermore, acceptance may be what most items 
on the AAQ II measure, despite the authors claiming that it also measures other 
ACT processes and psychological flexibility (Francis et al., in press).   
 
4.2.4. Acceptance and Cancer Appraisals 
There was also a significant correlation between AAQ II and Brief IPQ scores, 
and the Brief IPQ at times became a non-significant predictor when AAQ II was 
entered into regression models. Acceptance and cognitive appraisal may thus 
share variance due to acceptance involving a degree of considering emotion 
acceptability, prior to responding to those emotions in a willing manner. 
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However, the results did show that acceptance added unique and significant 
predictive value to models, beyond that contributed by either the Brief COPE or 
the Brief IPQ. This may support its construct as a response, rather than 
appraisal variable, as although appraisals were still associated with outcomes, 
acceptance contributed and added variance over and above the appraisals of 
cancer. This may have been because it was a response style, and response 
styles according to ACT are the cause of suffering and distress, rather than the 
feelings which result from initial appraisals themselves.  
 
The findings that acceptance, albeit with the potential limitations of the measure 
used, contributed unique explanatory power to regression models may therefore 
support ACT’s theory of psychopathology rather that that of cognitive therapy. 
The cognitive principle (Beck, 1979) posits that faulty appraisals lead to 
emotional distress, whereas in ACT, the cognitive processes employed to avoid 
painful thoughts are the problem, rather than the thoughts themselves. A lack of 
correlations between disease characteristics and responses or outcomes 
showed that psychological distress occurred independently of physical 
symptoms. This suggests that illness appraisal, rather than disease 
characteristics, may help to influence psychological outcomes in response to 
cancer and its threat to life, as cancer appraisals were significantly correlated 
with many response styles and outcomes. The ways in which appraisals and 
responses may interact to influence outcomes were not elucidated by the 
moderation analyses in this study however, as both remained independent, 
significant predictors or correlates of outcomes. This may in part be because 
the AAQ II and Brief IPQ measures were correlated. As the appraisal - 
outcomes analysis was correlational, directionality could not be established, and 
it is therefore possible that responses influenced appraisals; a possibility further 
suggested by the variance shared between appraisals and responses in 
regression analyses. In ACT terms, the mechanism underpinning this 
relationship would be that cognitive defusion leads to appraisals being 
perceived as less severe, potentially reducing the amount of subsequent 
response styles employed.  
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Despite cancer appraisals correlating with outcomes, the results implicate 
response processes over these appraisals in influencing outcomes. Applying 
these findings to clinical practice, the potential utility of changing relationships to 
cognitions and inner experiences, rather than attempting to modify cognitions 
themselves, may be inferred from the data. Furthermore, ACT may consider the 
modification of thoughts and appraisals to be more likely to contribute to 
experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion. In contrast to this, there is evidence 
to support cognitive reappraisal techniques (Helbig-Lang et al., 2015), and in 
line with ACT’s position on workability, there should not be one prescribed 
clinical method for working with all clients. Furthermore, although cancer 
appraisals had less predictive power in this study, they remained significantly 
correlated with avoidant response styles and poorer outcomes, in a relationship 
that was not moderated by acceptance. It is important to state that the results 
do not show that cognitive interventions would be of no benefit; only that 
response styles may be more significantly implicated in outcomes and perhaps 
interventions, as a result of contributing more to distress than illness factors 
themselves. A possible interactive explanation for this finding is that acceptance 
changes the potency of cancer appraisals, thus explaining why cancer 
appraisals were not predictive of outcomes, as perhaps those who were more 
accepting reported less threatening beliefs about their cancer.   
4.3. Implications for Clinical Knowledge and Practice 
In this study, death anxiety did not appear to function differently to any other 
measure of distress. All avoidant response styles were significantly correlated 
with distress, and inversely associated with quality of life. Furthermore, there 
was no support for the TMT theory that acceptance and death anxiety should be 
positively correlated, as the inverse of this was found. Death anxiety was also 
correlated with general anxiety and depression, and although there were no 
specific measures of other emotional experiences that might be associated with 
death, such as grief or loss, this suggests that death anxiety is related to a 
broader range of emotions (Hoelter 1979); all of which may become more 
distressing through the use of avoidant response styles. Given this generalised 
effect, there was no single emotional experience contra-indicated for an 
accepting approach. This may speak to ACT’s theory that experiential 
 102 
avoidance of emotions, rather than specific emotions themselves, leads to 
suffering. Given TMT’s supposition that death anxiety is a unique and 
intolerable factor, the lack of evidence found to support this is an important 
outcome. Otherwise, advocating for increased exposure to death-related 
emotions in cancer patients, without first knowing whether acceptance is 
implicated in better or worse psychological functioning, could have had 
iatrogenic and unethical impact.  
 
This study is a response to calls for further research into both ACT processes 
and potentially efficacious psycho-oncological interventions. Since the 
beginning of this study, media reports on the need for greater provision of 
psychological support in cancer have been numerous. Thus, the project is 
timely and the findings are relevant to today’s healthcare population; implicating 
the potential role of acceptance in improved psychological distress and quality 
of life, and suggesting that acceptance-based interventions might therefore be 
appropriate to influence future functioning. As there was no difference between 
objective disease status or demographic variables and outcomes, distress 
occurred across all cancer groups; though the study was not able to show 
beyond this whether acceptance-based interventions were better implicated for 
some participants than others. The exception to this was age, whereby older 
participants were more accepting; a finding explained in the literature by 
younger cancer patients suffering greater losses, and consequently having 
more threatening cancer appraisals. If the emotions arising from this perceived 
loss are then avoided, as shown through increased use of venting and planning 
response styles in this age group, this would explain greater distress amongst 
the younger demographic.  
  
Where traditional cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) involves the use of 
techniques such as planning, positive reframing, and instrumental support, this 
study found no empirical support for associations between these strategies and 
quality of life or lower distress, raising the question of whether they are likely to 
be helpful for a cancer population. Although an acceptance-based approach is a 
potential target for treatment, this method would also be appropriate for other 
reasons. Where CBT emphasises cognitive modification, many of the thoughts 
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experienced by cancer patients in relation to their illness and fate are not 
necessarily ‘maladaptive’; though the results of this study did suggest that 
actual disease status was not as associated with outcomes as appraisals, which 
may be influenced by a number of other factors. Given that challenging 
accurate but distressing thoughts about cancer-related issues such as death, 
disability, debt, or other issues may not be appropriate, an acceptance-based 
approach may be more appropriate in this context.   
4.4. Further Strengths and Limitations 
 
4.4.1. Correlational Research 
Although correlational research is often criticised for an inability to show 
causation, it allows for investigation between existing variables, where it is not 
feasible or ethical to manipulate those independent variables; as in the case of 
cancer. However, there may be alternative explanations for the findings in this 
study based on its primarily correlational design, such as whether a third 
variable was influencing both response styles or outcomes. Furthermore, as 
linearity was not established between response styles and outcomes, it has not 
been determined whether responses lead to poorer outcomes or are the 
corollary of poorer outcomes, e.g. patients feeling depressed may tend towards 
withdrawal. However, the cross-lag analyses carried out did go some way to 
addressing whether there was a circular relationship between acceptance and 
outcomes, and the results indicated that there was not. Acceptance was shown 
to be predictive of future anxiety and functional quality of life, whereas these 
outcomes did not predict future acceptance. The use of follow-up data therefore 
allowed tentative speculation upon whether acceptance was a theoretical driver 
in its associations with outcome, which could not otherwise have been inferred 
from cross-sectional data taken at one point in time.   
 
4.4.2. Further Limitations of Measures and Analyses 
There was a mixture of both global and specific measures in the questionnaire 
battery, and some measures, such as the AAQ II and DAS, were not cancer-
specific. However, it was hoped that the participant information sheet and 
wording between questionnaires was enough to orient participants to the 
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context of cancer; although this does not overcome the problem of item validity, 
as the wording of global items may not have been applicable to illness at all. 
ACT would suggest however, that avoidant response styles are likely to persist 
in many contexts, as a result of increasing experiential avoidance. Therefore, 
although Brief COPE items were not illness-specific, they were likely to indicate 
common patterns of responding that participants engaged in. TMT would imply 
that usual avoidant COPE styles may therefore have been provoked by the 
cancer-specific wording throughout the questionnaire, which served as a primer 
and anxiety-eliciting stimulus. 
 
A further limitation of the research was that participants were not individually 
tracked throughout the analysis, and as a result it was not possible to see 
whether avoidant responses were not adversely associated with outcomes for 
some participants. Thus, the results speak to a general, overall effect and do 
not account for individual differences. The findings can therefore not be 
interpreted to mean that avoidant responses are never helpful for outcomes of 
distress and quality of life, or that they are always less helpful than acceptance. 
This will be context dependent, and dependent on whether the function the 
response serves is helpful for valued living. Indeed, many behavioural and ACT 
theorists will attest to the negatively reinforcing use of avoidance strategies, 
which alleviate anxiety in the short-term. In terms of cancer, traditional models 
of grief, such as that by Kübler-Ross (1969), incorporate an initial phase of 
denial, stating that the initial and proximal threat posed by death is initially too 
aversive to comprehend. Given the lack of individual analysis, the results of this 
research cannot say that this concept is likely to be incorrect, as denial may be 
a helpful strategy for some people, in some contexts. However, the point at 
which avoidant responses cease to be useful is theoretically when they become 
overly-relied upon in the long term, at the expense of valued living. In 
psychological terms, increased avoidance leads to a withdrawal from 
pleasurable and positively reinforcing activities, and this may be the mechanism 
by which distress and quality of life become negatively impacted upon.   
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4.4.3. Follow-Up 
 A strength of this study is that it had a longitudinal component in the follow-up 
questionnaire which was issued to consenting participants via an online link, 
three months after they had initially taken part. The majority of research in ACT 
and in cancer populations is of a cross-sectional design, restricting its capacity 
to address one limitation of questionnaire-based methodologies, in that 
participants’ responses capture only a particular moment in time, and may 
therefore be affected by any number of extraneous variables. A follow-up 
therefore mitigated the impact of this to some extent by allowing analysis of 
whether significant changes had occurred between the first sample and those 
who participated in the follow-up. Furthermore, although individual participants’ 
clinical and treatment progress was not tracked, the inclusion of a follow-up 
provided the possibility of re-measuring cancer-related experiences at a later 
phase in the cancer journey. For example, in the period between time points 
one and two, participants recruited from hospitals may have been transitioning 
into a different stage of care, entering end-of-life care, or perhaps entering out 
of treatment and into remission. The effect of the months following cancer 
treatment on distress and psychological wellbeing are documented in the 
literature (e.g. Costanzo et al., 2007). The follow-up therefore allowed the 
possibility of capturing these, for any participants who had either left treatment 
during the course of the study, or those whose cancer had been historic at both 
time points one and two. Measurement at two time points consequently allowed 
the effects of acceptance and response styles to be considered over time, and 
potentially at different phases of participants’ cancer-related experiences. This 
in turn facilitated a broader range of analyses (e.g. cross-lag panel models), 
consideration of which factors might be influencing future outcomes, and 
potentially improved the generalisability of results to different, and changing, 
cancer contexts.   
 
The three-month follow-up period was decided upon as a combination of what 
was practicable within the time frame of a DClinPsy study, and was also based 
on what was common in the cancer literature, where many studies had 
conducted follow-ups within the same time frame, e.g. Deshields et al., 2005. 
Although distress can be maintained for a full year or longer following cancer 
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treatment (Carlson, Waller, Groff, Zhong & Bultz, 2012), contextual factors also 
influenced the decision not to extend the period between times one and two. A 
limitation of this relatively short follow-up period was that a longer period may 
have allowed a greater amount of change to occur, for example changes in 
psychological outcomes, or changes in factors that might influence 
psychological change, such as finishing treatment. However, as we were 
recruiting from hospitals and a hospice, it was also likely that a lengthy follow-up 
would increase the chances of consenting participants not being able to take 
part after a protracted period, and in fact three participants recruited from the 
hospice did die in between times one and two.   
 
The follow-up rate for the study was 53%, and although there are no 
universally-agreed thresholds for acceptable follow-up rates (Fewtrell et al., 
2013), this could be considered a small- to medium-sized response rate. Whilst 
low follow-up rates may significantly compromise validity in studies which rely 
upon comparative analyses, such as randomised controlled trials, the follow-up 
data in this study was used only in examining secondary analyses. Although 
obtaining a smaller, and self-selected follow-up sample can introduce the risk of 
bias, for example if those who take part a second time do so because they are 
less depressed, this was protected against to some degree, as the follow-up 
data were used only to answer secondary research aims. Primary results were 
therefore obtained using the data from the primary data set, based upon the 
original 72 participants who initially took part. 
4.5. Future Research 
Given that the findings of this study provide preliminary support for the use of 
acceptance-based interventions with cancer patients, testing this notion is a 
clear direction for future research. Many studies into ACT-based processes 
consider more than one process at once, whereas this study has focused on 
acceptance; albeit the factor structure of the AAQ II may mean that some other 
processes were also measured. This study is therefore one of few that can 
provide a rationale for acceptance in cancer, which is thought to underpin many 
of the processes which make up psychological flexibility, and has here been 
shown to be predictive of future functioning. It is also unique in having 
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predictive, longitudinal data to support this suggestion. However, in order to be 
workable, increasing acceptance relies upon other processes such as 
mindfulness and moment-to-moment awareness, which have not been 
addressed here. Future work could therefore deliver acceptance to a cancer 
population, utilising these strategies, in order to see whether they have 
beneficial impacts upon distress and quality of life, as has been demonstrated in 
other healthcare populations.   
4.6. Personal reflections 
 
4.6.1. Choosing a research project 
Upon starting the doctorate, we were soon encouraged to consider ideas for 
research projects. My initial thoughts were to conduct a study into complex 
trauma, though I soon found that many of the purported concepts I had found so 
captivating to read about, such as attachment and psychodynamic theories, 
were rather difficult to measure or operationalise, and did not easily lend 
themselves to research questions. Despite these initial interests leading to 
many thought-provoking theoretical discussions with a number of potential 
research supervisors, I struggled to translate them into practicable research 
projects and decided after several weeks to consider an alternative project. 
 
Although cancer research may not seem like an obvious path down which my 
ideas could evolve, I had a pre-existing personal interest in psycho-oncology, 
stemming from time I had spent before the DClinPsy as a ward outreach 
volunteer in a cancer unit. Even though this unit was nationally renowned, there 
still lacked provision for psychological support and intervention, and I had come 
across many patients struggling with emotional distress. Contrastingly, I had 
also encountered many patients with remarkable and seemingly accepting 
attitudes towards their illnesses, and this contrast between apparent responses 
was, and remains, of fascination to me. What made each person different? 
What factors might influence the direction of someone’s response to having 
cancer, and was this a stable response or did it fluctuate over time? It was 
thoughts such as these, combined with the support of my personal tutor, who 
has an interest in ACT, that led to the formation of my research project. Psycho-
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oncology remains an area of interest for my future career, but it also remains 
under-resourced; a fact which has been brought to light on several occasions in 
the media since I began this project in 2013. I am pleased to have conducted 
research in an area of potential relevance to many of the projected 50% of 
people who might go on to develop cancer, and that the findings have practical 
and clinical implications. Furthermore, the project contributes to a sparse 
knowledge base around interventions and ACT processes in cancer, and 
provides tentative support for increasing acceptance as a psychological 
intervention in this population, where best practice and psychological treatment 
recommendations have yet to be established.  
 
4.6.2. Ethical Reflections and Setting up the Study 
It was a long and sometimes challenging journey from conceiving the project 
and its design, to finally conducting data collection over a year later. The first 
hurdle was applying for and receiving ethical approval for the study, and the 
rather challenging response I received when first presenting my project 
proposal to the local NHS Ethics Committee, who raised numerous concerns 
about conducting research with a cancer population. Although I was able to 
meet their requirements and answer their questions about ethical safeguarding, 
I have been struck on numerous occasions by the contrast between the 
opinions of people not involved in cancer care, who thought the work was 
important and interesting, and the anxieties and resistance I encountered from 
those involved in the care of cancer patients. For example, on a second 
occasion, I presented my proposed study to a meeting of Consultant 
Oncologists at a local hospital, in an attempt to gain their support as 
gatekeepers. Two particular members of staff had very strong and adverse 
reactions to my proposal, and I have found it interesting to reflect on this in 
relation to the death anxiety literature, which posits that looking after ill or dying 
patients can evoke in us strong emotional responses and reminders of our own 
mortality, which we may then react against. I wondered whether this apparent 
avoidance of death-provoking stimuli I witnessed in their reluctance to listen to 
my answers to their questions or to engage in two-way discussions, also led to 
their patients being denied the opportunity to talk openly about their 
experiences of having cancer, and whether this might exacerbate any patient 
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distress. The phenomenon of clinicians avoiding talking about death-related 
subjects has been reported in previous literature, and can also be seen at a 
societal level in the West, where we are largely avoidant of shared 
conversations about dying. Recent initiatives, such as Death Cafés, are 
beginning to emerge to break these taboos, in recognition of the negative 
impact this death phobia might have on us, irrespective of whether we are likely 
to die in the near future or not for many years to come.  
 
Thankfully, some clinicians were willing to be gatekeepers for the study, and 
spoke to me about how the questionnaire may give patients permission to have 
important discussions with them about how they are feeling. The resistance I 
had encountered could have been through a desire to protect cancer patients 
from potentially distressing research questions, but given the lack of conclusive 
research on how best to intervene with cancer patients in distress, it also seems 
important to conduct research in this population. Furthermore, consent and 
information provided to participants gave them a clear choice as to whether or 
not to participate. The decisions surrounding the research project therefore had 
to minimise the risk of distressing participants as far as was possible, whilst also 
recruiting those patients who wished to contribute to the area of psycho-
oncological research. Whilst carrying out data collection, I received two 
separate emails from participants outlining how important they thought it was 
that research is conducted in this population, which may speak to the fact that 
although we are anxious about engaging cancer patients in research about their 
psychological experiences, this does not mean it should not be done in a careful 
and ethically-sensitive manner.   
 
4.6.3. Personal Development 
Despite previously having obtained an MSc and a BSc, and having completed 
independent research projects during both of these degrees, my research 
knowledge and skills have augmented beyond my expectations as a result of 
this DClinPsy project, and the self-managed learning it has facilitated and 
required of me. The thesis project as a whole has felt like a huge step up from 
my earlier, post-graduate research project, particularly in regards to my 
understanding of research methodology and its philosophical underpinnings, the 
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ability to critique research, and my grasp of data analysis. In part, my learning 
has been due to the quality of the teaching and the high standards required of 
trainee research during training, but managing the research process somewhat 
independently has also contributed to my development as a research 
practitioner. This study has allowed me to learn about myself, and to overcome 
personal and practical challenges along the way. For example, the setting up 
and management of questionnaire distribution across four different sites in 
Nottinghamshire, and liaising with up to six different clinicians, required a lot of 
time, effort, and organisation. I would certainly consider my organisational 
processes more thoroughly if I were to undertake a similar project in the future. 
For example, using subfolders in email accounts sooner, and having a database 
of different clinicians and members of Ethics Research and Development (R&D) 
departments, so that I could keep track of who was from which Trust and where 
I was in the R&D process with each different team.  
 
Although there were relatively few practical problems which emerged over the 
course of the two-year project, one oversight was that I had not considered how 
to match up participants whose first questionnaire had been paper-based 
(which I had coded with a hospital identifier), but who then went on to complete 
the follow-up online, where they generated a new pseudonym. This 
necessitated some painstaking work matching participants from the identifiers I 
had available to me, but thankfully most participants’ email addresses contained 
their names, and their online forms could therefore be matched to their original, 
paper consent forms. If it had not been possible to reconcile the time one and 
time two data sets however, this oversight would not have prevented most of 
the secondary analyses from being carried out in this study, as individual 
change on outcome measures was not a component (though individual 
comparisons in demographic details were made, to explore whether there was 
any fluctuation which might give context to shifts in outcome measures). Failure 
to track participants effectively could seriously compromise the utility and 
outcomes of a research project, and this has been an important learning point 
that I can take forward when thoroughly planning the processes involved in 
future studies I might undertake.  
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The biggest research hurdle for me has been the writing up of the study, and 
managing my own avoidance. I have wondered whether the subject matter, 
specifically cancer and death-related experiences, has heightened my anxiety, 
thus explaining my initial avoidance of writing up the project. I attempted to 
apply the concept of acceptance to my own inner experiences as they occurred, 
such as noticing when I had thoughts about leaving the room and engaging in 
different activities, or noticing surges in anxiety and thoughts about not 
understanding the results. It helped during these times to focus on the bigger 
picture, i.e. that this project is a significant contribution to my qualification as a 
clinical psychologist, and focusing on my values in this way allowed me to 
tolerate the stress and discomfort I felt at times, in the knowledge that these 
experiences were part of an important process in working towards my goal.   
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Extended Appendices 
 
Appendix A  
Clinical Gatekeeper Prompt Sheet 
Accepting the ‘Big C’: Exploring the Acceptance - Quality of Life relationship in a 
cancer population. 
 
Thank you for agreeing to help recruit participants for this study. This prompt 
sheet covers the study rationale and procedure, which may be useful when 
introducing the research to potential participants. 
 
Overview 
 
 There is a piece of research being carried out by clinical psychologists from 
Lincoln University. This research is not a part of our service but the 
researchers have approached us as we work with people who are affected 
by cancer.  
 
 The researchers are inviting anyone who currently has, or who has had 
cancer, to complete a questionnaire. This is to find out more about the 
quality of life and the psychological experiences of those people who have 
(or have had) cancer.   
 
 The researchers are investigating relationships between acceptance (which 
is ‘a willingness to experience both pleasant and difficult thoughts and 
feelings’) and other experiences that cancer patients have reported, such as 
anxiety.    
 
 The study uses a questionnaire to ask about your personal experiences of 
cancer, and would require you to rate your own experiences of elements 
such as anxiety, stress, and coping. The results could help psychologists to 
understand the psychological impact of having cancer, and how they can 
better support patients.    
 
 Whether you take part in this study, or not, will not affect your care in any 
way.  
 
Practicalities 
 
 The questionnaire should take 20-25 minutes to complete, and if you are 
interested in taking part I can give you a questionnaire pack*. It is important 
that you read the information sheet and take your time to consider whether 
to take part.  
 
 Your responses can be posted back to the researcher in the stamped 
envelope provided. 
 
 If you do take part, you will need to complete and sign the consent form 
attached to the questionnaire. The researchers have also asked you to 
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indicate on the consent form whether you would be happy to complete the 
questionnaire again in three months’ time.    
 
 Thank you very much for your interest in taking part. You can indicate on 
the questionnaire if you would like to be sent a link to the study results. 
  
 
*Questionnaire pack given to interested participants = Participant information 
sheet, consent form, questionnaire and stamped addressed envelope.  
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Appendix B – Participant Information Sheet (paper version) – Time One 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Title of Study:  Accepting the ‘Big C’: Exploring the Acceptance - Quality 
of Life relationship in a cancer population 
 
Name of Researcher:  Lucinda Brabbins  
 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. Before you 
decide whether to participate, we would like you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please read this 
information sheet and if you have any questions, ask a researcher, your 
nurse, or a member of your care team. 
 
You can take away this information and if you decide to participate, you 
can either post back the consent form and questionnaires, or bring them 
back to the clinic on your next visit. The nurse or researcher will then 
store your responses securely. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a relationship 
between the therapeutic concept of acceptance and quality of life in a 
cancer population. This study will look for a relationship between 
acceptance and many other variables, such as distress, anxiety and 
coping.  
 
Unlike much research into acceptance, this study is targeting a broad, 
rather than specific cancer population and will also include a 3-month 
follow-up after initial participation.  
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
You are being invited to take part because you have, or have previously 
had, a diagnosis of cancer. We are inviting current cancer patients and 
survivors to take part, with cancers of all sites, stages and points in 
treatment.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to 
take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to 
sign a consent form before completing the questionnaires.  
 
If you initially decide to take part but later change your mind, you are free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. Any decision not to take 
part or to withdraw from the study will not affect any care you may be 
receiving.  
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Please note that the final questions are about death and dying. If you find 
these, or any other questions, too distressing, you do not need to answer 
them. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part in the study and the three month follow-up, you 
will be asked to give some personal details, (e.g. name, telephone 
number, email address) which will be stored confidentially. You will also 
be asked to indicate whether you would prefer to be contacted via 
telephone or email. If you do not consent to the follow-up, you do not 
need to fill out the contact details on the consent form. Your consultant 
will be made aware of your decision to participate in the study.  
 
The study will begin with some demographic questions (e.g. cancer 
site/grade, whether you are currently in/have had cancer treatment, time 
since diagnosis, whether you have accessed psychological support etc.). 
Following this, you will be asked to complete six questionnaires, which 
are designed to measure your attitudes towards and your experiences of 
different things (e.g. anxiety). We anticipate that this will take between 20-
25 minutes in total.  
 
Once you have completed the questionnaires, you will only be contacted 
again if you have consented to complete a follow-up questionnaire 3 
months from the date you participate.  
 
The researcher’s details are available at the bottom of this information 
sheet should you have any questions at any time, before or after taking 
part. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
 
Due to the subject matter, some people may find answering questions 
about cancer and the realities of your situation distressing. It is therefore 
essential that you can access emotional support, through family, friends, 
cancer charities, psycho-oncology or your clinical team. If you are in 
treatment, your Cancer Nurse Specialist or another member of clinical 
staff will be able to refer you towards good sources of support (e.g. 
Macmillan). If you are no longer a cancer patient, your G.P. can provide a 
gateway to accessing support. Otherwise, many cancer charities have 
helplines, websites, and drop-in centres where you can find support. 
Three examples of these are:  
 
Macmillan Helpline – 0808 808 0000 or www.macmillan.org.uk 
Cancer Research UK – 0808 800 4040 or www.cancerresearchuk.org 
Shine (support for those aged 20-50) www.shinecancersupport.co.uk 
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On Nottingham City Hospital site, you can access support from Maggie’s 
on Hucknall Road, and from the Macmillan Cancer Information Centre in 
the Oncology Block. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
The information we get from this study may help to highlight how useful 
psychological interventions could be for cancer patients. You may have 
seen recent calls for this in the media. The results may also help to show 
which aspects of psychological experience interventions could target. 
  
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should speak to 
the researcher in the first instance, who will try to answer your questions. 
If you have a concern you wish to escalate, please contact the Research 
Supervisor. If this is an ethical concern, please contact Dr Patrick Bourke, 
Chair of the Lincoln University Research Ethics Committee. All contact 
details are at the bottom of this sheet. 
 
Will my data be kept confidential? 
 
Your data will either be collected via a paper survey or via an online 
survey tool (Qualtrics) on a computer, depending on how you have 
accessed the study. The survey data will be held online through Qualtrics, 
where it is inaccessible to any external party and available to view only by 
the researcher and research supervisors. Data from paper questionnaires 
will be stored in a locked filing cabinet at the University of Lincoln, to 
which only administrators, researcher and research supervisors will have 
access. Any follow-up questionnaires completed over the telephone will 
be recorded for data-gathering purposes. The recordings will be 
encrypted and stored securely at the University of Lincoln. 
 
The results will remain password protected and stored for 7 years before 
being destroyed, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Where 
consent has been given for the follow-up, your personal data (name, 
telephone number) will be stored securely so that we are able to contact 
you after 3 months, after which time it will be destroyed. The exception to 
this is if you have asked to be emailed a link to the study results, in which 
case your details will be stored until that time.  
 
The survey results (i.e. your responses) will be anonymised before being 
exported to a password-protected Excel spreadsheet. This anonymous 
data will then be subject to analysis using a computer statistics package.  
 
We will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will 
be handled in confidence.  
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
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Your participation is voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason, and without your legal rights being affected. If 
you withdraw however, then the data collected so far cannot be erased 
once analysis has begun. However, your personal details would still be 
destroyed. This is because the questionnaire data will be pooled once the 
analysis begins, and it is therefore not possible to separate out an 
individual’s responses. Should you wish to withdraw from this study at 
any time, please contact the Chief Investigator using the details below, 
and give your participant number. You will not need to give a reason why 
you wish to withdraw from the study. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results of this study will be written up as a thesis for a Doctorate in 
Clinical Psychology (DClinPsy), submitted in 2016. Participants will 
remain anonymous in the thesis and any further publications which may 
ensue. Participants will be asked at the start of the questionnaire whether 
they would like to be emailed a link to a results summary in 2016. If you 
would like access to these results, please indicate this on the 
questionnaire and a link to the study will be emailed to you in due course. 
 
The results may also be published in a relevant journal (e.g. Journal of 
Psycho-Oncology), no sooner than 2017.  
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research is being organised by the University of Lincoln.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
All proposed research in the NHS is assessed by an independent group 
of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. 
This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by University 
of Lincoln Ethics Committee and Lincoln Partnership Foundation Trust, as 
well as by the NHS Research Ethics Committee for this Trust.  
 
Should you have any concerns regarding the ethical practice or conduct 
of this study, please contact Dr Patrick Bourke using the email address 
given below. 
 
Contact Details 
Chief Investigator: Lucinda Brabbins  
Email: cancer.acceptance@gmail.com  
Telephone: 07538 884432  
 
Research Supervisor: Dr David Dawson   
Email: cancer.acceptance@gmail.com  
 
University of Lincoln Ethics Chair: Dr Patrick Bourke  
Email: soprec@lincoln.ac.uk 
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Appendix C – Participant consent form  
 
 
 
Trent Doctoral Training 
Programme  
in Clinical Psychology  
                       PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Title of Study: Accepting the ‘Big C’: Exploring the Acceptance – 
Quality of Life   relationship in a cancer population 
 
Name of Researcher: Lucinda Brabbins   
     
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the participant 
information sheet for this study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving reason, by contacting the 
researcher. This will not affect any care I may be receiving. I 
understand that should I withdraw, the results collected so far 
cannot be withdrawn if data analysis has begun, but that my 
personal details will still be destroyed. 
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my data collected in the 
study may be looked at by the researcher and research 
supervisor. I give permission for both parties to collect, store, 
analyse, and publish anonymous information obtained from my 
participation in this study. I understand that any personal details 
will remain confidential and stored securely for seven years. 
 
4. I understand that anonymous direct quotes from the survey may 
be used in the study reports and that any telephone calls will be 
recorded and stored securely for data analysis purposes. 
 
5. I understand that my consultant will be made aware of my 
decision to participate in this study. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
7. I agree to take part in the follow-up in three months’ time 
[optional]. 
 
 
Please tick the boxes below: 
 
Centre No: 
Participant No: 
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Please sign: 
 
Your name: ……………………………………  Date  __/__/__      
 
Signature: ……………………………. 
 
NB: 
If you DO NOT agree to take part in the follow-up in three months’ time, 
please indicate. You DO NOT need to leave contact details in this 
instance.  
 
If you wish to take part in the follow-up, please indicate how you 
would prefer to be contacted:  
 
Telephone Telephone number………………………..         
 
              Email          Email address…………………………….. 
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Appendix D – Final questionnaire – Time one 
          
Acceptance - Quality of Life Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research about your 
experiences of cancer. Please be sure to complete the consent form, 
and leave your contact details if you agree to the follow-up in three 
months' time. 
 
The questionnaire should take 25-30 minutes to complete. If you find 
any of the following questions too distressing, please leave them blank. 
Sources of support can be found in your information sheet.  
 
1. Personal Details 
 
Your age group:  18-24   25-34  35-44   45-54    55-64  65-74  
75+ 
 
Your gender: 
 
   Male 
 
   Female 
 
   Other  
 
Are you currently, or have you previously been, participating in any other 
research? 
 
    No 
 
    Yes 
 
If Yes, please give details:   
 
Please indicate the highest level of education you have achieved: 
 
   None 
 
   Qualifications at level 1 or below 
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   GCSE or equivalent 
 
   A levels or equivalent 
 
   Higher education or equivalent 
What, if any, has been your most recent occupation? 
 
Do you wish to be sent an email link to the study results, once they are 
available? 
  
  Yes 
 
   No 
 
If Yes, please leave your email address below: 
 
 
Do you consider yourself to be spiritual/religious? 
  
  No 
 
  Yes 
 
If yes, please describe: 
 
 
Have you had any psychological support since being diagnosed with cancer? 
  
  No 
 
  
  Yes 
  
If yes, please give a brief description of the type and source of support:  
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Have you been bereaved by cancer, or personally affected by a loved one 
having cancer? 
 
   Yes 
 
   No 
 
 
Please state your consultant’s name (if applicable):  
 
 
 
2. Clinical Details 
 
These questions concern the nature of your illness. Should you find 
any of them distressing in any way, you do not have to give an 
answer and should seek support from the sources specified in your 
information sheet.  
 
If you have had cancer in the past, please fill this in relating to your 
current experiences. Please answer N/A to any questions which 
may no longer apply. 
 
Which best describes your current situation? 
 
   Having curative treatment 
 
   Completed curative treatment 
 
   Having palliative treatment 
 
   Completed palliative treatment 
 
   Other (please describe) 
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If you are aware of your cancer stage/grade, please indicate it below: 
  
  I 
  II 
  III 
  IV 
  Don't know 
  Not Applicable 
 
If you have been told about your prognosis, please give details: 
 
Do you know where your cancer is? Please describe: 
 
 
Is this the first time you have had cancer? 
   Yes 
   No 
   N/A 
 
If no, how many previous occurrences of cancer have you had?        
 
 
 
Thank you for your responses so far. 
 
The following questions come from a battery of questionnaires which 
have been used in other psychological studies with cancer patients. 
If you find any of the questions too distressing, please do not 
answer them. Sources of support can be found in your information 
sheet. 
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Below is a list of statements that other people with your illness have said are 
important. Please mark your responses (one per line), as they apply to the 
past 7 days. 
 
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat 
Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
I have a lack of energy 
     
I have nausea 
     
Because of my physical 
condition, I have difficulty 
meeting the needs of my family 
     
I have pain 
     
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat 
Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
I am bothered by side effects of 
treatment      
I feel ill 
     
I am forced to spend time in bed 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not 
at all 
A 
little 
bit 
Somewhat 
Quite a 
bit 
Very 
much 
I feel close to my friends 
     
I get emotional support from my 
family      
I get support from my friends 
     
My family has accepted my 
illness      
I am satisfied with family 
communication about my illness      
I feel close to my partner (or the 
person who is my main support)      
I am satisfied with my sex life 
     
 
If you prefer not to answer this last question, please mark an X below 
 
 
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat Quite a bit 
Very 
much 
I am able to work 
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My work (including work at 
home) is fulfilling      
I am able to enjoy life 
     
I have accepted my illness 
     
I am sleeping well 
     
I am enjoying the things I 
usually do for fun      
I am content with the quality 
of my life right now      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at 
all 
 
 
 
 
A little 
bit 
 
 
 
 
Somewhat 
 
 
 
 
Quite a 
bit 
 
 
 
 
Very 
much 
I feel sad 
     
I am satisfied with how I am 
coping with my illness      
I am losing hope in the fight 
against my illness      
I feel nervous 
     
I worry about dying 
     
I worry that my condition will 
get worse      
 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about your illness by checking the appropriate box: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My cancer does not have 
much effect on my life      
I feel I have influence over 
my cancer (i.e. I can 
personally do things to 
improve my cancer) 
     
I expect to have this 
cancer for the rest of my 
life 
     
My treatment can affect 
my cancer      
I experience symptoms 
from my cancer      
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I am concerned about my 
illness      
I feel I understand my 
illness (i.e. I know what is 
'wrong' with me) 
     
My illness affects me 
emotionally      
 
Is there anything that you think caused your illness? (List with the most 
important cause first): 
 
1.  
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Read each item below and tick the box which comes closest to how you 
have been feeling in the past week.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. I feel tense 
or 'wound up' 
Most of the 
time 
 
 
 
 
A lot of the  
time 
From time to 
time, 
occasionally 
Not at all 
 
 
 
2. I still enjoy 
the things I 
used to enjoy 
 
Definitely as 
much 
Not quite so 
much 
Only a little Hardly at all 
 
 
 
3. I get a sort 
of frightened 
feeling as if 
something 
awful is 
about to 
happen 
Very definitely 
and quite 
badly 
Yes, but not 
too badly 
A little, but it 
doesn't worry 
me 
Not at all 
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4. I can laugh 
and see the 
funny side of 
things 
As much as I 
always could 
Not quite so 
much now 
Definitely not 
so much now 
Not at all 
 
 
 
5. Worrying 
thoughts go 
through my 
mind 
A great deal 
of the time 
A lot of the 
time 
From time to 
time, but not 
too often 
Only 
occasionally 
 
 
 
 
 
6. I feel 
cheerful 
Not at all Not often  Sometimes  Most of the 
time 
 
 
 
7. I can sit at 
ease and feel 
relaxed 
Definitely Usually Not often Not at all 
 
 
 
8. I get a sort 
of frightened 
feeling like 
'butterflies' in 
the stomach 
Not at all Occasionally Quite often Very often 
 
 
 
 
9. I have lost 
interest in my 
appearance 
Definitely I don't take as 
much care as 
I should 
I may not 
take quite as 
much care 
I take just as 
much care as 
ever 
 
 
 
 
10. I feel 
restless as if 
I have to be 
on the move 
Very much 
indeed 
Quite a lot Not very 
much 
Not at all 
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11. I look 
forward with 
enjoyment to 
things 
As much as I 
ever did 
Rather less 
than I used to 
Definitely less 
than I used to 
Hardly at all 
 
 
 
 
12. I get 
sudden 
feelings of 
panic 
Very often 
indeed 
Quite often Not very often Not at all 
 
 
 
13. I can 
enjoy a good 
book, or 
radio, or TV 
programme 
Often Sometimes Not often Very seldom 
 
 
 
 
 
The following is a list of statements. Indicate how true each statement is 
for you, using the scale below: 
 
 
1-------------2--------------3--------------4----------------5-------------6----------7 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It's ok if I remember something unpleasant 
       
My painful experiences and memories make it 
difficult for me to live a life that I would value        
I'm afraid of my feelings 
       
I worry about being unable to control my worries 
and feelings        
My painful memories prevent me from having a 
fulfilling life        
Never 
true 
Very 
seldom 
true 
Seldom 
true 
 
Sometimes 
true 
Frequently 
true 
Almost 
always true 
Always true 
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I am in control of my life 
       
Emotions can cause problems in my life 
       
It seems as if most people are handling their lives 
better than I am        
Worries get in the way of my success 
       
My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of 
how I want to live my life        
These items deal with the ways you've been coping with the stress in your 
life since you found out you had cancer.  
 
 
I haven't 
been doing 
this at all 
I've been 
doing this 
a little bit 
I've been 
doing this a 
medium 
amount 
I've been 
doing 
this a lot 
I've been turning to work or 
other activities to take my 
mind off things 
    
I've been concentrating my 
efforts on doing something 
about the situation I'm in  
    
I've been saying to myself 
"this isn't real"     
I've been using alcohol or 
other drugs to make myself 
feel better 
    
I've been getting emotional 
support from others     
I've been giving up trying 
to deal with it     
I've been taking action to 
try and make the situation 
better 
    
I've been refusing to 
believe this has happened     
I've been saying things to 
let my unpleasant feelings 
escape 
    
I've been getting help and 
advice from other people     
I've been using alcohol or 
other drugs to help me get 
through it 
    
I've been trying to see it in 
a different light, to make it 
seem more positive 
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I've been criticising myself 
    
I've been trying to come up 
with a strategy about what 
to do 
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I haven't 
been 
doing this 
at all 
I've been 
doing 
this a 
little bit 
I've been 
doing this a 
medium 
amount 
I've 
been 
doing 
this a 
lot 
I've been getting comfort and 
understanding from someone     
I've been giving up the attempt 
to cope     
I've been looking for something 
good in what is happening     
I've been making jokes about it 
    
I've been doing something to 
think about it less, such as going 
to the movies, watching TV, 
reading, daydreaming, sleeping, 
or shopping 
    
I've been accepting the reality of 
the fact that it has happened     
I've been expressing my 
negative feelings     
I've been trying to find comfort in 
my religion or spiritual beliefs     
I've been trying to get advice or 
help from other people about 
what to do 
    
I've been learning to live with it 
    
I've been thinking hard about 
what steps to take     
I've been blaming myself for 
things that happened     
I've been praying or meditating 
    
I've been making fun of the 
situation     
 
 
Thank you for your participation so far. 
 
These final questions are about death and dying, and we appreciate 
that these may be difficult and upsetting for some people. Therefore, 
if you prefer not to answer these questions, please leave them 
blank. This will not affect your participation in this study, nor any 
care you may be receiving. 
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If a statement is true, or mostly true as applied to you, indicate True. If a 
statement is false or mostly false, as applied to you, indicate False. 
 
True False 
I am very much afraid to die 
  
The thought of death seldom enters my mind 
  
It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death 
  
I dread to think about having to have an operation 
  
I am not afraid to die 
  
I am/was particularly afraid of having cancer 
  
The thought of death never bothers me 
  
I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly 
  
I fear dying a painful death 
  
The subject of life after death troubles me greatly 
  
I am really scared of having a heart attack 
  
I often think about how short life really is 
  
I shudder when I hear people talking about a World War Three 
  
The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me  
  
I feel that the future holds nothing for me to fear 
  
 
Thank you for your participation in this questionnaire, it is greatly 
appreciated. Please be sure you have filled out the consent form 
on the front page, and return it with your questionnaire using the 
envelope provided, or by handing the documents back to a member 
of the research team.  
 
If you have found any part of this questionnaire distressing and 
would like further support, please speak to a member of your clinical 
team, or consider the sources of support listed in the information 
sheet. You will also find the researcher's contact details on your 
participant information sheet. 
 
With kindest regards, 
Lucinda Brabbins (Principal Investigator) 
 
 
HADS copyright © R.P. Snaith and A.S. Zigmond, 1983, 1992, 1994. 
Record form items originally published in Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 67, 361–70, copyright © Munksgaard 
International Publishers Ltd, Copenhagen, 1983. This edition first published in 1994 by nferNelson Publishing Company 
Ltd (now GL Assessment Ltd), 389 Chiswick High Road, London W4 4AL. GL Assessment Ltd is part of the Granada 
Learning Group 
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Appendix E – Follow-Up Participant Information Sheet (paper version) 
 
Accepting the Big C: Exploring the acceptance – quality of life 
relationship in a cancer population 
Follow-up questionnaire participant information sheet  
Why have I been invited? 
A few months ago you participated in some research conducted by 
clinical psychologists at the University of Lincoln. Thank you for agreeing 
to participate in this follow-up questionnaire, which will help us to further 
investigate the relationships between quality of life and psychological 
variables such as acceptance, anxiety and coping.  
If you would like to remind yourself about this research project, then 
please take a moment to read this information sheet. If you have any 
questions before or after completing the questionnaire, the researcher’s 
contact details are available at the bottom of the sheet. This questionnaire 
is slightly shorter than the previous one, and will take approximately 15 
minutes to complete.  
The information we get from this study may help to highlight how useful 
psychological interventions could be for cancer patients. This is a current 
topic of interest, and calls for greater psychological support in cancer are 
regularly appearing in the media. The study results may also help to show 
which aspects of psychological experience interventions could target.  
What is involved?  
The questionnaire begins with some demographic questions (e.g. cancer 
site/grade, whether you are currently having cancer treatment etc.). 
Following this, you will be asked to complete a battery of questions, which 
are designed to measure your attitudes towards and your experiences of 
different things (e.g. anxiety). We anticipate that this will take 15 minutes 
in total. Please note that the final questions are about death and dying. If 
you find these, or any other questions, too distressing, you do not need to 
answer them and can leave them blank.  
Do I have to take part?  
It is entirely up to you to decide whether or not to take part in this follow-
up questionnaire. You may still be happy to take part, or you may have 
changed your mind since consenting. If you initially decide to participate 
but later change your mind, you are free to withdraw at any time, without 
giving a reason. You can do this by contacting the researcher using the 
details below.  
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Potential risks  
Due to the subject matter, some people may find answering questions 
about cancer and the realities of their situation distressing. It is therefore 
essential that you can access emotional support, through family, friends, 
or cancer charities. If you are in treatment, a member of clinical staff may 
be able to refer you towards good sources of support. If you are no longer 
a cancer patient, your G.P. can provide a gateway to accessing support. 
Otherwise, many cancer charities have helplines, websites, and drop-in 
centres where you can find support. Examples of these are:  
Macmillan Helpline – 0808 808 0000 or www.macmillan.org.uk Cancer 
Research UK – 0808 800 4040 or www.cancerresearchuk.org Shine 
(support for those aged 20-50) www.shinecancersupport.co.uk Sue Ryder 
- support.sueryder.org  
Data confidentiality  
The questionnaire results will be anonymised before being exported to a 
password-protected Excel spreadsheet. This anonymous data will then be 
subject to analysis using a computer statistics package. 
 
The results will remain password protected and stored for 7 years before 
being destroyed, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. The 
exception to this is if you initially indicated that you would like to be 
emailed a link to the study results, in which case your details will be 
stored securely until the results are finalised.  
Contact details  
This thesis is part of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology from the 
University of Lincoln. This study has been reviewed and given favourable 
opinion by University of Lincoln Ethics Committee.  
The researcher’s details are available below, should you have any 
questions at any time, before or after taking part. Should you have any 
concerns regarding the ethical practice or conduct of this study, please 
contact Dr Patrick Bourke using the details below.  
Chief Investigator: Lucinda Brabbins 
Email: cancer.acceptance@gmail.com 
Telephone: 07538 884432 
 
Research Supervisor: Dr David Dawson 
Email: cancer.acceptance@gmail.com 
 
University of Lincoln Ethics Chair: Dr Patrick Bourke 
Email: soprec@lincoln.ac.uk 
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Appendix F – Follow-up Questionnaire 
Acceptance - Quality of Life Follow-Up Questionnaire 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this follow-up questionnaire 
about your experiences of cancer. The responses you give will help us 
to further investigate whether there is a relationship between quality of 
life and psychological variables such as acceptance, anxiety and 
coping. 
 
The questionnaire should take around 15 minutes to complete. If you 
find any of the following questions too distressing, please do not 
answer them and leave them blank. Sources of support can be found 
in the accompanying information sheet.  
 
1. About you 
 
Have you participated in any other research since taking part in the first 
questionnaire? If so, please give details: 
 
  
Do you consider yourself to be spiritual / religious? 
 
  No 
 
  Yes 
 
If yes, please describe: 
 
 
Have you had any psychological support since being diagnosed with cancer? 
  
  No 
 
  
  Yes 
  
If yes, please give a brief description of the type and source of support:  
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Have you been bereaved by cancer, or personally affected by a loved one 
having cancer? 
 
   Yes 
 
   No 
 
 
2. Clinical Details 
 
These questions concern the nature of your illness. Should you find 
any of them distressing in any way, you do not have to give an 
answer and should seek support from the sources specified in your 
information sheet.  
 
If you have had cancer in the past, please fill this in relating to your 
current experiences. Please answer N/A to any questions which 
may no longer apply. 
 
Which best describes your current situation? 
 
   Having curative treatment 
 
   Completed curative treatment 
 
   Having palliative treatment 
 
   Completed palliative treatment 
 
   Other (please describe) 
 
If you are aware of your cancer stage/grade, please indicate it below: 
  
  I 
  II 
  III 
  IV 
  Don't know 
  Not Applicable 
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If you have been told about your prognosis, please give details: 
 
Do you know where your cancer is? Please describe: 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your responses so far. 
 
The following questions come from a battery of questionnaires which 
have been used in other psychological studies with cancer patients. 
If you find any of the questions too distressing, please do not 
answer them. Sources of support can be found in your information 
sheet. 
 
 
Below is a list of statements that other people with your illness have said are 
important. Please mark your responses (one per line), as they apply to the 
past 7 days. 
 
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat 
Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
I have a lack of energy 
     
I have nausea 
     
Because of my physical 
condition, I have difficulty 
meeting the needs of my family 
     
I have pain 
     
I am bothered by side effects of 
treatment      
I feel ill 
     
I am forced to spend time in bed 
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Not 
at all 
 
A 
little 
bit 
 
Somewhat 
 
Quite a 
bit 
 
Very 
much 
I feel close to my friends 
     
I get emotional support from my 
family      
I get support from my friends 
     
My family has accepted my 
illness      
I am satisfied with family 
communication about my illness      
I feel close to my partner (or the 
person who is my main support)      
I am satisfied with my sex life 
     
 
If you prefer not to answer this last question, please mark an X below 
 
 
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat Quite a bit 
Very 
much 
I am able to work 
     
My work (including work at 
home) is fulfilling      
I am able to enjoy life 
     
I have accepted my illness 
     
I am sleeping well 
     
I am enjoying the things I 
usually do for fun      
I am content with the quality 
of my life right now      
 
Not at 
all 
A little 
bit 
Somewhat 
Quite a 
bit 
Very 
much 
I feel sad 
     
I am satisfied with how I am 
coping with my illness      
I am losing hope in the fight 
against my illness      
I feel nervous 
     
I worry about dying 
     
I worry that my condition will 
     
 156 
get worse 
 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
about your illness by checking the appropriate box: 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
My cancer does not have 
much effect on my life      
I feel I have influence over 
my cancer (i.e. I can 
personally do things to 
improve my cancer) 
     
I expect to have this 
cancer for the rest of my 
life 
     
My treatment can affect 
my cancer      
I experience symptoms 
from my cancer      
I am concerned about my 
illness      
I feel I understand my 
illness (i.e. I know what is 
'wrong' with me) 
     
My illness affects me 
emotionally      
 
Is there anything that you think caused your illness? (List with the most 
important cause first): 
 
1.  
 
2. 
 
3. 
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Read each item below and tick the reply which comes closest to how you 
have been feeling in the past week.  
 
 
 
 
1. I feel tense 
or 'wound up' 
Most of the 
time 
 
 
 
 
A lot of the  
time 
From time to 
time, 
occasionally 
Not at all 
 
 
 
2. I still enjoy 
the things I 
used to enjoy 
 
Definitely as 
much 
Not quite so 
much 
Only a little Hardly at all 
 
 
 
3. I get a sort 
of frightened 
feeling as if 
something 
awful is 
about to 
happen 
Very definitely 
and quite 
badly 
Yes, but not 
too badly 
A little, but it 
doesn't worry 
me 
Not at all 
 
 
 
4. I can laugh 
and see the 
funny side of 
things 
As much as I 
always could 
Not quite so 
much now 
Definitely not 
so much now 
Not at all 
 
 
 
5. Worrying 
thoughts go 
through my 
mind 
A great deal 
of the time 
A lot of the 
time 
From time to 
time, but not 
too often 
Only 
occasionally 
 
 
 
6. I feel 
cheerful 
Not at all Not often  Sometimes  Most of the 
time 
 
 
 
7. I can sit at 
ease and feel 
Definitely Usually Not often Not at all 
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relaxed 
 
 
 
8. I get a sort 
of frightened 
feeling like 
'butterflies' in 
the stomach 
Not at all Occasionally Quite often Very often 
 
 
 
 
9. I have lost 
interest in my 
appearance 
Definitely I don't take as 
much care as 
I should 
I may not 
take quite as 
much care 
I take just as 
much care as 
ever 
 
 
 
 
10. I feel 
restless as I 
have to be on 
the move 
Very much 
indeed 
Quite a lot Not very 
much 
Not at all 
 
 
 
 
11. I look 
forward with 
enjoyment to 
things 
As much as I 
ever did 
Rather less 
than I used to 
Definitely less 
than I used to 
Hardly at all 
 
 
 
 
12. I get 
sudden 
feelings of 
panic 
Very often 
indeed 
Quite often Not very often Not at all 
 
 
 
13. I can 
enjoy a good 
book, or 
radio, or TV 
programme 
Often Sometimes Not often Very seldom 
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The following is a list of statements. Rate how true each statement is for 
you, using the scale below: 
 
1-------------2--------------3--------------4----------------5-------------6---------7 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It's ok if I remember something unpleasant 
       
My painful experiences and memories make it 
difficult for me to live a life that I would value        
I'm afraid of my feelings 
       
I worry about being unable to control my worries 
and feelings        
My painful memories prevent me from having a 
fulfilling life        
I am in control of my life 
       
Emotions can cause problems in my life 
       
It seems as if most people are handling their lives 
better than I am        
Worries get in the way of my success 
       
My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of 
how I want to live my life        
 
These items deal with the ways you've been coping with the stress in your 
life since you found out you had cancer.  
 
I haven't 
been doing 
this at all 
I've been 
doing this 
a little bit 
I've been 
doing this a 
medium 
amount 
I've been 
doing 
this a lot 
I've been turning to work or 
other activities to take my 
mind off things 
    
I've been concentrating my 
efforts on doing something 
about the situation I'm in  
    
I've been saying to myself 
"this isn't real"     
I've been using alcohol or 
other drugs to make myself 
feel better 
    
I've been getting emotional 
support from others     
Never 
true 
Very 
seldom 
true 
Seldom 
true 
 
Sometimes 
true 
Frequently 
true 
Almost 
always true 
Always true 
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I've been giving up trying to 
deal with it     
I've been taking action to 
try and make the situation 
better 
    
I've been refusing to 
believe this has happened     
I've been saying things to 
let my unpleasant feelings 
escape 
    
I've been getting help and 
advice from other people     
I've been using alcohol or 
other drugs to help me get 
through it 
    
I've been trying to see it in 
a different light, to make it 
seem more positive 
    
I've been criticising myself 
    
I've been trying to come up 
with a strategy about what 
to do 
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I haven't 
been 
doing this 
at all 
I've been 
doing 
this a 
little bit 
I've been 
doing this a 
medium 
amount 
I've 
been 
doing 
this a 
lot 
I've been getting comfort and 
understanding from someone     
I've been giving up the attempt 
to cope     
I've been looking for something 
good in what is happening     
I've been making jokes about it 
    
I've been doing something to 
think about it less, such as going 
to the movies, watching TV, 
reading, daydreaming, sleeping, 
or shopping 
    
I've been accepting the reality of 
the fact that it has happened     
I've been expressing my 
negative feelings     
I've been trying to find comfort in 
my religion or spiritual beliefs     
I've been trying to get advice or 
help from other people about 
what to do 
    
I've been learning to live with it 
    
I've been thinking hard about 
what steps to take     
I've been blaming myself for 
things that happened     
I've been praying or meditating 
    
I've been making fun of the 
situation     
 
 
Thank you for your participation so far. 
 
These final questions are about death and dying, and we appreciate 
that these may be difficult and upsetting for some people. Therefore, 
if you prefer not to answer these questions, please leave them 
blank. This will not affect your participation in this study, nor any 
care you may be receiving. 
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If a statement is true, or mostly true as applied to you, indicate True. If a 
statement is false or mostly false, as applied to you, indicate False. 
 
True False 
I am very much afraid to die 
  
The thought of death seldom enters my mind 
  
It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death 
  
I dread to think about having to have an operation 
  
I am not afraid to die 
  
I am/was particularly afraid of having cancer 
  
The thought of death never bothers me 
  
I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly 
  
I fear dying a painful death 
  
The subject of life after death troubles me greatly 
  
I am really scared of having a heart attack 
  
I often think about how short life really is 
  
I shudder when I hear people talking about a World War Three 
  
The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me  
  
I fear that the future holds nothing for me to fear 
  
 
Thank you for your participation in this follow-up questionnaire, it is 
greatly appreciated. Please return it to the research team using the 
envelope provided.  
 
If you have found any part of this questionnaire distressing and 
would like further support, please speak to a member of your clinical 
team, or consider the sources of support listed in the information 
sheet. The researcher's contact details are also available on the 
participant information sheet. 
 
Kind regards, 
Lucinda Brabbins 
 
 
HADS copyright © R.P. Snaith and A.S. Zigmond, 1983, 1992, 1994. 
Record form items originally published in Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 67, 361–70, copyright © 
Munksgaard International Publishers Ltd, Copenhagen, 1983. This edition first published in 1994 
by nferNelson Publishing Company Ltd (now GL Assessment Ltd), 389 Chiswick High Road, 
London W4 4AL. GL Assessment Ltd is part of the Granada Learning Group 
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Appendix G – NHS Ethical approval letter  
 
12 January 2015  
Miss Lucinda Brabbins  
University of Lincoln,1st Floor, Bridge House, Brayford Pool LN6 7TS  
Dear Miss Brabbins  
NRES Committee East Midlands - Nottingham 1 
Royal Standard Place Nottingham NG1 6FS Telephone: 0115 8839428  
Study title:  
Accepting the 'Big C': Exploring the Acceptance –  
Quality of Life relationship in a cancer population.  
REC reference:  14/EM/1224  
IRAS project ID:  152363  
Thank you for your letter of 09 January 2015, responding to the Committee’s 
request for further information on the above research and submitting revised 
documentation. The further information has been considered on behalf of the 
Committee by the Vice-Chair.  
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the 
HRA website, together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier 
than three months from the date of this favourable opinion letter. The 
expectation is that this information will be published for all studies that receive 
an ethical opinion but should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, 
wish to make a request to defer, or require further information, please contact 
the REC Manager, Ms Penelope Gregory, NRESCommittee.EastMidlands-
Nottingham1@nhs.net. Under very limited circumstances (e.g. for student 
research which has received an unfavourable opinion), it may be possible to 
grant an exemption to the publication of the study.  
Confirmation of ethical opinion  
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical 
opinion for the above research on the basis described in the application form, 
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protocol and supporting documentation as revised, subject to the conditions 
specified below.  
Conditions of the favourable opinion  
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to 
the start of the study. Management permission or approval must be obtained 
from each host organisation prior to the start of the study at the site concerned.  
Management permission ("R&D approval") should be sought from all NHS 
organisations involved in the study in accordance with NHS research 
governance arrangements. Guidance on applying for NHS permission for 
research is available in the Integrated Research Application System or at 
http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.  
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and 
referring potential participants to research sites ("participant identification 
centre"), guidance should be sought from the R&D office on the information it 
requires to give permission for this activity. For non-NHS sites, site 
management permission should be obtained in accordance with the procedures 
of the relevant host organisation. Sponsors are not required to notify the 
Committee of approvals from host organisations  
Registration of Clinical Trials  
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) 
must be registered on a publically accessible database. This should be before 
the first participant is recruited but no later than 6 weeks after recruitment of the 
first participant. There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you 
should do so at the earliest opportunity e.g. when submitting an amendment. 
We will audit the registration details as part of the annual progress reporting 
process.  
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is 
registered but for non-clinical trials this is not currently mandatory.
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Document 
 
Version 
Date 
Copies of advertisement materials for research participants 
[Poster for online recruitment] 
1.1 10 October 2014 
Evidence of Sponsor insurance or indemnity (non NHS Sponsors 
only) [Professional Indemnity Certificate] 
1.2 30 December 2014 
IRAS Checklist XML [Checklist_22102014] 
 
22 October 2014 
IRAS Checklist XML [Checklist_09012015] 
 
09 January 2015 
Letters of invitation to participant [Participant Invitation Text] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Other [CV Second Supervisor Nima Moghaddam] 1.1 10 October 2014 
Other [Letter to REC committee] 1.1 09 January 2015 
Participant consent form [Participant Consent Form] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Participant Information   
Sheet] 
1.2 30 December 2014 
REC Application Form [REC_Form_22102014] 
 
22 October 2014 
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Research protocol or project proposal [Research Protocol] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Summary CV for Chief Investigator (CI) [CV Lucinda Brabbins] 1.1 10 October 2014 
Summary CV for supervisor (student research) [CV Supervisor 
David Dawson] 
1.1 10 October 2014 
Summary, synopsis or diagram (flowchart) of protocol in non 
technical language [Research Schematic] 
1.1 10 October 2014 
Questionnaire [Participant questionnaire] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant Questionnaire -FACT-G] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant questionnaire -Brief IPQ] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant questionnaire -AAQ II] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant questionnaire -HADS] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant questionnaire -Brief COPE] 1.2 30 December 2014 
Validated questionnaire [Participant questionnaire -Death Anxiety   
Scale] 
1.2 
 
30 December 2014 
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If a sponsor wishes to request a deferral for study registration within the 
required timeframe, they should contact hra.studyregistration@nhs.net. The 
expectation is that all clinical trials will be registered, however, in exceptional 
circumstances non registration may be permissible with prior agreement from 
NRES. Guidance on where to register is provided on the HRA website.  
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are 
complied with before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular 
site (as applicable).  
Ethical review of research sites  
NHS sites  
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject 
to management permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior 
to the start of the study (see "Conditions of the favourable opinion" below).  
Non-NHS sites The Committee has not yet completed any site-specific 
assessment (SSA) for the non-NHS research site(s) taking part in this study. 
The favourable opinion does not therefore apply to any non-NHS site at 
present. We will write to you again as soon as an SSA application(s) has been 
reviewed. In the meantime no study procedures should be initiated at non-NHS 
sites.  
Approved documents  
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as 
follows:  
Statement of compliance  
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.  
After ethical review  
Reporting requirements The attached document “After ethical review – 
guidance for researchers” gives detailed guidance on reporting requirements for 
studies with a favourable opinion, including:  
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   Notifying substantial amendments   
   Adding new sites and investigators   
   Notification of serious breaches of the protocol   
   Progress and safety reports   
   Notifying the end of the study   
 The HRA website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in 
the light of changes in reporting requirements or procedures.   
 User Feedback The Health Research Authority is continually striving to 
provide a high quality service to all applicants and sponsors. You are invited to 
give your view of the service you have received and the application procedure. 
If you wish to make your views known please use the feedback form available 
on the HRA website: http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/governance/quality-
assurance/   
 HRA Training  We are pleased to welcome researchers and R&D staff at our 
training days – see details at  http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  With the 
Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project.  
 Yours sincerely  Dr Carl Edwards Chair  
 
 Email:NRESCommittee.EastMidlands-Nottingham1@nhs.net Enclosures: 
“After ethical review – guidance for  researchers” [SL-AR2]  Copy to: Professor 
Sara Owen  Mrs Tracey McCranor, NHS (LPFT)   
 14/EM/1224 Please quote this number on all correspondence  
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Appendix H – NHS Ethical approval letter for submitted study amendments 
 
 
30 September 2015  
Miss Lucinda Brabbins University of Lincoln, 1st Floor, Bridge House Brayford 
Pool LN6 7TS  
Dear Miss Brabbins  
East Midlands - Nottingham 1 Research Ethics Committee 
Royal Standard Place Nottingham NG1 6FS 
Tel: 0115 8839269 
Study title:  
Accepting the 'Big C': Exploring the Acceptance - Quality of Life 
relationship in a cancer population.  
REC reference:  14/EM/1224  
Amendment date:  29 September 2015  
IRAS project ID:  152363  
 
Thank you for your letter of 29 September 2015, notifying the Committee of the 
above amendment.  
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment” as 
defined in the Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees. 
The amendment does not therefore require an ethical opinion from the 
Committee and may be implemented immediately, provided that it does not 
affect the approval for the research given by the R&D office for the relevant 
NHS care organisation.  
Documents received  
The documents received were as follows:  
Statement of compliance  
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The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees and complies fully with the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK.  
Document  Version  Date  
Notice of Minor Amendment [Study Extension to 
September 2016]   
29 September 
2015  
Other [Email of Notification]  
 
29 September 
2015  
  
14/EM/1224: Please quote this number on all correspondence  
Yours sincerely  
Teagan Allen REC Assistant  
Email: NRESCommittee.EastMidlands-Nottingham1@nhs.net  
Copy to: Mrs Tracey McCranor, NHS (LPFT) Miss Lucinda Brabbins  
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Introduction
75% of cancer patients experience psychological distress, reduced quality of life and
heightened levels of anxiety, grief, pain, and depression [1]. Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy (ACT) [2] is reportedly effective for chronic pain, addictions,
psychosis, diabetes, HIV, and epilepsy, but is under-researched in cancer
populations. According to ACT, it is through our attempts to avoid and control
difficult inner experiences that we inadvertently create a state of suffering. This can
be alleviated through an alternative, accepting stance, involving a willingness to
allow all thoughts and feelings to occur without judgement or avoidance. Given
ACT’s efficacy for other health populations [3], acceptance may be an effective and
response style for cancer patients, and a potential alternative to the avoidant
response styles associated with poorer psychological and functional outcomes [4-5].
Aims
The primary aims of this study were 1) to discover whether acceptance was related
to quality of life and distress outcomes in cancer patients, and 2) whether
acceptancemoderated any relationship between cancer appraisal, and quality of life
and distress outcomes (Figure 1). Secondary aims were to examine 3) whether
sample characteristics and alternative response styles were related to quality of life
and distress outcomes, and 4) any temporal relationships between acceptance and
outcomes, across timepoints oneand two.
Method
72 participants with direct experience of a range of cancers completed a battery of
clinical questions and six standardised questionnaires: Brief IPQ, HADS, FACT-G, Brief
COPE, AAQ II, Death Anxiety Scale (DAS). 31 participants repeated the measures
after threemonths. Five avoidant coping styleswere entered into regression models
alongside the Brief IPQ and AAQ II, for time one and time two data. Moderation
analyses explored the impact of moderation on cancer appraisals and outcome
variables at both time points. Cross-lag panel models explored whether acceptance
was predictiveof outcomes over time.
Results
Results showed acceptance was a significant explanatory variable in social and
emotional quality of life outcomes, and also had significant explanatory power for
outcomes of depression, anxiety, and death anxiety, in a negative direction.
Behavioural disengagement was also a significant contributor to depression
outcomes, though acceptance explained a greater proportion of variance for the
depression model. Avoidant response styles were negatively correlated with
quality of life, and positively correlated with distress on all outcomes.
Although acceptancewas not a significant moderator in the relationship between
illness perceptions and outcomes, acceptance was predictive of anxiety and
quality of life at time two.
Discussion
Avoidant response styles such as denial, behavioural disengagement, and self-
distraction, showed a pattern of moderate to strong negative correlations with
quality of life, and significant positive correlations with distress outcomes in the
cancer population. Contrastingly, acceptance was an independent explanatory
variable of quality of life and distress outcomes, in directions consistent with
psychological health, and also demonstrated predictivepower for these outcomes
over time, over and above the influence explained by either physical disease
characteristics or cancer appraisals. In contrast to psychodynamically-informed
death anxiety literature, which suggests that inner experiences resulting from
threats to mortality must beavoided, results suggest the opposite: that accepting
cancer-related inner experiences has positive implications for quality of life and
psychological distress outcomes.
The findings support ACT’s hypothesis that experientially avoiding and struggling
against experiences maintains distress [2]. Furthermore, results also show that
many response styles that might be incorporated into more traditional cognitive
behavioural or expressive therapies, e.g. active coping, emotional support,
planning, positive reframing, and venting, are not associated with positive
outcomes in cancer patients, and that targeting acceptance rather than cognitive
reappraisal is indicated as a psychological intervention.References:
[1]	Cancer	Research	UK.	Cancer	risk	statistics. London	2014.
[2]	Hayes	S,	Strosahl	K,	Wilson	K.	Acceptance	and	commitment	therapy:	an	experiential	approach	to	behavior	change.	2nd ed.	New	York:	Guilford	Press.	2003.
[3]	A-Tjak,	JGL,	Davis,	ML,	Morina,	N,	Powers,	MB,	Smits,	JAJ,	Emmelkamp,	 P	MG.	A	meta-analysis	of	the	efficacy	of	acceptance	and	commitment	therapy	for	clinically	relevant	mental	and	physical	health	
problems. Psychother Psychosom.	2014; 84(1):	30-36.
[4]	Hulbert-Williams	NJ,	Storey L.	Psychological	flexibility	correlates	with	patient-reported	outcomes	independent	of	clinical	or	sociodemographic	characteristics.	Support	Care	Cancer.	2015;	24(6):	2513-2521
[5]	Nipp RD,	El-Jawahri A,	Fishbein JN,	Eusebio J,	Stagl JM,	Gallagher	ER,	et	al.	The	 relationship	between	coping	strategies,	quality	of	life,	and	mood	in	patients	with	incurable	cancer.	Cancer.	2016;	122: 2110-16.
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Abstract 
 
Objective. This systematic review aims to critique the current evidence for 
the use and effectiveness of mindfulness-based therapies in palliative cancer 
care. 
 
Methods. A thorough search of the literature was conducted using electronic 
databases and hand searching, following systematic review methods. Efforts 
were made to identify unpublished, ‘grey’ literature. Results were filtered and 
evaluated according to pre-determined inclusion and exclusion criteria, before 
being synthesised and presented. 
 
Results. Six papers were identified as meeting the criteria. Four were 
published after 2007, and two were based on the same study (one being a six 
month follow-up). Three studies were randomised controlled trials, and two 
were pretest-posttest designs. Results found a dose-response effect between 
time practicing mindfulness and improved psychological outcome. Significant 
effects for lessened anxiety, depression, and pain were also found. 
Methodological limitations were identified, and modifications to mindfulness 
interventions suggested. 
 
Conclusions. Mindfulness has promise as an intervention for this population, 
both in group settings and as a self-administered intervention. Further 
adaptations and component studies are recommended. 
 
Keywords: Cancer, Oncology, Mindfulness, Palliative, Terminal, 
Intervention 
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Background 
 
Mindfulness is defined by Kabat-Zinn [1] as ‘the awareness that emerges 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment and non-
judgementally to the unfolding of experience’ (p.145). Attempts to achieve this 
state of consciousness stem from Buddhist tradition, and it is a skill developed 
through the practice of mindfulness meditation. In recent years, the reported 
benefits of mindfulness have seen its inclusion within formal, structured 
interventions such as mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), 
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR), Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
(DBT), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) [2, 3-6]. However, 
Kabat-Zinn cautions against the temptation to manualise and apply 
mindfulness to clinical problems, without understanding the context within 
which it belongs. For example, in its heightened popularity, decontextualised 
mindfulness may be offered to a clinical population as a ‘curative’ intervention, 
aiming to fix problems - as healthcare patients have come to expect. 
However, a true mindful approach would require a complete departure from 
this curative perspective, invoking a willing openness to accept both good and 
bad experiences, rather than trying to forcibly eliminate unpleasant ones.  
 
Mechanisms of action 
Shapiro [7] highlighted the need to understand how mindfulness works, given 
that studies have demonstrated its effectiveness in anxiety disorders, chronic 
pain, stress, and mood disturbance in cancer patients [8-11]. Shapiro 
suggests that mindfulness leads to changes when three fundamental 
components - intention, attention, and attitude - are cultivated. Specifically, 
these refer to: a personal vision to be achieved by obtaining a mindful state; 
the observation of internal and external states without interpretation; and 
approaching these observations in a compassionate and curious manner. 
These axioms lead to ‘reperceiving,’ i.e. a shift in perspective, which 
underpins the changes that practicing mindfulness can reportedly bring [8-11]. 
Shapiro suggested that reperceiving leads to four further direct mechanisms 
of action: self-regulation and management, flexibility, values clarification, and 
exposure. A review by Hölzel et al. [12] showed that more recent research 
has lent support to these theorised mechanisms (with the exception of values 
clarification), and also included findings from neuroimaging studies. Here, 
mindfulness has been shown to produce neuroplastic changes across several 
areas of the brain, including the amygdala; where activity has decreased in 
line with increased emotional regulation in mindfulness [13]. The same study 
concluded that by consciously influencing mental processes, humans can 
influence the ‘electrochemical dynamics of their brains.’   
 
The concept of reperceiving has parallels within other psychological 
approaches, such cognitive therapy, which works to shift a person’s appraisal 
of a situation in order to change their emotional and behavioural responses 
[14]. This approach is often applied within cognitive behavioural therapy 
(CBT), which has a vast evidence base and, like mindfulness, has also been 
shown to be effective in anxiety, depression, and chronic health conditions 
[15,16]. Studies have compared mindfulness-based and cognitive behavioural 
interventions, finding them both effective in treating anxiety disorders, and 
differing in the aspects they impacted most on: worry and anxious arousal, 
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respectively [17]. This level of compatibility means that mindfulness has been 
incorporated into a CBT approach, where reperceiving is referred to as 
‘decentring’, and has also been integrated with CBT in the form of MBCT [3]. 
However, to heed concerns about maintaining the context surrounding 
mindfulness interventions, the roles of intention, attention, and attitude should 
all be emphasised, rather than giving precedence to the role of attention, as 
CBT can do. Further research and dismantling studies would help to 
determine more precisely which active components of mindfulness are the 
most effective, and to continue elaborating on theories about its mechanisms 
of action. 
 
MBCT represents one way in which mindfulness can be applied, and was 
recently developed as a group programme to target vulnerability to future 
relapse in depression. More specifically, it aims to foster attention and new 
ways of relating to the negative thoughts which precede depressive relapse; 
thoughts identified as common amongst depressed people by Beck [18]. It is 
also helpful in non-clinical populations, for people experiencing anxiety and 
stress [19]. Evidence for MBCT is promising based on the results of 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs) thus far. However, it is also a nascent 
intervention and as such there are not yet enough RCTs to demonstrate 
generalisable results [20,21].  
 
MBCT evolved out of MBSR, a psycho-educational and skills-based 
programme, combining yoga exercises with mindfulness meditation. MBSR 
takes place over eight, weekly, two-and-a-half hour group sessions (including 
one whole retreat day), and requires daily practice using recordings. 
Mindfulness skills such as body scan and sitting meditation are taught, and 
yoga stretches help participants to become aware of bodily sensations [22]. 
MBCT combines these factors with cognitive therapy, has smaller class sizes, 
and a more homogenous group demographic, e.g. similar physical conditions. 
Although developed and effective for sufferers of chronic pain and stress-
related problems [9], MBSR has also been shown to be effective for 
fibromyalgia, HIV, anxiety, and in reducing sleep, stress, low mood, and 
fatigue in cancer patients [23-26].  
 
Cancer patients present a unique and heterogeneous population due to the 
variability of the disease and the impact of different factors (e.g. treatment 
side-effects, operations, hospitalisation, prognosis) upon patients’ lives. 
Cancer sufferers are therefore at increased risk of psychological distress, 
anxiety, and depression; with some estimates of depression and distress as 
high as 30%-45% [27,28]. Certain types of cancer, e.g. advanced prostate, 
have unique challenges for patients, due to the impact of hormonal treatments 
on factors such as mood disturbance, cognitive impairment, hot flushes, and 
sexual dysfunction. The impact of these changes puts men with advanced 
prostate cancer at greater risk of psychological distress and suicide [29,30]. 
The psychological effects of advanced cancer are not limited to its occurrence 
in the prostate: advanced cancer is associated with cancer-related fatigue and 
pain across multiple sites [31]. Patients also suffer from anxiety, depression, 
and poor quality sleep - the latter correlating with worse pain and poorer 
quality of life [32, 33].  
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Given the high distress levels amongst the palliative population, there is a 
clear rationale for psychological intervention: a claim supported by the NICE 
guidelines for palliative care [34]. This need is further emphasised by the 
discrepancy in numbers between patients who experience distress (45%) and 
those who receive psychological support (10%) [28]. The unique needs of 
palliative patients and the logistical challenges they face must be 
accommodated by any intervention offered. Given the potential flexibility of 
mindfulness interventions, their lower impact on staff time [28], and the 
existing evidence for their effectiveness, they would logically seem suitable for 
a palliative population.  
 
Applications of mindfulness-based therapies to cancer patients reflects a 
wider trend for the use of alternatives to medication, awareness of 
psychological and physical wellbeing, and the development of a more holistic 
approach to cancer treatment [26]. Although the evidence for mindfulness in 
cancer is becoming well-established, comparatively there exist far fewer 
studies and reviews focusing on a population with advanced, terminal or late 
stage cancer; despite the higher levels of distress they may face [35, 29]. 
Given that studies have acknowledged differences in wellbeing across the 
cancer trajectory [26], and the proposed adaptation of interventions for 
advanced cancer [36], it is necessary to gain a better understanding of how 
mindfulness is applied to this population, and whether or not it is effective. It 
thus seems timely to answer calls to consider different stages of cancer in 
future research [36], by reviewing the existing evidence for mindfulness-based 
therapies in palliative cancer.  
 
This review will aim to synthesise current research in this area, to evaluate 
the use of mindfulness-based therapies (i.e. how and where they are 
implemented, and in what form), alongside their effectiveness, for a palliative 
cancer population.  
 
Methods 
 
Searching 
A thorough search of the literature was conducted via electronic databases, 
and hand-searches of journals and reference lists. Six biomedical, life and 
behavioural sciences, mental health, and nursing electronic databases were 
identified as being appropriate for the area of research.  
 
EMBASE, MEDLINE, psycINFO, CINAHL and SCOPUS were accessed, and 
grey literature was searched via PROQUEST. Searching electronic databases 
alone is unlikely to identify all relevant literature available [37], and for this 
reason four relevant journals were hand searched: Journal of Psycho-
Oncology, Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, Journal of 
Advanced Nursing and Journal of Integrative Cancer Therapies.  
 
Search terms 
The final search terms used were:  
 
1. Mindfulness, meditat*, “mindfulness meditation,” MBCT, MBSR, MBSR-C, 
“Acceptance and Commitment Therapy” 
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2. Therap*, treatment, intervention, psych*, training, practice, practise 
 
3. Cancer, oncology, tumo#r, neoplasm 
 
4. Dying, terminal, palliative, “stage 4,” “stage four,” “stage IV,” “grade d,” “end 
of life,” metasta*, incurable, advanced 
 
(NB: See Appendix II for a visual representation of these search terms.) 
 
The Boolean operator OR was used between each separate word or phrase, 
and AND was used to include all four strings of words in each search. Limits 
were set to only include English language and a human, adult population. 
These limits were decided on the basis of a) readability, and b) evidence of 
large differences between adult, adolescent, and childhood cancers, both 
biologically, i.e. disease site and aggression, and in terms of impact and 
survival rate [38].  
  
Search terms were decided by considering what would be necessary to 
answer the research question, and after reviewing keywords in existing 
literature on cancer, psychological interventions, and mindfulness.  
 
Neoplasm and tumo#r were added to the search terms following a pilot 
search, which helped to highlight keywords and medical subject (MeSH) 
headings commonly used in studies using a cancer population. Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) was also included after the pilot search, in 
order to capture any studies that used mindfulness, but described its use as 
an ACT intervention.  
 
Selection  
Filtering took place in three phases, each time reducing the number of papers 
to be included at different stages. 322 papers were initially identified, and six 
were included in the final review. A visual representation of this searching and 
filtering process is displayed in Figure 5 below. 
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Databases searched and articles identified 
 
(Embase, Medline, PsychINFO, CINAHL, Scopus, Proquest and Journals) 
 
N=322 
Duplicates identified & removed  
n=113  
Remaining articles identified for title/abstract 
review 
n = 209 
Phase One: 
A. Books, book chapters, 
reviews, discussions, meta-
analyses etc. 
B. Not cancer patients or 
palliative population 
C. Irrelevant subject matter 
D. No mention of 
psychological/psychosocial 
intervention/mindfulness 
n=167 
 
Articles accessed in full copy  
    n=42  
Phase Two 
A. Study design not 
quantitative 
B. Mindfulness 
components not 
defined 
C. Other form of 
meditation 
D. Paper 
unavailable 
      n=22 
Full text articles considered for inclusion 
    n= 20 
Hand Search 
 
Articles identified for 
abstract review (n=19) 
 
Articles suitable for full 
text review (n=1) 
 
 
 
Phase Three 
A. Palliative 
patients not 
separable in 
results (6) 
B. Sample not 
palliative (7) 
C. Author did not 
respond (2) 
      n=15 
 
Articles included in review 
       n=6 
Figure 5: A Quorum diagram outlining the filtering process 
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Inclusion criteria 
Inclusion criteria were kept as broad as possible, given that using a palliative 
population was likely to lead to lower numbers of articles [35] (as discussed 
above). For this reason, no time limit was placed on the searches, and all 
types of cancer were included, provided there was an adult, palliative 
population, of any age (above 18), gender or race. For this review, palliative is 
taken to be interchangeable with any other word in search string four, i.e. it 
refers to patients whose cancer is incurable and will result in loss of life. There 
also needed to be reference made to mindfulness-based therapy mentioned 
at phase one, matching any of the search terms in search string one, or 
similar alternatives. At phase two, the properties of the mindfulness therapies 
were more extensively scrutinised (see below).  
  
Exclusion criteria 
Exclusion criteria will be outlined by phase, so as to elucidate the filtering 
process. 
 
Phase one - Studies were excluded on the basis of non-adult populations, 
and non-English write-ups, as explained above. Only primary research was 
considered for this review, and other forms of material (e.g. book chapters, 
magazine articles, previous reviews) were excluded on this basis. Primary 
research involves detailed reporting of both results and methodology, 
therefore enabling the question as to the effectiveness of mindfulness 
interventions to be answered.  
 
Given the inclusion criteria, any articles that were not about the subject of a 
mindfulness therapy, a cancer population, or, those that were explicitly not 
palliative (e.g. early stage cancer, patients in remission, or ‘survivors’) were 
excluded, as they were not relevant to the research question.  
 
Phase two – Studies which were not quantitative were excluded. Qualitative 
studies do not necessarily intend to produce generalisable findings [43], 
whereas this review aims to synthesise findings across different papers in 
order to contribute to discussion on the rationale and evidence for 
mindfulness-based therapies in palliative cancer care. As demonstrated by 
the hierarchy of evidence [44], quantitative studies are more commonly used 
than qualitative studies to inform healthcare interventions, and were therefore 
selected because of their capacity to directly impact upon development within 
palliative cancer care.     
 
Studies were excluded if their intervention was not within the context of the 
key concepts of mindfulness, e.g. moment-to-moment, non-judgemental 
awareness. For example, studies which had been selected due to containing 
meditation were later excluded if they were not underpinned by mindfulness 
principles. These principles could be discussed within the background of a 
study, or described explicitly to participants in the study - either was taken to 
mean that the article referred to the version of mindfulness defined and  
 
 
  
181 
propagated by Kabat-Zinn [1], and the quality of the intervention would then 
be assessed within this review. Similarly, other types of meditation, e.g. 
transcendental meditation, were also excluded as they are not mindfulness-
based.   
  
Several papers from the grey literature database could not be retrieved, and 
were also excluded at this stage. 
 
Phase three – Studies were excluded at this stage if palliative patients were 
included as part of a wider sample, but their results were not reported 
separately, or subjected to statistical analysis (n=6). This was in order to 
ensure that any reported findings were attributable and relevant to the 
palliative subject group. Four further studies transpired not to have palliative 
samples, e.g. had defined cancer as ‘advanced,’ but had integrated stage III 
and IV results on closer inspection. One further study may have been relevant 
for final inclusion in the review, but the full-text article could not be retrieved 
and the author could not be contacted [45].  
 
Two study protocols were identified for proposed RCTs, but were not included 
within the final articles as the lack of results would not help to answer the 
question of effectiveness [32,41].  
 
Minimising bias 
There is a bias in research towards studies which report positive findings, and 
they also have an increased likelihood of being selected for publishing [46]. 
Therefore, an attempt to minimise bias was made by conducting a search of 
the grey literature and reading unpublished studies. However, bias is 
acknowledged in only including results published in the English language, 
which may restrict findings from other countries and cultures, and present 
further bias considering that positive findings are more likely to be reported in 
English language journals [46]. Furthermore, only one researcher coded and 
filtered the articles included in this review, rather than two, as recommended 
[47].  
 
Data extraction 
A coding framework was used to obtain relevant information from the six 
remaining studies, to help inform thinking about the effectiveness and use of 
interventions. The components of this framework can be seen in the table 
headings in Tables 8-10 (see appendices). Evaluating the methodological 
quality of studies is fundamental when considering their findings, and a 
quantitative quality assessment tool, the Effective Public Health Practice 
Project, (EPHPP) [48] was used to aid this process. The EPHPP has high 
content and construct validity, and was developed for use in evaluating public 
health initiatives and interventions.  
  
Results 
 
The search initially identified 322 papers, of which 113 were duplicates and 
were removed. 209 papers were therefore identified for abstract review, and 
following filtering, 42 of these were identified in full text for review. 20 of these  
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papers were considered for inclusion, and hand searching of their reference 
lists identified a further six further papers for full-text review. One further RCT 
[40] was identified here, whose six-month follow-up paper had already been 
reviewed [26]. Both are included, as they have slightly differing authors and, 
despite their content mostly overlapping, one is more detailed overall*. Of 
these 20 papers, a further 15 were excluded, and six papers are therefore 
included in the final review [26,28,35,39,40,42]. 
 
*Papers [40,26] have been combined in the results tables (see appendices), 
and will be referred to in the write up as one study [26], for continuity. 
 
The remaining papers comprised three randomised controlled trials (RCTs) 
and two single group, pretest-postest designs. All studies used quantitative 
methods, but only two [26,42] did not also incorporate a qualitative element, 
either through focus groups or semi-structured interviews, to gauge 
participants’ opinions and responses following the intervention. Quality ratings 
were allocated to each study using an assessment tool, to help to assess 
methodological robustness, though interpretation and quality assessment will 
not be limited to these scores (Appendix A, Table 9). Results are presented in 
Tables 8-10 (see appendix A), separated into study characteristics and key 
findings, methodological properties, and intervention characteristics. A 
narrative synthesis of the findings is provided below. 
 
i. Study characteristics 
 
Only two studies were conducted longer than a decade ago [26], with the 
remaining four taking place between the years 2007-2012.   
 
Participants 
Only one study [26] recruited a palliative sample from within a wider cancer 
sample, where the palliative sub-population comprised 21% of overall 
participants. There were 215 participants in total across all studies, of whom 
60% were female and 40% were male. The mean age of participants ranged 
from 52-72.4, with a total mean of 64 years old. Only one study provided 
ethnicity statistics, within which the majority of participants were Caucasian 
(82%) and the remainder were African American (18%) [35]. The education 
level overall was high, except for in Hong Kong, where 81% of participants 
had education equal to or below primary school level [42]. Three studies had 
speaking English as an inclusion criterion [39,35,28], and the same three also 
specified that participants could not have a psychiatric disorder. There was a 
wide range of countries represented, spanning four continents, with no two 
studies taking place in the same country. 
 
The most common cancer was breast, reflecting the higher number of women 
in the studies. Two studies included mixed cancer sites [26,42], one solely 
included metastatic breast [35], one solely prostate [39], and one included 
metastasised breast and prostate [28]. Terms used to refer to the stage of 
participants’ cancer differed between studies, with only two studies using the 
same term, ‘metastatic’ [28,35], and the others using ‘stage 4’ [26], ‘advanced’ 
[39] and ‘terminal’ [42].  
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Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) 
Of the three RCTs, two had waiting-list control groups [26,28] (the 
interventions were delivered to controls at 7 weeks and 6 weeks respectively), 
and one had a no treatment control group [42]. Descriptions of the 
randomisation process briefly mentioned fixed randomisation using a number 
table [26], randomisation by balloting [42], and one did not report the method 
used [28]. All three RCTs were unblinded, and none reported a position of 
equipoise. Some participants were given information to use if they wished to 
increase their knowledge of mindfulness [26], and another reported that some 
participants actively participated in extra palliative activities, such as 
psychotherapy, at the hospital [42]. All three studies took baseline measures 
and demographic information from participants prior to the randomisation 
process, and one matched participants in the two groups on socio-
demographic variables [28]. 
 
Cohort studies 
Two studies [35,39] were quasi-experimental because participants were not 
randomly assigned to a group. Rather, there was only one group in each 
study, no control, and measures were taken before and after participants took 
part in mindfulness interventions, and again at follow-up. One study attempted 
to reduce bias by ensuring that quantitative analysis was carried out by 
researchers who were independent of the intervention [39]. Three studies 
were pilots [35,39,28], i.e. aimed to assess the feasibility of mindfulness 
interventions for specific populations, and Carson et al. [35] declared there 
were no a priori hypotheses, accordingly.  
 
Attrition rates, follow-ups, and recruitment 
A pattern can be seen across all six studies, whereby the longer the follow-up, 
the higher the attrition rate. For example, a study with a one-month follow-up 
reported an attrition rate that was then calculated to be 20% [42], whereas at 
six months, there was an attrition rate of 47% [26]. The study with the lowest 
attrition rate also had the highest number of initial participants (n=60).  
 
Four studies had follow-ups, and the average length was 3.5 months. Of 
these, only one could not report reasons for attrition because the follow-up 
was a paper-based measure sent through the post. The most common 
reasons stated for participants dropping out were death or illness (n=22), 
which accounted for 10% of the total participants in all studies. It is fair to 
assume these numbers could be higher, as further numbers were given but 
not separated by reason [28], and also given the 9 participants whose 
reasons for dropping out were unknown [26]. The only study to financially 
reward participants each time they completed measures [35], was also the 
only study to have retained all participants post-intervention.   
 
Recruitment methods were divided. All participants were recruited from 
oncology clinics, either within hospitals or specialist cancer centres, and all 
were outpatients. Two studies used a mixture of self-selection, whereby 
posters, flyers and leaflets were used to advertise the study, alongside 
referrals from oncologists or clinical staff [26,28]. Otherwise, oncology or 
urology staff were used to identify appropriate patients and in this sense acted 
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as clinical gatekeepers; although the criteria by which they selected suitable 
patients is unreported. The two highest attrition rates (47%, 46%) were from 
studies that had used self-selection to recruit participants [26,28].   
 
ii. Use of mindfulness interventions 
 
MBSR 
Two studies reported MBSR interventions [26,42], though there was large 
variation in their deliveries. One was a group intervention with seven, weekly, 
90-minute sessions including many mindfulness components, and home 
practice (suggested amount not specified) [26]. By comparison, the other did 
not involve a group or face-to-face contact time, relying on participants to 
practice at home using a body scan meditation CD for 45 minutes per day. 
These participants also received weekly telephone calls to encourage them to 
practice, and had initial body scan meditation training for 90 minutes, 
delivered by a trainer.  
 
MBCT 
One study reported an MBCT intervention [39], which shared many 
components of the MBSR intervention [26], but lasted for 30 minutes longer 
each week and was one week longer in duration. The studies differed in their 
aims however, as the MBSR intervention had looked for the impact of MBSR 
on mood disturbance and symptoms of stress; whereas MBCT was being 
piloted to assess its feasibility [39]. The MBCT intervention had been adapted 
for a cancer population and its elements reflected this, e.g. including the topic 
of adjustment to progressive illness. A detailed programme structure was 
outlined, which was not reported in the MBSR studies. 
 
Other 
Two simplified interventions were found. One intervention was a Yoga of 
Awareness Programme (YAP) [35] and one described itself as a brief 
wellbeing intervention [28]. The YAP intervention included similar stretching, 
education and mindfulness components to those in the MBSR [26] and MBCT 
[39] interventions. The brief wellbeing intervention (BWI) [28] only required 
participants to practice body scan meditation from a CD for 20 minutes per 
day, and to keep a diary.   
 
iii. Effectiveness 
 
Carlson et al. [26,40] reported that an MBSR intervention for 19 palliative 
patients led to significant reductions in physiological and psychological 
symptoms of stress, and a decrease in mood disturbance. These 
improvements were best predicted by attendance rate and were sustained at 
six month follow-up, for the low number of palliative patients who completed 
the follow-up measures (n=10). Multiple regressions revealed no effects of 
age, cancer stage or cancer duration on any measures. Surprisingly, later 
stage of cancer predicted lower initial mood disturbance, whereas being 
female and educated was an initial predictor of higher stress. Higher 
educational level and high initial mood disturbance predicted the largest 
improvements on stress symptoms. The study also found the most 
improvement on anxiety, anger, and depressive subscales, rather than on 
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those for physiological symptoms of stress such as heart rate or muscle 
tension. A dose-response effect was found, as the amount of home practice 
predicted pre-post improvement in mood. 
 
Carson et al. [35] reported positive findings from a pilot study using a Yoga of 
Awareness Programme, which had a small sample (n=13), no control group 
and no follow-up. However, despite low statistical power, there were 
statistically significant increases in ratings of daily invigoration and 
acceptance, and trends for lower pain and higher relaxation. A dose-response 
effect was again found, between the amount of practice and improved levels 
of pain, invigoration, and acceptance. These effects were also sustained the 
next day. Uniquely, the baseline measures of the sample and those who 
dropped out prior to starting the intervention were compared, and revealed 
that dropouts had lower levels of fatigue. Post-intervention focus group 
findings indicate that women found being in the company of other women with 
metastatic breast cancer very valuable. Mindfulness groups were declared 
feasible for this population, with further evidence and more studies needed. 
 
Chambers et al. [39] found significant changes in both psychological and 
cancer-specific distress, as demonstrated by changes in levels of avoidance, 
anxiety, and mindfulness skills from baseline to post-intervention, and at three 
month follow-up. They reported moderate to large effect sizes, with the largest 
for avoidance. There was no effect found for quality of life or physical 
functioning. Meditation and moment-to-moment awareness were rated as the 
most helpful aspects of the intervention, and again participants found it useful 
to be part of a group of patient peers. Over half of patients were still practicing 
mindfulness at follow-up, and one third reported having daily awareness. The 
intervention was declared to have utility and effectiveness for cancer patients.  
 
Ramachandra et al. [28] concluded that a brief wellbeing intervention was 
feasible and acceptable to patients with cancer. There was significant 
improvement in quality of life, and improvement in post-intervention anxiety 
and depression scores, though these were not significant. There was no 
change in overall functioning. Participants interestingly cited that their 
motivation to participate had been due to gratitude and altruism, rather than 
for personal gain. There were gender differences in daily compliance rates, 
where 73% women recorded daily positive activities compared to 67% of 
men. This reversed for use of the body scan CD, where 59% women 
compared to 61% men reported daily use. 
 
Tsang et al. [42] reported that terminal cancer patients had baseline scores 
on the Short Form Health Survey (SF-36) that were only 37-42% of those of a 
population without cancer, suggesting that their physical and mental health 
was well below average at the start of the study. There was no difference in 
baseline scores between the control and intervention groups however, despite 
having cancer in different sites. Body scan meditation (BSM) had no effect on 
physical function, physical role functioning or general health perceptions. 
BSM did however, have significant effects on scores of vitality, social 
functioning, mental health, and overall mental component scores. These 
effects were only significant after one month of practice, and not at one week 
post-intervention. There was no duration reported for the study, though it was 
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suggested that effects of BSM could continue to increase up to six months if 
practice was maintained.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Effectiveness 
There is evidence for the effectiveness of mindfulness interventions on 
psychological outcomes. Studies consistently reported improvements in 
anxiety and depression rated on standardised measures with high validity and 
reliability, e.g. HADS [26,28,39]. Although one study reported significant 
effects on physical measures [26], these were found to be less significant 
than effects on the psychological aspects of anger and depression. Two 
further studies found no effect of MBSR or MBCT on physical functioning 
[39,42], though given the population had advanced cancer this is perhaps 
unsurprising. However, the perception of physical pain is perhaps shown to 
have shifted, as participants reported lower levels of pain [35,42]. Although 
the physical reasons for their pain are unlikely to have changed, the influence 
of cognitive processes upon subjective levels of pain is well-established in 
healthcare literature [49], and has also been demonstrated by the success of 
mindfulness-based interventions at lessening chronic pain [9,16].  
 
Relating to theory 
A dose-response relationship was reported in three studies [26,35,42], 
between the time spent practicing meditation and the strength of its impact on 
many variables, such as mood, mental health, pain, and acceptance. This has 
implications for future interventions, and practice should be encouraged. That 
the ongoing practice of meditation should continue to foster improvements is 
in line with Shapiro’s theory that mindfulness facilitates and accelerates the 
process of reperceiving, i.e. shifting perspective and becoming able to 
observe events rather than to become embedded within them [7]. The theory 
that this shift could be achieved through the mechanisms of intention, attitude, 
and attention finds support in several of the studies in this review. 
 
 A later stage of cancer predicted a lower level of mood disturbance before 
intervention, despite patients facing the end of life. If they have supposedly 
overcome existential anxiety, this may have been due to an increased degree 
of acceptance of their situations. Acceptance is a component of mindfulness 
found in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy [6], which refers to a 
willingness to experience unpleasant thoughts and feelings; much like 
Shapiro’s axiom of ‘attitude.’ Furthermore, ACT posits that avoidance of 
unpleasant experiences is the opposite of acceptance, and levels of 
avoidance were shown to decrease following an MBCT intervention [39]. 
Belonging to a group was very positive for participants, and it could be that 
interacting with other people in similar conditions helped to increase 
acceptance, and to foster a common attitude towards their illnesses, thus 
moving participants towards reperceiving.  
 
Methodological issues 
Studies were mixed in methodological quality. The generalisability of results 
may have been compromised by small sample sizes, a lack of control groups, 
and the influence of extraneous variables on participants, e.g. participation in 
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other psychotherapeutic interventions [42]. Where participants were self-
selected, they may have been motivated and not necessarily representative of 
a wider population. Contrastingly, the heterogeneity of participant groups in 
terms of cancer site and stage was beneficial, therefore demonstrating that 
groups do not necessarily need to be homogenous and tightly controlled in 
order to be effective. There was a lack of reporting of negative findings, both 
in the initial papers identified for review and within the papers themselves, 
which suggests reporting bias is present. Many papers were excluded on the 
basis of not including, or not distinguishing a palliative sample. This selection 
bias demonstrates that palliative patients remain under-represented in cancer 
research [35], and researchers may deliberately exclude them from studies to 
insure that they do not diminish effect sizes, as they are likely to show less 
change than participants who can recover [42]. Furthermore, participants 
were entirely older adults, excluding those who face the end of life at a young 
age from intervention. 
 
Intervention use 
Interventions were variable in their deliveries of MBSR. There was a lack of 
reporting about MBSR and MBCT facilitators, who are required to practice 
ongoing mindfulness and have access to supervision; which was only 
reported in one study [39]. One intervention only required participants to listen 
to a body scan meditation CD at home, rather than engaging them in the 
group-based format [42]. No interventions included a full day’s meditation, as 
recommended, but contact time was not necessarily indicative of better 
results, in line with previous findings [50]. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
separate the impact that group membership and social interaction might have 
had from the content of the mindfulness intervention and meditative practice 
itself. Results from larger, more inclusive MBSR or MBCT interventions could 
not differentiate between mindfulness components to establish which are the 
most effective. However, the more simplistic interventions which reported 
significant results [28,42] could be helpful in this endeavour. Both utilised 
body scan meditation and found improvements on several factors already 
discussed. In order to ascertain whether body scan meditation is sufficient to 
deliver maximum effectiveness, or whether including other components is 
necessary, further research is needed. Similarly, to continue exploring which 
active components have the most use and effectiveness for a given 
population, calls for dismantling studies are supported [7].  
 
Overall, there was a high rate of attrition, which worsened as study length 
increased, and this was lowest in the study with the shortest follow-up time 
and fewest measures. This may imply that there is an optimum length of time 
between one and two months for mindfulness interventions with a palliative 
population; particularly as results showed mindfulness to be very effective 
when practiced outside of formal sessions, away from the demands of contact 
time. Follow-up times varied from one to six months, and although the most 
common reason for attrition was death or illness, it is likely that due to the 
physical demands of palliative illness, participants are also combatting 
cancer-related fatigue [26,35], which may contribute to attrition. Therefore, 
interventions need to be further adapted to suit the palliative population by 
placing fewer demands on their time. Furthermore, studies which utilised 
technology to deliver mindfulness interventions, and did not require contact 
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time, found reduced pain ratings and increased quality of life, vitality, mental 
health and social functioning [28,42]. Adapted interventions could also prove 
more time-efficient for both patients and healthcare staff, and may be more 
cost-effective. These could include increased use of technology [39], shorter 
measures and less time face-to-face, depending on participant preference. 
Continued research into the best adaptations of interventions for this 
population is therefore recommended, in order to maximise their access to 
appropriate psychological support, in line with NICE guidelines [34].   
  
Limitations 
This review is limited in that it has assessed the quality of studies based upon 
their write-ups, which may or may not be of high quality. Furthermore, it only 
included English language papers, and used only one rater to determine the 
quality of studies selected. 
 
Summary 
The results of mindfulness-based interventions in palliative cancer care are 
promising, although cannot be taken to show causality or generalisability due 
to methodological limitations. Congruent with the findings of previous reviews 
[2,36], there are no conclusive findings for the effectiveness of mindfulness on 
quality of life, despite evidence for its impact on psychological and affective 
domains. The palliative cancer population remains under-represented and 
under-researched, but overall mindfulness interventions could be both useful 
and effective, provided future interventions are adapted to reflect the unique 
needs of this group.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A. Results Tables 
 
Table 8. Study characteristics and key findings 
 
First author, year, 
location & reference 
number 
Overall sample 
size (N) and 
number of 
terminal 
patients (n) 
Participant 
demographics 
Intervention Main findings 
Carlson et al.* (2001) 
[26, 40] 
 
 
Canada 
 
 
N=89  
 
n=19 
 
m=17, f=72.   
 
Mixed sites & stages 
 
Mean age=52 
MBSR 
 
Significant reduction in mood and stress scores pre to post, and post to 
follow-up. Less mood disturbance (p<0.001) and reduction in stress 
symptoms (p<0.001) compared to controls. Effects were sustained over 
time (6 months). 
 
Time spent practicing meditation predicted change in rated mood 
disturbance (p<0.03), but level of attendance did not. Average daily 
practice was 32 minutes. Number of sessions attended predicted change in 
stress symptoms (p<0.05).  
 
Cancer stage predictive of lower mood disturbance at baseline; later stage 
cancer predicted lower total mood disturbance (p<0.02). Dropouts had 
significantly higher levels of anxiety, fatigue and total mood disturbance 
(p<0.05). 
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Carson et al. (2007) 
[35] 
 
USA 
N=13 
 
n=13  
 
f=13 
 
Metastatic breast 
 
Mean age=59 
YAP  Significant improvements in daily invigoration (p<0.01) and acceptance 
(p<0.02). 
 
Increased practice time predicted lower pain the next day (p<0.01), and 
also the day after (p=0.03). 
 
No significant differences in the demographics of completers and drop-
outs, but completers had higher levels of fatigue (M=46.92) compared to 
drop-outs (M=26.15), and lower levels of relaxation (M=45.21) compared to 
drop-outs (M=63.16), at baseline.  
Chambers et al. 
(2012)  
[39] 
 
Australia 
N=19 
 
n=19 
 
m=19 
 
Prostate 
 
Mean age=67 
 
MBCT Changes in psychological and cancer-specific distress demonstrated by 
significant differences between baseline and follow-up scores for anxiety 
(p=0.0027) and avoidance (p=0.032).  
 
There was no significant effect on quality of life was found. There was 
increased mindfulness over time, and a trend for increased observation and 
decreased reactivity to inner experience. 
Ramachandra et al. 
(2009) 
[28] 
 
UK 
N=46 
 
n=46 
 
 
m=24, f=22 
 
Metastatic breast 
Metastatic prostate 
 
Mean age=72.4 
 
BWI Rated quality of life significantly improved (p=0.046), which was also 
reflected in qualitative interviews. 
 
Anxiety and depression scores improved, but the change was not 
significant (p=0.088). There was no change in overall functioning.  
 
Compliance rates were reported: 71% reported daily in diaries, and 60% 
did the meditation at least once per day. 
 
Qualitative findings 
Participants reported the diary helped them to notice positive events, but 
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that both recording in the diary and the CD was repetitive. The CD was 
reportedly too basic; participants wanted increased length and complexity.  
 
Tsang et al. (2012) 
[42] 
 
Hong Kong 
N=60 
 
n=60 
 
m=26, f=22 
 
Mixed sites 
 
Mean age =71.4 
MBSR Physical effects 
Practicing BSM significantly reduced pain after one week (p=0.00), and 
lower pain was related to increased overall physical health scores, 
compared to control. Effect on pain was greater after one month of 
continuous practice (p=0.000).  
 
Mental effects 
Practicing body scan meditation (BSM) significantly improved vitality, social 
function, mental health and overall mental component score (p=0.000). 
Effects only reached statistical significance after one month of continuous 
practice.  
 
 
*Denotes 6-month follow-up of an RCT [ref] also included in the final review, but not included in the tabulated data to avoid replication. 
 
Abbreviations. MBSR, Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction; YAP, Yoga of Awareness Programme; MBCT, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy; BWI, Brief Wellbeing Intervention. 
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Table 9. Methodological properties 
 
Study Overall sample size, 
sampling technique 
& representativeness 
rating (R1-R3) 
n at post and 
follow-up 
Follow-up 
length 
Attrition rate & 
reasons 
Study design  Standardised 
measures & 
frequencies 
Randomisation 
(R),  
Control (C), 
Blinding (B), 
Partial blinding 
(PB) 
Quality  
rating 
 
Carlson et al. 
(2001)  
[26,40] 
 
 
 
N=89 
 
Self-selected and 
purposive 
 
R3 
 
n=19 
 
Post, n=19 
 
Follow-up, 
n=10 
6 months Follow-up = 47% 
 
Reasons stated 
as unknown  
 
RCT- waiting list 
control 
 
 
 
i. POMS 
SOSI 
B, P, F 
 
 
ii. Record of amount of 
home practice (mins) 
B, P 
 
R 
C 
- 
- 
 
M 
Carson et al. 
(2007)  
[35] 
N=13 
 
Purposive 
 
R2 
n=13 
 
Post, n=13 
 
- - Pilot study 
 
Single group, 
pretest-posttest 
design, with 
repeated 
measures 
 
 
i. Diary ratings using 
visual analogue scales 
B, D, P 
 
ii. Focus group & 
bespoke questionnaire 
(not specified) 
P 
 
- 
- 
- 
M 
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Chambers et al. 
(2012)  
[39] 
N=19 
 
Self-selected and 
purposive 
 
R3 
n=19 
 
Follow-up, 
n=12 
 
3 months Post = 37% 
 
Death (n=2), 
withdrawal (n=1), 
not reported (n=4) 
Pilot study 
 
Single group, 
pretest-posttest 
design, with 
repeated 
measures 
  
 
 
HADS 
IES-R 
MAX-PC 
EPIC 
FACT-P 
FFMQ 
B, P, F 
 
Qualitative questions 
(method not stated) 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
P 
 
- 
- 
- 
PB 
W 
Ramachandra 
et al. (2009) 
[28] 
N=46 
 
Purposive 
 
R2 
n=46 
 
Post, n=27 
 
Follow-up, 
n=25 
 
3 months & 
4.5 months 
Post = 41% 
 
Follow-up = 46% 
 
Death (n=7), 
illness, other 
commitments and 
disengagement 
(n=14) 
Feasibility study 
 
RCT –waiting list 
control 
LOT-R 
TIPI 
B 
 
SOFAS 
WHO QOL-BREF 
Semi-structured interview 
B, F 
 
Wellbeing diary 
D 
 
R 
C 
- 
- 
W 
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Tsang et al. 
(2012)  
[42] 
N=60 
 
Purposive  
 
R2 
n=60 
 
post, n=48 
 
1 month Post = 20% 
 
Death, admission 
to hospital (n=12) 
RCT – no 
treatment control 
 
 
SF-36 
B, P, F 
 
R 
C 
- 
- 
M 
 
Note: 1. Overall sample size & representativeness rating: N=Overall population, n=population with terminal cancer. R1=very likely 
(participants randomly selected from a list of individuals in the target population), R2=somewhat likely (referred from a source in a systematic 
manner), R3=not likely (self-referred), 4=can’t tell. 2. Standardised outcome measures and frequencies: B = baseline, P = post, F = 
follow-up, D = daily. 3. Quality Rating: S = Strong, M = Moderate, W =Weak.  
  
Abbreviations: POMS, Profile of Mood states; SOSI, Symptoms of Stress Inventory; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; IES-R, 
The Revised Impact of Events Scale; MAX-PC, Memorial Anxiety Scale for Prostate Cancer; EPIC, The Expanded UCLA Prostate Cancer 
Index; FACT-P, The Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy -Prostate; FFMQ, The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; WHO QOL-
BREF, WHO Quality of Life Scale, SOFAS, Social and Occupational Functioning Assessment Scale; LOT-R, Life Orientation Test; TIPI, Ten-
Item Personality Inventory; SF-36, Short Form (36) Health Survey. 
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Table 10. Interventions 
 
Study Intervention characteristics 
 
 
Duration and 
intervention 
type  
Daily 
recommended 
practice 
(minutes) & any 
aids 
Follow-up 
length & 
method 
Facilitators  Uncontrolled variables 
Carlson et al. 
(2001)  
[26,40] 
 
 
 
 
MBSR 
 
Weekly, 90 minute sessions 
 
Cancer clinic 
 
o Weekly 
psychoeducation/guided 
discussion about theory 
o Body scan 
o Breathing 
o Guided meditation 
o Yoga poses 
o Group discussion of 
any intervention challenges 
o Home-based practice  
 
7 weeks 
 
G, I 
Not stated 
 
Booklet covering 
weekly topics and 
audiotape of 
relaxation and 
guided meditation 
6 months 
 
M 
No information on 
facilitation/trainers 
Extra practice and information 
was facilitated (e.g. a bibliography 
was provided), but not controlled 
for 
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Carson et al. (2007)  
[35] 
Yoga of Awareness Programme 
 
Weekly, 120 minute sessions 
 
Breast oncology unit 
 
o Gentle yoga postures 
o Breathing exercises 
o Meditation 
o Guided discussion 
about theory  
o Group discussion of 
any intervention challenges 
o Home-based practice 
 
8 weeks 
 
G, I 
10 mins per day 
 
CD and illustrated 
handbook 
 
Applications to 
daily living were 
assigned each 
week, e.g. 
acceptance during 
intervals of pain 
- Each group jointly 
led by same yoga 
teacher & health 
psychologist  
 
Manual to provide 
facilitators with 
session guidelines 
 
Sessions recorded 
and reviewed by 
treatment team 
Some participants had practiced 
meditation before 
 
 
Chambers et al. 
(2012)  
[39] 
MBCT  
 
Weekly, 120 minute sessions 
 
Urban and regional cancer 
centres 
 
o Psychoeducation 
o Body scan 
o Stretching and walking 
o Breathing 
o Meditation 
Group process 
Semi-structured interview at 8 
8 weeks 
 
G, I 
35 mins 
 
Handbook 
covering weekly 
topics and 
meditation CD 
3 months 
 
Ms 
Psychologists, 
trained in MBCT, 
who also had 
supervision 
 
Manual to provide 
facilitators with 
session guidelines 
 
Optional extra 4-hour meditation 
session conducted at week 6 
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weeks 
 
Ramachandra et al. 
(2009) 
[28] 
Brief, self-administered 
wellbeing intervention 
 
Oncology clinic (for briefing and 
interviews) 
 
o Record 3 positive 
experiences per day 
o Mindfulness CD (body 
scan) 
o Planning pleasurable 
activities 
 
6 weeks 
 
I 
20 mins 
 
Record diary, CD 
3 months & 
4.5 months 
 
Ms & INT 
(at home 
or 
telephone) 
-  
Tsang et al. (2012) 
[42] 
MBSR 
 
90 min training in body scan 
meditation 
 
o Home-based practice 
o Weekly telephone call 
 
Duration not 
reported 
 
I 
45 mins, 5 days 
per week, using 
soundtrack CD 
1 month 
 
M 
 
Trainer with audio 
soundtrack of body 
scan 
Participants had differing 
participation in other palliative 
activities at day centre, e.g. 
groups or psychotherapy 
 
Note. 1. Duration & Intervention Type: G=group, I=individual therapy. Follow-up length & Method: M(s) = Measure(s) re-administered at 
follow-up, INT = Semi-structured interview.    
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    Appendix B. Database search terms 
 
 
